Sweet v. Swangel
Decision Date | 08 April 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 53217,53217 |
Citation | 166 N.W.2d 776 |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Parties | Craig E. SWEET, Appellee, v. Warren L. SWANGEL and Millie Swangel, d/b/a Gilbert Motel, Appellants. |
Gilbert, Stoddard & Anderson, Oskaloosa, for appellants.
Fisher & Pickens, Cedar Rapids, and Tomasek & Vogel, Grinnell, for appellee.
Plaintiff was injured when a chair on which he was sitting in his motel room collapsed. His petition seeking to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in the fall contained two counts. The first alleged specific acts of negligence. The second count sought to recover under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff on the res ipsa loquitur count.
As all three of appellant's assigned errors relate to the submission of the res ipsa loquitur count, the sole issue before us here is whether this doctrine is applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
On January 14, 1965, plaintiff was in the construction and home improvement business and he and three of his employees were working at Deep River in Poweshiek County. Because of bad weather, plaintiff and his men, instead of returning home to Cedar Rapids, obtained a room at the Gilbert Motel in Montezuma. After showering the four men decided to play cards.
One of the two beds in the room was used as a table and three of the men sat on the bed. Plaintiff, who weighed about 225 pounds, sat on a straight chair which he brought over to the bed from a writing desk in the room. He noticed the chair, which was about the same height as the bed, was a little wobbly but because there was nothing else to sit on he used it.
Very soon after plaintiff sat down and during the first hand of a game of hearts, the chair suddenly collapsed and plaintiff was thrown to the floor and was injured. There were no intoxicating liquors in the room and neither plaintiff nor any of the other men had been drinking.
Defendants purchased the Gilbert Motel on January 1, 1961, and continued to operate it through the date of plaintiff's accident. They took over the buildings and equipment which were in the motel at the time they purchased it, including the chair which collapsed under plaintiff. Defendants determined whether repairs were needed by the appearance of the furniture as they dusted and cleaned the rooms. During the four years they operated the motel they repaired one or two chairs a year. Defendant, Warren Swangel, stated it is possible he had repaired the chair used by plaintiff by gluing it.
Raymond Eckhart, a man who has been in the furniture repair business for 47 years, examined the remains of the chair and testified an attempt had been made to mend it without taking it apart and without any pressure being applied to pull the joints together. Mr. Eckhart stated the chair which he inspected would not have been safe for a man weighing over 200 pounds to sit on. He pointed out the chair is of the type used as a dinette chair in many homes and is a good chair if kept firm. He further testified it was substantial but he could not say it was an exceptionally good chair. It would not stand a lot of heavy use.
There was other evidence tending to prove specific charges of negligence to which we will not refer as the applicability of res ipsa loquitur is to be determined from common experience alone and not from the evidence tending to prove a negligent act in the particular case. Smith v. Ullerich, 259 Iowa 797, 804, 145 N.W.2d 1, 5; Shinofield v. Curtis, 245 Iowa 1352, 1360--1361, 66 N.W.2d 465, 470, 50 A.L.R.2d 964, 972.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to be applied sparingly, DeMoss v. Darwin T. Lynner Construction Co., Iowa, 159 N.W.2d 463, 466, and only when it is shown the instrumentality causing the injury was under the exclusive control and management of the defendant when the negligent act occurred; and the accident was one that would not, in the ordinary course of events, happen without negligence on the part of the one having such exclusive control. Id. Iowa, 159 N.W.2d at 465; Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Association, Iowa, 152 N.W.2d 293, 296; Smith v. Ullerich, 259 Iowa 797, 804, 145 N.W.2d 1, 5; Eaves v. City of Ottumwa, 240 Iowa 956, 969, 38 N.W.2d 761, 769, 11 A.L.R.2d 1164, 1176.
Where, as here, defendant's exclusive control did not continue to the time of injury, plaintiff must also prove by a preponderance of the evidence there was no change in the condition of the instrumentality after it left defendant's control which could reasonably have caused the injury. Thompson v. Burke Engineering Sales Co., 252 Iowa 146, 151, 106 N.W.2d 351, 353, 84 A.L.R.2d 689.
Plaintiff must also eliminate his own conduct as a cause of the injury. 'One of the essential elements to the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that the injury is caused without the fault of the injured party.' Lamb v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 180 Kan. 157, 300 P.2d 387, 393; 65 A C.J.S. Negligence § 220.13, pp. 565--567; Prosser, Law of Torts at 228--229 (3d Ed.1964). The rule should not be confused with the problem of the contributory negligence. Simmons v. F. W. Woolworth Company, 163 Cal.App.2d 709, 329 P.2d 999, 1002; 65 A C.J.S. Negligence § 220.13, p. 567. He may meet this burden by showing he has done nothing abnormal with the instrumentality causing the injury and has used it in the manner and for the purpose for which it was intended. Southern Arizona York Refrigeration Co. v. Bush Mfg. Co., 331 F.2d 1, 7--8 (9 Cir.1964); Dennis v. Carolina Pines Bowling Center, 248 Cal.App.2d 369, 56 Cal.Rptr. 453, 454, 457; Bornstein v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 26 N.J. 263, 139 A.2d 404, 410.
Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 Calif.L.Rev. 183, 202.
Plaintiff testified:
On cross-examination he testified: ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Wiles v. Myerly
...152 N.W.2d 293, 295--296; DeMoss v. Darwin T. Lynner Construction Co., 159 N.W.2d 463, 465--468 (Iowa 1968); Sweet v. Swangel, 166 N.W.2d 776, 778--779 (Iowa 1969); Pastour v. Kolb Hardware Inc., 173 N.W.2d 116, 125 (Iowa 1969); Wilson v. Paul, 176 N.W.2d 807, 809--811 (Iowa 1970); Fischer,......
-
Palleson v. Jewell Co-op. Elevator
...have caused the event resulting in the injury. Pastour v. Kolb Hardware, Inc., 173 N.W.2d 116, 125 (Iowa 1969); Sweet v. Swangel, 166 N.W.2d 776, 778 (Iowa 1969); Thompson v. Burke Engineering Sales Co., supra, 252 Iowa at 149--50, 106 N.W.2d at In this case the jury could have found the fo......
-
McGuire v. Davidson Mfg. Corp.
...could reasonably have caused the injury"; and (4) "the injury [was] caused without the fault of the injured party." Sweet v. Swangel, 166 N.W.2d 776, 778 (Iowa 1969) (citations and internal quotation marks A plaintiff could "eliminate his own conduct as a cause of the injury" by proving, "b......
-
Wheeler v. Corner
...Accord: Gow v. Multnomah Hotel, Inc., supra.12 Nownes v. Hillside Lounge, Inc., a Corporation, 179 Neb. 157, 137 N.W.2d 361; Sweet v. Swangel, Iowa, 166 N.W.2d 776; Gow v. Multnomah Hotel, Inc., supra, and cases cited therein and notes 8 and 10.13 See notes 1, 2 and 3.14 Schroeder v. Donlin......