Sweet v. State

• Decision Date: 27 February 2020
• Docket Number: No. SC19-195,SC19-195
• Citation: 293 So.3d 448
• Parties: William Earl SWEET, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

293 So.3d 448

William Earl SWEET, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. SC19-195

Supreme Court of Florida.

February 27, 2020

Eric C. Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Margaret S. Russell and Julie A. Morley, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, for Appellant

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Lisa A. Hopkins, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee

PER CURIAM.

William Earl Sweet challenges an order summarily denying his eighth successive motion to vacate the judgment of conviction and sentence of death, filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Sweet also challenges an order denying his motion to compel production of public records. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the opinion on direct appeal, we summarized the facts of the incident underlying Sweet's conviction and death sentence:

On June 6, 1990, Marcine Cofer was attacked in her apartment and beaten and robbed by three men. She could identify two of the men by their street names. On June 26, 1990, she was taken by Detective Robinson to the police station to look at pictures to attempt to identify the third assailant. When Robinson dropped Cofer off at her apartment, William Sweet was standing nearby and saw her leave the detective. Unknown to Cofer, Sweet had previously implicated himself in the robbery by telling a friend that he had committed the robbery or that he had ordered it done. Cofer asked her next-door neighbor, Mattie Bryant, to allow the neighbor's daughters, Felicia, thirteen, and Sharon, twelve, to stay with Cofer in her apartment that night. Mattie agreed, and the children went over to Cofer's apartment around 8 p.m.

At approximately 1 a.m. that evening, Sharon was watching television in the living room of Cofer's apartment when she heard a loud kick on the apartment door. She reported this to Cofer, who was sleeping in the bedroom, but because the person had apparently left, Cofer told Sharon not to worry about it and went back to sleep. Shortly thereafter, Sharon saw someone pulling on the living room screen. She awakened Cofer. The two then went to the door of the apartment, looked out the peephole, and saw Sweet standing outside. Sweet called Cofer by name and ordered her to open the door.

At Cofer's direction, Felicia pounded on the bathroom wall to get Mattie's attention in the apartment next door, and a few minutes later Mattie came over. The four then lined up at the door, with Cofer standing in the back of the group. When they opened the door to leave, Sweet got his foot in the door and forced his way into the apartment. Sweet's face was partially covered by a pair of pants. He first shot Cofer and then shot the other three people, killing Felicia. Six shots were fired. Cofer, Mattie, and Sharon were shot in the thigh, ankle and thigh, and buttock, respectively, and Felicia was shot in the hand and in the abdomen.

Sweet v. State , 624 So. 2d 1138, 1139 (Fla. 1993).

The jury found Sweet guilty of first-degree murder and recommended a sentence of death. Id. at 1139. After finding the existence of four statutory aggravating circumstances and one nonstatutory mitigating circumstance (which was assigned slight weight), the trial court sentenced Sweet to death. Id. at 1142. On direct appeal, we affirmed Sweet's conviction and death sentence. Id. at 1143.

In the twenty-five years following his direct appeal, Sweet filed numerous postconviction motions—the latest being his eighth successive motion to vacate the judgment of conviction and sentence. Along with his eighth successive motion, Sweet filed a motion to compel discovery documents from the Office of the State Attorney for the Fourth Judicial Circuit. The postconviction court summarily denied Sweet's eighth successive postconviction motion and denied his motion to compel.

In this appeal, Sweet challenges the postconviction court's order summarily denying his eighth successive motion to vacate the judgment of conviction and sentence. Sweet argues that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a newly discovered evidence claim alleging spoliation of evidence and a Brady¹ violation, and that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on several claims alleging ineffective assistance of trial and postconviction counsel.

Sweet further argues that the court erred in summarily denying a standalone actual innocence claim. Finally, Sweet challenges the denial of his motion to compel, arguing that he sufficiently alleged entitlement to the requested records. We address each of Sweet's arguments in turn, and for the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

SUMMARILY DENIED POSTCONVICTION CLAIMS

Rule 3.851(f)(5)(B) provides that a circuit court may summarily deny a successive postconviction motion if "the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief." A summary denial of a postconviction claim is subject to de novo review. Long v. State , 183 So. 3d 342, 344 (Fla. 2016) (quoting Hunter v. State , 29 So. 3d 256, 261 (Fla. 2008) ).

