Sweatt v. Department of Corrections

• Decision Date: 13 May 2003
• Docket Number: Docket No. 120220, Calendar No. 12.
• Citation: 468 Mich. 172,661 N.W.2d 201
• Parties: Ronald G. SWEATT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

661 N.W.2d 201

468 Mich. 172

Ronald G. SWEATT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 120220, Calendar No. 12.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued November 20, 2002.

Decided May 13, 2003.

Kelman, Loria, Will, Harvey, & Thompson (by James P. Harvey), Detroit, MI, for the plaintiff-appellee.

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Ray W. Cardew, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and Gerald M. Marcinkoski, Special Assistant Attorney General, Birmingham, MI, for the defendant-appellant.

Libner, VanLeuven, Evans, Portenga & Slater, P.C. (by John A. Braden), Muskegon, MI, in support of the plaintiff, amicus curiae.

Opinion

MARKMAN, J.

We granted leave to appeal in this case to consider whether defendant must pay plaintiff differential worker's compensation benefits, i.e., partial-disability benefits, under subsection 361(1) of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), M.C.L. § 418.101 et seq., where defendant, by law, cannot rehire plaintiff because of plaintiff's "commission of a crime." The worker's compensation magistrate concluded that the fact that plaintiff is no longer able to work for defendant as a result of plaintiff's "commission of a crime" does not relieve defendant of its responsibility to pay plaintiff differential benefits. The Worker's Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In our judgment, although defendant must pay a percentage of the difference between what plaintiff was earning while working for defendant and what plaintiff was earning at the time of the hearing (plaintiff's loss of wage-earning capacity) to the extent that this difference is attributable to plaintiff's work-related injury, defendant is not required to pay a percentage of the difference that is attributable to plaintiff's "commission of a crime."

We conclude that the language of M.C.L. § 418.361(1) makes clear that the Legislature intended that employees no longer be able to receive worker's compensation benefits for a loss of wage-earning capacity that is attributable to an employee's "imprisonment or commission of a crime."¹ The dissent fails, in our judgment, to give effect to this intent, and would allow benefits to be paid to employees because of a loss of wage-earning capacity attributable to "imprisonment or commission of a crime." We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the magistrate to determine to what extent, if any, plaintiff's loss of wage-earning capacity is attributable to his work-related injury and to what extent, if any, plaintiff's loss of wage-earning capacity is attributable to his "commission of a crime."

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1986, plaintiff began working for defendant as a corrections officer. In 1989, plaintiff injured his knee when he intervened in a fight between prisoners. Defendant voluntarily paid worker's compensation benefits to plaintiff because it had a policy of not rehiring anybody who was not one hundred percent fit for duty.² In 1995, plaintiff was convicted of delivery of heroin, a felony, and, as a result, was imprisoned. Once plaintiff was convicted and imprisoned, defendant stopped paying benefits to plaintiff. Also in 1995, defendant discontinued its policy of not rehiring anybody who was not one hundred percent fit for duty and began offering favored work to which plaintiff would have been eligible if he were not imprisoned. Defendant took part in a work-release program while he was imprisoned.

In 1996, M.C.L. § 791.205a became effective, which forbids defendant from hiring and subsequently employing persons who have been convicted of a felony. Also in 1996, plaintiff was paroled. It is undisputed that plaintiff continues to have a work-related injury. In 1998, plaintiff began working for Pressure Vessel, Inc., earning less than he had while working for defendant.

Plaintiff petitioned for differential worker's compensation benefits. Defendant denied plaintiff's request on the basis that it was not required to pay plaintiff differential benefits because plaintiff was convicted of a felony and M.C.L. § 791.205a(1) precludes the department from hiring someone convicted of a felony and M.C.L. § 418.361(1) relieves it of its responsibility to pay differential benefits to an employee who is unable to work for defendant because of the "commission of a crime."

