Stidham v. Swenson
Decision Date | 08 June 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 20685.,20685. |
Citation | 443 F.2d 1327 |
Parties | James William STIDHAM, Appellant, v. Harold R. SWENSON, Warden, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
James W. Stidham, pro se.
John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Mo., and Kenneth M. Romines, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Mo., for appellee.
Before GIBSON, HEANEY and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges.
On September 22, 1954, an inmate of the Missouri State Penitentiary was beaten and stabbed to death by fellow inmates during a riot in that institution. An investigation was undertaken by the prison authorities immediately after the quelling of the riot. Written confessions were eventually obtained from several inmates, including James William Stidham. Stidham's confession was used against him in his 1955 trial in state court in which he was convicted of first degree murder.
Stidham made a number of attempts to obtain relief in Missouri courts on the ground that the trial judge did not find his confession to be voluntary, as required by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964),1 before submitting it to the jury. State v. Stidham, 305 S.W.2d 7 (Mo.1957); State v. Stidham, 415 S.W. 2d 297 (Mo.1967); State v. Stidman, 449 S.W.2d 634 (Mo.1970). He was unsuccessful in each attempt.
On November 9, 1970, a habeas corpus petition brought by Stidham was denied by the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The District Court found (1) that the trial court which initially tried Stidman had complied with Jackson, and (2) that on the basis of the undisputed facts adduced at the state trial and the subsequent state evidentiary hearing, the confession was voluntary. Stidham appeals from the denial.2
At the initial trial, the state court heard evidence outside the presence of the jury on the voluntariness of the confession. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated:
The United States District Court found that this ruling comported with the requirements of Jackson v. Denno, supra, stating:
We believe that the District Court's analysis is incorrect. It assumes that Missouri law, at the time of Stidham's trial, required the trial court to find that a confession was voluntary before permitting it to be considered by a jury. Our examination of the Missouri case law convinces us that a trial court had and frequently used the right to submit the question of voluntariness to the jury without a prior determination that the confession was voluntary.
The following statements of the pre-Jackson-Denno Missouri procedure support this view:
* * *"
State v. Gibilterra, 342 Mo. 577, 116 S. W.2d 88, 94 (1938).
(Citations omitted.)
State v. Sanford, 354 Mo. 998, 193 S.W. 2d 37, 38 (1946) (concurring opinion).
"* * * Under our system of jurisprudence it is generally left to the jury to determine whether a confession was voluntary, unless the contrary appears so conclusively that the confession must be held involuntary as a matter of law. * * *" (Citations omitted.)
State v. Laster, 293 S.W.2d 300, 304 (Mo.1956).3
Our analysis of the record of Stidham's trial leads us to conclude that the trial judge in this case submitted the voluntariness issue to the jury without making a prior factual determination that the confession was voluntary. His finding, that the confession was not "involuntary as a matter of law," was not, under the then existing Missouri law, the same as finding that it was voluntary. If the trial judge does not make a factual determination that a confession is voluntary before submitting it to the jury, Jackson standards are violated. Parker v. Sigler, 413 F.2d 459 (8 Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 396 U.S. 482, 90 S.Ct. 667, 24 L.Ed.2d 672 (1970).
The Missouri Supreme Court's treatment of this issue on Stidham's appeals buttresses our view that the requirements of Jackson were not met. In its first Stidham opinion, 305 S.W.2d 7 (1957), the court stated:
* * *"(Emphasis added.)
In its most recent Stidham opinion, 449 S.W.2d 634 (1970), the Missouri Supreme Court examined its procedure and determined that "* * * Missouri employs the so-called Massachusetts procedure `impliedly approved in Jackson v. Denno' * * *". In doing so, the court relied upon State v. Washington, 399 S.W.2d 109 (Mo.1966). We point out that State v. Washington was decided after Jackson became the law, and a comparison of its standard with those enunciated in the Missouri cases, above cited, reveals the difference between the 1955 and 1966 standards.
The Supreme Court recently reemphasized that a defective procedure, standing alone, is not a sufficient basis for habeas corpus relief:
Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S. 446, 91 S.Ct. 485, 27 L.E.2d 524, 529 (1971).
Stidham alleges: that he was returned to his regular Death Row cell in the early evening of September 22; that between September 22 and September 27, he was questioned intermittently by police officers and state troopers who threatened him with physical harm if he did not tell everything he knew about the murder; that between September 22 and September 27, he was able only to catch short naps while sitting on the toilet because his straw tick, on the floor, was too water-logged to be slept on as a result of his cell being flooded when rioting inmates opened water pipes; that he was giving nothing to eat from September 22 until September 29; that he weighed 184 pounds before the riot but only 159 pounds on September 29; that he was never informed of his Miranda rights;5 that on September 27, he was taken to the prison's athletic field house and questioned in the presence of six police officers armed with pistols, rifles and riot guns; that he was questioned for approximately twenty to thirty minutes, during which time he denied involvement in the murder; that, thereafter, a rope was placed through his handcuffs and he was hung up for approximately fifteen minutes with his hands behind him; that upon his continued refusal to implicate himself, he was again hung up and beaten with corkball or baseball bats until he lost consciousness; and that he then wrote out a confession which was dictated to him.
We believe that the above version of the facts, if true, requires the conclusion that the confession was an involuntary one. See, Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413, 88 S.Ct. 541...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Cobb v. Wyrick
...these standards. Stidham v. Swenson, 328 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D.Mo.1970), affirmed in part and reversed in part on other grounds, 443 F.2d 1327 (8th Cir. 1971), reversed and modified on other grounds, 409 U.S. 224, 93 S.Ct. 359, 34 L.Ed.2d 431 (1972); Robinson v. Wolff, 349 F. Supp. 514 (D.Neb.......
-
Bailey v. Lally
...Cir. 1977); United States v. Clarke, 499 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1974); Grant v. Wainwright, 496 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1974); Stidham v. Swenson, 443 F.2d 1327 (8th Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds and remanded, 409 U.S. 224, 93 S.Ct. 359, 34 L.Ed.2d 431 (1972); Townsend v. Henderson, 405 F.2d 3......
-
State v. Garrett
...those in Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1967) cert. den. 397 U.S. 1014, 90 S.Ct. 1248, 25 L.Ed.2d 428. Stidham v. Swenson, 443 F.2d 1327 (8th Cir. 1971), cited by the appellant has been overruled. Compare United States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1975). The overall th......
-
Taylor v. Swenson
...as to the merits of the motion to suppress. We are thus unable to read Erving v. Sigler, 453 F.2d 843 (CA8 1972); Stidham v. Swenson, 443 F.2d 1327, 1329-1330 (CA8 1971), petition for certiorari filed 40 U.S.L.W. 3111 (U.S. August 12, 1971); and Parker v. Sigler, 413 F.2d 459, 462-465 (CA8 ......