I. Sweet's Spoliation of Evidence / Brady Violation Claim

Sweet argues that the postconviction court erred by summarily denying his newly discovered evidence claim alleging spoliation of evidence by the State and a Brady violation.

" Brady requires the State to disclose material information within its possession or control that is favorable to the defense." Riechmann v. State , 966 So. 2d 298, 307 (Fla. 2007). To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show "(1) that favorable evidence, either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced." Dailey v. State , 283 So. 3d 782, 789 (Fla. 2019) (quoting Taylor v. State , 62 So. 3d 1101, 1114 (Fla. 2011) ); see also Turner v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1885, 1888, 198 L.Ed.2d 443 (2017) ("[T]he government violates the Constitution's Due Process Clause ‘if it withholds evidence that is favorable to the defense and material to the defendant's guilt or punishment.’ ") (quoting Smith v. Cain , 565 U.S. 73, 75, 132 S.Ct. 627, 181 L.Ed.2d 571 (2012) ).

In assessing Brady materiality and ensuing prejudice, we "review the net effect of the suppressed evidence and determine ‘whether the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’ " State v. Huggins , 788 So. 2d 238, 243 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Maharaj v. State , 778 So. 2d 944, 953 (Fla. 2000) ). Evidence that is "too little, too weak, or too distant from the main evidentiary points to meet Brady 's standards" is not material. Turner , 137 S. Ct. at 1894.

Here, Sweet's spoliation and Brady claims are based on jail records for Eric Wilridge, a purported witness to the murder. In 2017, when Sweet filed his sixth successive postconviction motion, he attached an affidavit signed by Wilridge. Wilridge swore he witnessed the shooting and could rule Sweet out as the shooter. Sweet v. State , 248 So. 3d 1060, 1065 (Fla. 2018). The State produced Wilridge's arrest and booking reports to show that Wilridge was incarcerated when he supposedly witnessed the murder. The postconviction court found that Wilridge was not a credible witness and this Court affirmed. Id.

Now, in his instant eighth successive postconviction motion, Sweet alleges that his collateral counsel recently obtained copies of Wilridge's arrest and booking reports from the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office (JSO) and the Duval County Public Records Database (CORE), in hopes of proving that Wilridge was not incarcerated and therefore could have seen the shooting. According to Sweet, the reports obtained from CORE and JSO differ in certain respects from the supposedly same documents that were previously produced by the State during discovery for Sweet's sixth successive postconviction claim. Sweet argues:

Since the documents produced by the State, which were admitted into evidence based on the business records exception to the hearsay rule, markedly differ from what is available in CORE and what was produced by [JSO], there was a grave possibility of a Brady violation, spoliation of evidence, and withholding evidence favorable to Mr. Sweet.

We hold that the postconviction court did not err in summarily denying this claim. Even assuming Sweet sufficiently alleged evidence that was favorable to the defense and suppressed by the State, he failed to describe evidence that is material to his guilt or punishment. In previous postconviction proceedings, Sweet argued that the trial court erred in admitting Wilridge's arrest report and in finding that Wilridge was not a credible witness. Sweet , 248 So. 3d at 1065. In affirming the denial of relief as to these arguments, we noted that "[t]he trial court's determination of Wilridge's credibility did not rest on the admission of the arrest record," id. at 1066, but on the fact that Wilridge kept changing his story about what he supposedly saw. Id. at 1067-68.²

As the determination of Wilridge's credibility was based on inconsistencies in his accounts, not on whether he was incarcerated, any discrepancy in Wilridge's jail records is simply too little and too weak to be material under Brady standards. See Huggins , 788 So. 2d at 243. Likewise, as the admission or exclusion of Wilridge's jail records would not even affect the finding as to that one witness's credibility, the purported evidence cannot reasonably be taken to put Sweet's whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. See id. at 243. Accordingly, we hold that Sweet's Brady allegations are meritless and therefore affirm the summary denial of his Brady claim.

As to Sweet's spoliation of evidence allegations, the effect of the State's failure to satisfy its discovery obligations "is [the same...