Sweet v. State, SC00-1509.
Decision Date | 31 January 2002 |
Docket Number | No. SC00-1509.,SC00-1509. |
Citation | 810 So.2d 854 |
Parties | William Earl SWEET, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Michael P. Reiter, Capital Collateral Counsel-Northern Region, John M. Jackson, Assistant CCRC, and Kimberly L. Sharkey, Assistant CCRC-Northern Region, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Barbara J. Yates, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellee.
William Earl Sweet appeals the trial court's denial of postconviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the trial court's order denying Sweet postconviction relief.
Sweet, who was twenty-three years old at the time of the offenses, was convicted of first-degree murder, three counts of attempted first-degree murder, and burglary. See Sweet v. State, 624 So.2d 1138, 1139 (Fla.1993)
. The facts of the crime are detailed in this Court's opinion on direct appeal.
Id. The jury recommended a sentence of death by a vote of ten to two, and the trial court followed this recommendation. See id. The trial court found four aggravators1 and no statutory mitigators, but found as a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance that Sweet "lacked true parental guidance as a teenager." Id. at 1142.2
On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Sweet's convictions and sentence of death. See id. at 1143.3 Sweet timely filed a motion for postconviction relief on August 1,1995, and filed an amended motion on June 30, 1997, raising twenty-eight claims.4 A Huff5 hearing was held on February 20, 1998. The trial court granted an evidentiary hearing, which was held from January 25 through January 28, 1999, on the following four claims: (1) trial counsel, Charlie Adams, failed to investigate and present evidence of other suspects; (2) Adams failed to present, as potentially mitigating evidence, Sweet's background history; (3) Adams failed to present background information to the mental health experts; and (4) the mental health experts conducted an inadequate evaluation. The trial court summarily denied Sweet's remaining claims. After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief on the four remaining claims. Sweet now appeals the trial court's denial of postconviction relief, raising six issues for this Court's review.6
In order to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must prove two elements:
104 S.Ct. 2052. To establish prejudice Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Ineffective assistance claims present a mixed question of law and fact which is subject to plenary review. See Stephens v. State, 748 So.2d 1028, 1032 (Fla.1999). "This requires an independent review of the trial court's legal conclusions, while giving deference to the trial court's factual findings." State v. Riechmann, 777 So.2d 342, 350 (Fla.2000). Moreover, because the "Strickland standard requires establishment of both prongs, where a defendant fails to make a showing as to one prong, it is not necessary to delve into whether he has made a showing as to the other prong." Waterhouse v. State, 792 So.2d 1176, 1182 (Fla.2001).
In Sweet's first claim, he asserts that the trial court erred in denying his ineffective assistance claim during the guilt phase with regard to Adams' failure to investigate and present evidence of other suspects and individuals who would have refuted the State witnesses' identification of Sweet as the shooter. Sweet contends that his theory of defense was that he was innocent and that the State's witnesses misidentified him as the shooter. Sweet claims that three witnesses—Dale George, Jesse Gaskins, and Anthony McNish—were available to either identify other individuals as the shooter or to establish that Sweet was not the shooter, and that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to utilize these witnesses at trial.
As to Dale George, Sweet contends that Adams rendered ineffective assistance in failing to investigate George as a suspect. George was Marcine Cofer's boyfriend, and he lived with Cofer at the time of the shooting. Sweet maintains that Adams rendered ineffective assistance in failing to investigate George as a possible suspect for several reasons. First, Adams had police reports containing several domestic violence petitions that Cofer filed against George, alleging that George had threatened to kill her and that Cofer feared for her life. Second, the evidence at trial showed that in the afternoon preceding the night of the shooting, George took the clip out of Cofer's gun. Third, evidence was presented at trial that George was involved in drug-dealing activity with Cofer, and Sweet alleges that this could have provided an alternative motive for the shooting. Fourth, the State's theory of prosecution in this case originated with George, and Sweet contends that this should have raised a red flag that a potential suspect was trying to shift the blame to another.
Although Adams' theory of defense in this case was that someone else killed the victim, Adams never put on evidence of other suspects at trial. At the evidentiary hearing, Adams admitted that evidence of other potential suspects would have been helpful. However, Adams stated that he never considered George a suspect because there was no credible reason why Cofer and her neighbor, Sharon Bryant, could not identify George if he was the shooter. Bill Salmon, who was accepted at the evidentiary hearing as an expert on capital cases, stated that the failure to investigate George as a suspect presented a "close question" as to whether Adams acted deficiently. Salmon ultimately concluded, however, that Adams should have presented George to the jury as an alternative suspect. At a minimum, Salmon concluded, Adams should have investigated and considered George before making the determination of whether George should take the stand.
In rejecting Sweet's contention that Adams rendered ineffective assistance in failing to investigate George as a potential suspect, the trial court explained:
In the defendant's second claim under this ground, he alleges that counsel failed to investigate other possible suspects who would have had a motive to kill Marcine Cofer.... The only other person that the defendant suggests had a motive to kill Cofer was Dale George. Dale George was not only Cofer's boyfriend, he lived with Cofer, and he was known to Sharon Bryant. There was no evidence presented as to why George would have had any problem getting into the home that he lived in, as did the murderer, nor why either...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Perkins v. State
...Darling v. State, 966 So.2d 366, 377 (Fla.2007), citing in turn Gudinas v. State, 816 So.2d 1095, 1106 (Fla.2002); Sweet v. State, 810 So.2d 854, 863–64 (Fla.2002)). Here, Perkins failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that counsel was ineffective for relying on experts. Accordi......
-
Lynch v. State
...to present cumulative evidence." Darling, 966 So.2d at 377 (citing Gudinas v. State, 816 So.2d 1095, 1106 (Fla.2002); Sweet v. State, 810 So.2d 854, 863-64 (Fla. 2002)). For the most part, the postconviction lay witnesses simply provided slightly more detail concerning the fact that Lynch w......
-
Hannon v. State
...See Cooper v. State, 856 So.2d 969, 977 n. 7 (Fla.2003) (rejecting similar argument as insufficient for consideration); Sweet v. State, 810 So.2d 854, 870 (Fla.2002) ("[B]ecause on appeal Sweet simply recites these claims from his postconviction motion in a sentence or two, without elaborat......
-
Saunders v. State
...to evidence presented during trial even where the postconviction evidence is more elaborate than the trial testimony. See Sweet v. State, 810 So.2d 854, 863 (Fla. 2002)." State v. Bright, 200 So.3d 710, –––– (Fla. 2016). " ‘[T]his Court has held that "even if alternate witnesses could provi......