Swenson v. Stidham
Decision Date | 07 December 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 71-224,71-224 |
Citation | 34 L.Ed.2d 431,409 U.S. 224,93 S.Ct. 359 |
Parties | Harold R. SWENSON, Warden, Petitioner, v. James William STIDHAM |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
See 410 U.S. 904, 93 S.Ct. 955.
During respondent's trial for murder he challenged the voluntariness of his confession. A full evidentiary hearing was held outside the jury's presence, following which the trial court held the confession admissible. After affirmance of respondent's conviction on appeal, respondent sought state post-conviction relief. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the denial of respondent's motion to vacate, and an evidentiary hearing was held by the St. Louis Circuit Court on the voluntariness issue. That court concluded that the trial judge himself had found the confession voluntary and thus complied with Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, and held additionally that respondent had been given a new evidentiary hearing by the St. Louis court and that his confession had again been found to be voluntary. Respondent then sought federal habeas corpus. The District Court determined that Jackson v. Denno had been satisfied. The Court of Appeals, concluding that the trial judge, as permitted by then-prevailing state law, had not made the voluntariness finding himself but had submitted the issue to the jury, reversed and held that respondent was entitled to a new hearing. Held: The trial court's Jackson v. Denno error, if any, was remedied by the constitutionally adequate evidentiary hearing given respondent on the voluntariness issue by the St. Louis court, which the Missouri Supreme Court upheld after concluding from its independent examination of the record that the confession was voluntary. The Court of Appeals therefore erred in holding that respondent was entitled to still another voluntariness hearing in the state court. Pp. 228—231.
443 F.2d 1327, reversed and remanded.
Kenneth M. Romines, Thayer, Mo., for petitioner.
Mark M. Hennelly, St. Louis, Mo., for respondent.
This case has a long and tortured history and is not yet concluded. At this juncture the question is whether, absent further state court proceedings to determine the voluntariness of his confession, respondent's 1955 conviction for murder is vulnerable to attack under the Fourteenth Amendment as construed and applied in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964).
In July 1955, respondent Stidham was convicted of first-degree murder of a fellow inmate during a riot. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. He was represented by experienced counsel who challenged his confession when it was offered at trial. A full evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury was held. Stidham's testimony as to the relevant circumstances surrounding his confession was in sharp conflict with that of the officers. His claim was that he had been subjected to gross physical abuse; the officers denied the claim. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge admitted the confession with the following ruling:
Stidham's conviction was affirmed on appeal in State v. Stidham, 305 S.W.2d 7 (Mo.1957). A motion to vacate was denied and the denial affirmed, 403 S.W.2d 616 (Mo.1966). On a second motion to vacate, however, the Missouri Supreme Court ordered an evidentiary hearing in accordance with its newly revised post-conviction procedures. State v. Stidham, 415 S.W.2d 297 (1967). Among the issues to be heard and decided was whether Stidham's conviction was infirm under Jackson v. Denno and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In compliance with this order, an evidentiary hearing was held on December 5, 1968, before Judge Godfrey in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis. The court heard oral testimony from both Stidham and witnesses offered by the State; it also had before it the transcript of the prior proceedings as well as certain stipulations of fact by the parties. In April 1969, the court issued its opinion, with findings of fact and conclusions of law, denying the relief requested. With respect to the confession issue, the court first concluded that the judge himself at Stidham's trial had found the confession volun- tary and had thus complied with the rule of Jackson v. Denno. As to voluntariness vel non, the court said:
'As to subparagraph b concerning the averment that 'the overwhelming evidence was that the statement was involuntary because of coercion exerted on movant,' this contention was raised and profusely litigated in State vs. Stidham, supra, and the Court finds it no longer open to question here. State vs. Statler, supra; Crawford vs. State, supra.
This judgment was affirmed in the Missouri Supreme Court. State v. Stidham, 449 S.W.2d 634 (1970). Agreeing first that the judge at Stidham's trial had with sufficient clarity found the confession voluntary and admissible in evidence, the court then held that in any event Stidham had been given a new evidentiary hearing and his confession again determined to be voluntary by the circuit court. In its view, the circuit court had 'found, as had the previous court, that the oral and written confessions were voluntary . . .' Based upon its own extensive analysis of the record, the Missouri Supreme Court also concluded that the finding of voluntariness was 'overwhelmingly supported and procedurally and factually the cause meets all the requirements of the federal cases and there has been no invasion of due process.' Id., at 644.
Stidham then resorted to federal habeas corpus, presenting several issues including the confession matter. The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, after having examined the full record of the state court proceedings, denied the petition without a hearing but with an opinion holding that there had been no violation of...
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