Swaney v. Crawley
| Citation | 191 N.W. 583,154 Minn. 263 |
| Decision Date | 12 January 1923 |
| Docket Number | 23,201 |
| Parties | D. L. SWANEY AND ANOTHER v. J. S. CRAWLEY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
After the former appeal the case was tried before Dean, J., who when plaintiffs rested granted defendant's motion to dismiss the action on the ground that no cause of action had been proved. From an order denying their motion for a new trial, plaintiffs appealed. Reversed.
When question is for jury error to direct verdict.
The evidence was sufficient to entitle plaintiffs to have the issues made by the pleadings submitted to the jury, and it was error to direct a verdict in defendant's favor.
Allen & Allen, for appellants.
F. B Faber and Haycraft & McCune, for respondent.
This case was here before. The facts are fully stated in the opinion delivered on the former appeal. See 133 Minn. 57, 157 N.W. 910. On that appeal the order denying a new trial was reversed, unless, within ten days after the cause was remanded, plaintiffs filed their consent to a reduction of the verdict to $100. Such consent was not filed. The second trial was by jury. When plaintiff rested, the court dismissed the case on the ground that no cause of action had been proven. A motion for a new trial was denied and plaintiffs appealed.
Before the second trial, the complaint was amended by adding an allegation that plaintiffs were required to pay interest at the rate of 8 per cent on the second mortgage of $4,000, and that it was the custom of money lenders to exact interest at that rate when the security was a second mortgage. In support of this allegation, one of the plaintiffs testified that, in the vicinity of the premises in question, the customary interest charge on loans secured by a second mortgage was 8 per cent at the time when the $4,000 mortgage was given. He also testified that, although the mortgage as written bore interest at the rate of 6 per cent, plaintiffs had to pay a bonus of $400 to the mortgagee in order to obtain the loan and that they got the loan as cheaply as they could. There was proof of the contract between plaintiffs and Dowdall, to which reference was made in the opinion heretofore rendered. The sole question presented is whether the proofs were such that plaintiffs were entitled to go to the jury on either or both of the two items sought to be recovered, namely $100 for services and $400, representing the difference between interest on...
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