Sweers v. Malloy

Decision Date11 July 1967
Citation28 A.D.2d 955,281 N.Y.S.2d 693
PartiesIn the Matter of Elizabeth SWEERS, Judgment Creditor, Respondent, v. Sam E. MALLOY et al., Judgment Debtors, Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, Appellant. In the Matter of Lily Mae SWEERS, Judgment Creditor, Respondent, v. Sam E. MALLOY et al., Judgment Debtors, Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, Appellant.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

James T. Viger, Troy (Robert J. Armstrong, Troy, of counsel), for petitioner-respondent.

Bouck & Holloway, Albany (Francis J. Holloway, Albany, of counsel), for appellants.

Before GIBSON, P.J., and HERLIHY, REYNOLDS, AULISI and STALEY, JJ.

STALEY, Justice.

Appeals by MVAIC from orders and judgments of the Supreme Court, Rensselaer County, entered on March 8, 1967 in proceedings pursuant to section 610 of the Insurance Law which direct the appellant to pay the sum of $10,781 to each of the petitioners.

On November 23, 1963, the petitioners, Elizabeth Sweers and Lily Mae Sweers, were crossing Fifth Avenue in the City of Troy when they were struck and injured by an automobile owned by Sam E. Malloy, and operated by Archie L. Wooten. Personal injury actions were commenced in Rensselaer County Supreme Court on behalf of both of the petitioners with service of the summons upon both the owner and operator of the vehicle.

The attorney for Royal Globe Insurance Company returned the summonses to George Barkley, the individual--whether agent or broker--through whom the policy was written, with a letter advising that the policy of insurance issued by Royal Indemnity Company (apparently a subsidiary of Royal Globe Insurance Companies) was terminated on November 18, 1963, and that there was no coverage for Mr. Malloy on November 23, 1963.

Notice was thereafter given to MVAIC which appeared and defended the actions on behalf of the defendants. The trial resulted in a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, the petitioners herein.

Sam E. Malloy had obtained the automobile liability insurance in question through Barkley, as hereinbefore indicated, in the month of June, 1963, and was issued Policy No. RDR 15 22 02 by the Royal Indemnity Company under the assigned risk plan upon his entering into a premium finance agreement wherein Barkley was named as payee. By the terms of the agreement, Barkley undertook to pay the insurance premium on behalf of the assured, Malloy. The premium finance agreement was then assigned by Barkley to Prepaid Premiums, Inc. Malloy made the installment payments to Prepaid for July, August and September, but failed to pay the installment due October 25, 1963. A cancellation notice was sent to Malloy by Prepaid on November 4, 1963, terminating the policy as of November 18, 1963. Shortly before November 18, 1963 a notice of termination was sent by Prepaid to the Royal Indemnity Company.

The appellant contends that the attempted cancellation by Prepaid Premiums, Inc. was ineffectual because the financing agreement did not extend such authority to Prepaid. The financing agreement provided, that upon failure of the Assured to pay any installment due, 'the Payee may deliver said policies to the insurance companies issuing the same for cancellation, and collect and receive all unearned premiums and dividends due under the said policies. The Assured hereby constitutes and appoints the payee, his true and lawful attorney-in-fact, irrevocably, in his name and stead and on his behalf, to cancel such insurance policy or policies, any or all, as the case may be, and to do all the things necessary to that end, and to collect any and all returned premiums or premiums on such policy or policies, and apply the same to the satisfaction, discharge and payment of such sum or sums as may be due from him to the Payee under the terms of this note, and the said insurance carrier or carriers are hereto authorized and directed, upon demand of the Payee, to cancel such policy or...

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7 cases
  • PRUDENTIAL PROP. & CAS. INS. v. Safeguard Mut. Ins.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • December 28, 1981
    ...N.C.App. 255, 168 S.E.2d 224 (1969); Hayes v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 274 N.C. 73, 161 S.E.2d 552 (1968); Sweers v. Malloy, 28 A.D.2d 955, 281 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1967); Daniels v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 258 N.C. 660, 129 S.E.2d 314 (1963); Stone v. Travellers Insurance Co., ......
  • Nassau Ins. Co. v. Newsome
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • May 11, 1976
    ...Trial Term, Part 7). That case, however, contains the following language: 'Then there appears the later case of Sweers v. Malloy, 28 A.D.2d 955, 281 N.Y.S.2d 693 (3d Dept.) which without reference seems to distinguish the pronouncement in Teeter by permitting a finance company the right to ......
  • Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Garrett
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • December 27, 1968
    ...as it had not sent Garrett the statutorily required notice of cancellation (Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 313; see, Matter of Sweers v. Malloy, 28 A.D.2d 955, 281 N.Y.S.2d 693; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 40 Misc.2d 409, 243 N.Y.S.2d 114; Stone v. Travelers Ins. Co., 40 Misc.2d 164, 242 N.Y......
  • Anzalone v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • March 14, 1983
    ...has the right to cancel the policy it has financed but only if the right is contained in the finance agreement (Matter of Sweers v. Malloy, 28 A.D.2d 955, 281 N.Y.S.2d 693). On this record--and in the absence of any denial from Steed or any contrary evidence (see Welde v. Wolfson, 32 A.D.2d......
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