Sweat v. Rogers
| Decision Date | 30 September 1871 |
| Citation | 53 Tenn. 117 |
| Parties | William Sweat v. William A. Rogers. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
FROM UNION.
Appeal in error from the judgment of the Circuit Court, February Term, 1869. JAMES P. SWANN, J.W. P. WASHBURN and HENRY R. GIBSON for Plaintiff in Error.
M. S. HALL, GRATZ & MEEK, and J. R. COCKE, for Defendant in Error.
This is an action of trespass on the case commenced in the Circuit Court of Union county in February, 1861, by Rogers, in which he claims $6,000 as damages for the burning and robbing of his storehouse and goods by two slaves belonging to Sweat. There are three counts in the declaration. The first two allege that the slaves were of bad character for stealing and pilfering, and that Sweat, being their owner, was cognizant of their vicious character and habits, and allowed them to go abroad, and did not prevent them from practicing their stealing propensities, and therefore that he is responsible for the damages. The third count alleges that the slaves, with the knowledge, indulgence, permission, allowance, and instigation of Rogers, set fire to the store-house of Sweat, by which the house and many of the goods, wares, etc., therein were consumed, and that those chattels in the house not so consumed the said slaves did steal, take, and carry away to the damage of the said Rogers, $6,000.
The defendant pleads not guilty, and, upon a trial, the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for $6,000. Motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were overruled, and defendant appealed in error to this court.
The motion in arrest of judgment was properly overruled. The affidavits for a new trial were not sufficient, and the reasons in arrest of judgment were not well taken. We hold that the first two counts do not contain the necessary allegations to make the defendant liable for the trespass and felonies of his slaves: Wright v. Weatherly, 7 Yerg., 369; but the allegation in the third count, that the burning and stealing by the slaves were with the knowledge, indulgence, permission, allowance, and instigation of defendant, was sufficient, and therefore the motion in arrest of judgment was properly overruled.
It does not appear from the bill of exceptions that it contains all the evidence in the case. We are bound, therefore, to presume that the verdict was supported by the evidence. But this will not cure errors in the admission or rejection of evidence which was material to the issue, nor errors of law in the charge of the court, which we can see might have misled them in rendering their verdict.
Many such errors are relied on for a reversal, but we deem it unnecessary to notice all of them.
1. It appears from the bill of exceptions that the court allowed the declarations of the two slaves, charged with the burning and stealing, as well as of other slaves of defendant, made after the house was burned and the goods stolen, to be given in evidence against the objections of the defendant. It is insisted that it was error to admit these declarations until there was other evidence showing, or tending to show, the existence of a conspiracy between defendant and the said slaves to commit the trespass. It is certainly the better practice to require at least a prima facie case of conspiracy to be made out before such evidence is admitted; but this is a matter within the discretion of the court below, and, unless we should clearly see that his discretion had been abused to the injury of the defendant, we could not hold it to be a reversible error. We find that the Judge instructed the jury that, if the evidence did not satisfy them of the existence of the conspiracy, they should disregard the declaration of the slaves objected to. The next objection to these declarations of the slaves is, that they were made after the burning of the house and the stealing of the goods, and therefore that they were not competent evidence even upon the hypothesis that there was a conspiracy. The conspiracy charged in the declaration is, that the two slaves, at the instigation of defendant, did set fire to the store-house, and did steal, take, and carry away the goods not consumed by the fire. The common...
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State v. Walker
...84 Tenn. 1 (1885). (Tenn.1958). The earliest and most complete reference to the law as it existed in that time is found in Sweat v. Rogers, 53 Tenn. 117, 120 (1871). The conspiracy charged in that case was that two (2) persons, at the instigation of the defendant, set fire to a storehouse, ......
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Clements v. Veterans Cab Co.
...v. Anderson, 59 Tenn. 40; Jackson Ins. Co. v. Sturges, 59 Tenn. 339; Tomeny v. German Nat. Bank, 56 Tenn. 493; [48 TENNAPP 156] Sweat v. Rogers, 53 Tenn. 117; Heatherly v. Bridges, 48 Tenn. 220; Massengill v. Shadden, 48 Tenn. 357; Hix v. Cornelison, 47 Tenn. 299; Woods v. State, 47 Tenn. 3......
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State v. Gaylor
...time the statement was made, the declaration is not admissible under the hearsay exception. Owens v. State, 84 Tenn. 1 (1885); Sweat v. Rogers, 53 Tenn. 117 (1871). As to Miller's initial testimony, the conversations he described appear to have taken place at the beginning of the conspiracy......
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State v. Henry
...at a subsequent period, and are therefore merely narrative of past occurrences, they are, as we have just seen, to be rejected. 53 Tenn. 117, 120 (1871) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see Snowden v. State, 66 Tenn. 482 (1874) ("[W]hen the common purpose is at an end, whether by accomp......