The magistrate concluded that defendant is required to pay plaintiff differential benefits and the fact that defendant is precluded from rehiring plaintiff does not at all relieve defendant of this requirement. In a four-to-three decision, the WCAC affirmed. The majority concluded that, in order for it to be relieved of its responsibility to pay plaintiff differential benefits, the department must prove, and it had not, that, were it not for the statutory prohibition on hiring an ex-felon, it would have made an offer of reasonable employment to plaintiff.³ The dissenting commissioners disagreed, stating that the majority erred in placing "an artificially-created burden on defendant to prove it would have done the very thing the ex-felon statute prohibits defendant from doing, namely, offering employment to an ex-felon...."

In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed. While the concurring opinion author concluded that the WCAC reached the right result for the right reasons, the lead opinion writer concluded that the WCAC reached the right result for the wrong reasons. Specifically, the lead opinion writer concluded that defendant was not relieved of its responsibility for paying plaintiff differential benefits because plaintiff was not "unable to perform or obtain work" as the result of the "commission of a crime," M.C.L. § 418.361(1), as evidenced by the fact that plaintiff was working at the time of the hearing. The dissenting judge, on the other hand, concluded that because plaintiff was unable to work for defendant because of the "commission of a crime," defendant was relieved of its responsibility to pay plaintiff any differential benefits.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether defendant must pay differential benefits to plaintiff under M.C.L. § 418.361(1) is a question of statutory interpretation. Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law that are reviewed de novo by this Court. Robertson v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 465 Mich. 732, 739, 641 N.W.2d 567 (2002).

III. ANALYSIS

That defendant cannot employ plaintiff because of his "commission of a crime" is undisputed. MCL 791.205a(1) provides:

Beginning on the effective date of this section, an individual who has been convicted of a felony, or who is subject to any pending felony charges, shall not be employed or appointed to a position in the department [of corrections].

Plaintiff has been convicted of a felony; thus, defendant cannot reemploy plaintiff. A part of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), M.C.L. § 418.361(1), provides:

While the incapacity for work resulting from a personal injury is partial, the employer shall pay, or cause to be paid to the injured employee weekly compensation equal to 80% of the difference between the injured employee's after-tax average weekly wage before the personal injury and the after-tax average weekly wage which the injured employee is able to earn after the personal injury, but not more than the maximum weekly rate of compensation, as determined under section 355. Compensation shall be paid for the duration of the disability. However, an employer shall not be liable for compensation under section 351, 371(1), or this subsection for such periods of time that the employee is unable to obtain or perform work because of imprisonment or commission of a crime. [Emphasis added.]

This provision is known as the differential worker's compensation or partial-disability provision. Under this provision, an employer must pay an employee a percentage of the difference between what the employee was earning while working for the employer before the employee was injured and what the employee is able to earn after the work-related injury. However, the employer is not liable to the employee to the extent that "the employee is unable to obtain or perform work because of imprisonment or commission of a crime."

Defendant argues that it does not have to pay plaintiff anything because plaintiff is "unable to obtain or perform work" with defendant because of plaintiff's "commission of a crime." Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that defendant must pay plaintiff the total difference between what plaintiff was earning while working for defendant and what plaintiff was earning at the time of the hearing because plaintiff was not "unable to obtain or perform work" as evidenced by the fact that plaintiff was, in fact, working at the time of the hearing.

The language "unable to obtain or perform work" does not stand alone, and thus it cannot be read in a vacuum. Instead, "[i]t exists and must be read in context with the entire act, and the words and phrases used there must be assigned such meanings as are in harmony with the whole of the statute, construed in the light of history and common sense." Arrowhead Dev. Co. v. Livingston Co. Rd. Comm., 413 Mich. 505, 516, 322 N.W.2d 702 (1982).⁴ When interpreting a statute, we must "consider both the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase as well as `its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.'" Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward, 460 Mich. 230, 237, 596 N.W.2d 119 (1999) (citation omitted). "Contextual understanding of statutes is generally grounded in the doctrine of noscitur a sociis: `it is known from its associates,' see Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.), p. 1060. This doctrine stands for the principle [of interpretation] that a word or phrase is given meaning by its context or setting." Tyler v. Livonia Pub. Schools, 459 Mich. 382, 390-391, 590 N.W.2d 560 (1999). Although a phrase or a statement may mean...