Swick v. Glenn L. Martin Co.

• Decision Date: 31 March 1947
• Docket Number: No. 5569.,5569.
• Parties: SWICK v. GLENN L. MARTIN CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

160 F.2d 483 (1947)

SWICK v. GLENN L. MARTIN CO.

No. 5569.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

March 31, 1947.

Theodore M. Wolkof, of New York City, Abraham Engelman, of Brooklyn, N. Y., and Milton R. Rothstein, of Baltimore, Md., for appellant.

Charles C. G. Evans, of Baltimore, Md. (Marbury, Miller & Evans, of Baltimore, Md., Edward J. Creswell, of Washington, D. C., and Franklin G. Allen, of Baltimore, Md., on the brief), for appellee.

Before PARKER, SOPER and DOBIE, Circuit Judges.

SOPER, Circuit Judge.

On June 25, 1946 the plaintiff herein sued his employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq., for overtime compensation in the sum of $2,449.92 earned between March 5, 1941 and June 14, 1942, and for an equal amount as liquidated damages and for attorneys' fees. The employer set up the defenses, amongst others, that the plaintiff was employed in a bona fide executive capacity and was therefore exempt from the wage and hour provisions of the statute, and that the suit was barred by limitations by the provisions of Chapter 518 of the Laws of the General Assembly of Maryland of 1945, Article 59 Section 19 of the Code of Maryland, effective June 1, 1945. This act imposes a three year limitation upon suits under the federal statute in the following terms: "19. All actions brought by or on behalf of any employee or employees for the recovery of unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, fees and/or penalties, as the case may be, under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, shall be brought within three years from the time such cause or causes of action accrued, unless such Fair Labor Standards Act shall prescribe a different period within which such action or actions may be brought; provided, however, that all such subsisting causes of action which accrued more than two years before June 1, 1945, shall be sued on within one year after June 1, 1945, unless such Fair Labor Standards Act shall provide a different period within which such causes of action may be sued on."

The controversy came before the court on the motion of the defendant for a judgment in its favor on the pleadings, and on the motion of the plaintiff to strike out the defense of limitations on the ground that the Maryland statute violates Article VI of the Federal Constitution in that it discriminates against a right arising under the federal laws, and on the further ground that it denies the equal protection of the laws, as provided in Section 1 of the XIV Amendment. The court, being of the opinion that the Maryland Act of 1945 is valid and constitutional, entered judgment for the defendant.

Since no period of limitations is fixed by the Fair Labor Standards Act, suits thereunder are governed by the applicable state statutes of limitations. Rockton & Rion Ry. Co. v. Davis, 4 Cir., 159 F.2d 291. In Maryland, actions founded on contract must be brought within three years from the time the cause of action accrues under Article 57, Section 1 of the Maryland Code; but the plaintiff contends that a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act is an action on a specialty, and is governed as to limitations by Article 57 Section 3 of the Maryland Code which provides as follows: "3. No bill, testamentary, administration or other bond (except sheriffs' and constables' bonds), judgment, recognizance, statute merchant, or of the staple or other specialty whatsoever, except such as shall be taken for the use of the State, shall be good and pleadable, or admitted in evidence against any person in this State after the principal debtor and creditor have been both dead twelve years, or the debt or thing in action is above twelve years' standing; provided, however, that every payment of interest upon any single bill or other specialty shall suspend the operation of this section as to such bill or specialty for three years after the date of such payment; saving to all persons who shall be under the aforementioned impediments of infancy or insanity of mind the full benefit of all such bills, bonds, judgments, recognizances, statute merchant, or of the staple or other specialties, for the period of six years after the removal of such disability."

These statutory provisions are of ancient origin. They were originally contained in Chapter 23 of the Laws of 1715 enacted by the Provincial Assembly of Maryland and were derived from the Act of 21 James I, Chapter 16. See Alexander's British Statutes, Coe's Ed., Vol. 2, p. 603. The distinction between actions barred by limitations after three years and actions barred after 12 years has therefore long existed, but the Court of Appeals of Maryland has not had occasion to decide which period of limitations applies to suits for wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The question, however, was considered prior to the passage of the Maryland Act of 1945 by the Baltimore City Court on March 15, 1943 in Manhoff v. Thomsen-Ellis-Hutton Co., 6 Labor Cases 61,498, and by the District Court of the United States for the District of Maryland on August 14, 1944 in Bright v. Hobbs, 56 F.Supp. 723. Both courts held that suits in Maryland under the Fair Labor Standards Act were then covered by the 12 year statute of limitations, and both based their opinions on broad statements in decisions of the Court of Appeals to the effect that in cases where liability is created by the positive requisitions of a statute and not by the act of the parties themselves, the liability is founded upon a record of the highest sort and is in the nature of a specialty and is therefore subject to the period of limitations provided for obligations of that kind. See Mattare v. Cunningham, 148 Md. 309, 129 A. 654; Sterling v. Reecher, 176 Md. 567, 6 A.2d 237; Taggart, Insurance Commissioner v. Wachter, Hoskins & Russell, Inc., 179 Md. 608, 21 A.2d 141, 141 A.L.R. 751. Cf. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Household Finance Corporation, 168 Md. 13, 176 A. 480. Thus in Sterling v. Reecher, 176 Md. 567, 569, 6 A.2d 237, 238, it was said: "Since shortly after the enactment of the English statute of limitations on actions, 21 James 1, chapter 16, suits grounded on statutes have been held to be in debt on records of the highest rank, those of acts of Parliament, and hence specialties. Bacon, Abridgement, Limitation of Actions, (D). `All instruments under seal, of record, and liabilities imposed by statute are specialties'. 1 Wood, Limitation of Actions 4 Ed.,...