Sweatt v. Norman, 0307
| Citation | 322 S.E.2d 478,283 S.C. 443 |
| Decision Date | 25 September 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 0307,0307 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of South Carolina |
| Parties | Michelle D. SWEATT, Respondent, v. G. Worth NORMAN, Jr., Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Janet Faye Norman, Appellants. . Heard |
Marvin C. Tyndall and Louis D. Nettles, Florence, for appellants.
George M. Hearn, Jr. and J. Jackson Thomas, both of Stevens, Stevens, Thomas, Hearn & Hearn, Myrtle Beach, for respondent.
Michelle D. Sweatt (plaintiff) brought this personal injury action against G. Worth Norman, Jr. (defendant Norman) individually and as executor of the estate of his daughter, Janet Faye Norman (intestate Norman). Plaintiff was seriously injured when the vehicle she was driving collided head-on with a vehicle being driven by intestate Norman on the wrong side of a four-lane divided highway west of Myrtle Beach, S.C. The case was tried and the jury rendered a verdict for plaintiff for $1.5 million. We affirm.
At issue are whether (1) the evidence was sufficient to submit to the jury plaintiff's contention that the ownership and use of intestate Norman's automobile brought it within the purview of the family purpose doctrine, (2) the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, (3) the verdict was so excessive as to indicate caprice, passion, and prejudice by the jury, (4) the trial judge erred by admitting, over objection, two pictures of plaintiff taken by her doctors prior to surgery and (5) the trial judge erred in charging Section 56-5-2930, South Carolina Code of Laws (1976), which deals with driving an automobile while under the influence.
We first address the question of the family purpose doctrine; under this doctrine, where the head of a family owns, furnishes and maintains a vehicle for the general use, pleasure and convenience of a family, he is liable for the negligence of a member of the family having general authority to drive it while the vehicle is being so used. Lucht v. Youngblood, 266 S.C. 127, 221 S.E.2d 854 (1976). We assume the trial judge properly instructed the jury as to the law; the charge is not of record, as later noted herein.
Defendant Norman moved for a nonsuit, a directed verdict and judgment n.o.v. on the basis that the evidence failed to establish the applicability of the family purpose doctrine.
The record reveals that (1) intestate Norman was driving, at the time of the accident, a 1979 Camaro automobile, which had been purchased by her father, defendant Norman, from Scott Motor Company in North Carolina, (2) the car had not been titled, (3) defendant Norman had traded in a Mustang of his own as the down payment for the Camaro, (4) defendant Norman admitted the Mustang which he traded in was a family purpose automobile, (5) defendant Norman financed the balance of the purchase price of the Camaro by signing a sales contract, purchasing life insurance on his own life and buying collision insurance in his own name, (6) the Mustang license plate in the name of defendant Norman was on the Camaro at the time of the wreck, (7) after the wreck defendant Norman attempted to have the Camaro added to his own automobile liability policy and requested as much of his liability insurance agent, (8) intestate Norman, although at the time was staying at the beach, listed her parent's home in Nichols, South Carolina, as her home address on her last income tax return and also on her drivers license, and (9) intestate Norman had worked for her father at his restaurant in Marion, South Carolina on the evening of the night of the wreck, which occurred at about 4:00 a.m.
The rule is that on motion for nonsuit, directed verdict, judgment n.o.v. and new trial, the evidence and all reasonable inferences which are to be drawn from it must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and if there is any testimony tending to prove the allegations of the complaint, the motions must be refused. This rule is especially strong in South Carolina where the "scintilla of evidence rule" is applicable. In view of this rule and the above-summarized testimony, this court finds that the learned trial judge properly overruled the motions relating to the inapplicability of the family purpose doctrine, and we so hold. Melton v. Williams, 281 S.C. 182, 314 S.E.2d 612 (S.C.App.1984).
Defendant Norman next asserts that the trial judge should have directed a verdict because of plaintiff's contributory negligence. We find no merit in this argument. Intestate Norman was driving on the wrong side of a four-lane highway. Whether the...
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