Swan v. Florida Farm Bureau Ins. Co., s. 80-1358

• Decision Date: 07 October 1981
• Docket Number: Nos. 80-1358,80-1359,s. 80-1358
• Citation: 404 So.2d 802
• Parties: James W. SWAN, Appellant, v. FLORIDA FARM BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 802

404 So.2d 802

James W. SWAN, Appellant, v. FLORIDA FARM BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.

Nos. 80-1358, 80-1359.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Oct. 7, 1981.

Arthur G. Leonhardt, Jr., of Leonhardt, Trickel, Leigh, Gibson & Martin, Orlando, for appellant.

Janet R. DeLaura of Smalbein, Eubank, Johnson, Rosier & Bussey, P.A., Rockledge, for appellee.

ORFINGER, Judge.

In this action brought for damages under a policy of fire insurance, the jury returned a verdict for defendant. Appellant, plaintiff below, challenges the final judgment entered on the jury verdict, and also questions the cost judgment subsequently entered against him.

Appellant's pharmacy was destroyed by fire and he brought suit against appellee to recover the proceeds of a fire insurance policy issued to him by appellee. Liability was denied on the asserted ground that appellant had either deliberately burned the premises or had caused them to be burned. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in permitting appellee to introduce evidence tending to show that appellant was under investigation for narcotics violation just prior to the fire; that a preliminary search of his records had been made and that the investigating officers had advised appellant that they would be back to make a more detailed search. Appellee contends that the evidence is relevant as tending to show a motive for the fire, i.e., the destruction of the records, which evidence, coupled with evidence that the appellant urgently requested a large increase in his fire insurance coverage two days before the fire, and expert evidence that the fire was deliberately set, supports its defense of arson. Additionally, appellee says that the issue of admissibility of this evidence was not preserved for appeal because no objections to it were offered at the trial.

Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion in limine requesting that the appellee be prohibited "from mentioning, testifying, arguing, or otherwise bringing to the attention of the jury, either directly or indirectly, any mention or reference ... to any charges of narcotics laws violations of plaintiff," contending that any such evidence would deny appellant due process, violate the rules of evidence and would be extremely prejudicial. The motion was denied. ¹ At trial, substantial evidence was introduced to show appellant's involvement in alleged narcotics laws violations, the search of his records and the announcement by the officers that they intended to return to make a more thorough search. All this evidence was introduced at trial without objection.

Appellee's contention is correct that no issue as to admissibility of this evidence was preserved for appeal because of the failure of appellant to object to its introduction at trial. Appellant contends that the motion in limine, overruled by the trial court, eliminates the need to object at trial. This precise issue as it applies to civil cases appears not to have been addressed by any appellate court in Florida.

The rule requiring a contemporaneous objection at trial to the introduction of allegedly inadmissible testimony is firmly established in criminal law. In Crespo v. State, 379 So.2d 191 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), cert. denied, 388 So.2d 1111 (Fla. 1981), the appellant's motion in limine was denied prior to trial, and appellant did not object at trial to the introduction of testimony initially sought to be excluded. The court concluded...