Sweets v. State, 01-91.
Decision Date | 13 December 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 01-91.,01-91. |
Citation | 36 P.3d 1130,2001 WY 126 |
Parties | Michael Wayne SWEETS, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Michael Wayne Sweets, pro se, Representing Appellant.
Hoke MacMillan, Wyoming Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General, Representing Appellee.
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
[¶ 1] Appellant Michael Wayne Sweets filed a pro se motion for presentence incarceration credit of one year and three months. At the time of his second conviction, Sweets was incarcerated for a conviction of indecent liberties with a minor, and for a period of time his second sentence ran concurrently with the first. As the district court determined, the period of confinement for his first conviction is not presentence incarceration as defined by this Court, entitling Sweets to presentence credit against his second sentence. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying the motion.
[¶ 2] The parties present the following issue for review:
Did the trial court properly deny Appellant's motion for credit for presentence incarceration?
[¶ 3] On January 6, 1998, Sweets sold marijuana to a confidential informant working for the Southwest Wyoming Drug Enforcement Team. In August of 1998, Sweets was convicted for indecent liberties with a minor and began serving a sentence at the Wyoming State Penitentiary. On May 26, 2000, an Information was filed charging Sweets with one count of delivery of a controlled substance, marijuana, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii). Sweets was transported from the Wyoming State Penitentiary to the Sweetwater County jail and incarcerated there while he awaited trial on the drug delivery charge. On July 6, 2000, Sweets pled guilty to the drug delivery charge and was sentenced to a stipulated two to five years to be served concurrently with the sentence for the indecent liberties conviction. At the sentencing hearing, Sweets claimed that part of the plea agreement was a credit of thirty-one days, and the trial court awarded that amount against the second sentence. The record does not tell us what the thirty-one days relates to, but presumably it is the period of time that Sweets spent in jail before receiving his second sentence. The trial court also explained to Sweets that, although his sentences ran concurrently, the second conviction might extend his incarceration after he has served out his sentence on the first conviction.
[¶ 4] On March 19, 2001, Sweets filed a motion for credit for presentence incarceration in the district court stating that he had been confined for a period of one year and three months, and Renfro v. State, 785 P.2d 491 (Wyo.1990), stated that "credit will be automatically granted for presentence incarceration time on all sentences." From these unclear statements, the trial court determined Sweets was requesting presentence credit for the period served on "an unrelated charge," and denied the motion. This timely appeal followed.
[¶ 6] Under this definition, Sweets' incarceration for the time period that he served on the earlier unrelated conviction for indecent liberties with a minor is not presentence confinement. Sweets was confined because of the earlier sentence and is not entitled to presentence confinement credit when his confinement was not because of inability to post bond on the drug delivery charge, but because he was incarcerated to continue serving his sentence on his prior conviction. That confinement would have continued regardless of his ability to post bond and, therefore, Sweets is not entitled to any presentence credit. Smith v. State, 932 P.2d 1281, 1282 (Wyo.1997).
[¶ 7] Sweets' receipt of thirty-one days presentence credit at the time of his sentence for the second conviction is not contrary to the law. It is within the trial court's discretion to grant or deny credit for time served in presentence detention if (1) the detention is not due to the defendant's indigency, and (2) the sum of the time spent in presentence detention plus the sentence given upon conviction does not exceed the maximum allowable sentence. Hedge v. State, 696 P.2d 51, 52 (Wyo.1985). In this case, it appears that at the time of sentencing the district court determined that Sweets believed that this credit was part of his plea agreement, and it was within the sentencing court's discretion to award it. Having granted some credit not required by law, however, does not entitle Sweets to any other credit.
[¶ 8] We also consider whether Sweets is entitled to any relief under applicable rules. If Sweets' motion is considered a motion to correct an illegal sentence or reduce a sentence, W.R.Cr.P. 35 is invoked:
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