Sweet v. Perkins

• Citation: 196 N.Y. 482,90 N.E. 50
• Parties: SWEET v. PERKINS et al.
• Decision Date: 30 November 1909
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

196 N.Y. 482

90 N.E. 50

SWEET

v.PERKINS et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 30, 1909.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Action by Oscar H. Sweet against Charles H. Perkins and another. A judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Appellate Division (123 App. Div. 910,107 N. Y. Supp. 1147), and defendants appeal. Affirmed.

See, also, 115 App. Div. 784,101 N. Y. Supp. 163.

Horace McGuire, for appellants.

H. R. Durfee, for respondent.

GRAY, J.

This action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries, sustained by the plaintiff under the following circumstances: He was driving, in the evening, upon a country highway, which passed through a farm, occupied by the defendants, as the lessees of its owner. Within the limits of the highway, but some 4 feet, more or less, from the beaten track, or traveled part, the defendants had placed a quantity of muck, or manure, making a pile about 170 feet in length, about 17 feet in width, and from 4 to 5 feet in height. At this point in the highway, the plaintiff's horse became frightened by an approaching automobile, reared up, and, swerving to the side of the way, ran upon the pile of muck with the wagon. The wagon was tipped over backward, and the plaintiff was thrown out into the roadway. It is not important to consider, more particularly, the manner in which the plaintiff received his injuries. The evidence would support the verdict, which the plaintiff has recovered, upon the theory that the accident occurred as narrated by him, substantially as stated, and that he was, himself, not in fault.

There are two points, presented by the defendants upon their appeal, which, in view of a divergence in opinion below, appear to merit a brief discussion. It is argued that the defendants' pile of muck was not the proximate cause of the accident, and therefore that the complaint should have been dismissed upon their motion. Unquestionably, it was not the sole cause of the accident. The driving of the automobile and the presence of the pile of muck were two causes contributing to its occurrence, and both were, in their nature, proximate. There may be more than one proximate cause of an accident, if each of the causes asserted can be seen to have been an efficient one, without which the injury resulting would not have been sustained. If the negligent acts of two, or more, persons concur in contributing to an accident, the injured person may hold them, jointly and severally, liable. Where concurrence in causes is charged, the test is, simply, could the accident have happened without their co-operation? Ring v. City of Cohoes, 77 N. Y. 83, 33 Am. Rep. 574;Leeds v. N. Y. Tel. Co., 178 N. Y. 180, 70 N. E. 219. In the case of Hulse v. Town of Goshen, 71 App. Div. 436, 437,75 N. Y. Supp. 723, 724, which the appellants cite, where the plaintiff's horse, becoming frightened by a dog ran into a stone placed in the highway by the highway commissioners, the opinion incorrectly states the law upon this point. It is there said that: ‘The rock was not the proximate cause of the accident. It would not have resulted in injury to the plaintiff except from the fact that his horse was frightened and crowded the vehicle out of the beaten track and against this rock, just as he might have run the wagon against the fence corner if the rock had not been there.’ This observation, in the opinion, was not necessary to the decision of the case and is contrary to the rule of the decisions. Had the highway commissioners, in that case, been guilty of a neglect of their duty, in the respect complained of, their act, because co-operating would have been an efficient cause of the plaintiff's injury and would have subjected the town to a liability.

It is also argued by the appellants that their occupation of the highway, on the undisputed evidence, was reasonable and necessary, and that it was...