Swift v. Erwin

• Decision Date: 03 June 1912
• Citation: 148 S.W. 267,104 Ark. 459
• Parties: SWIFT v. ERWIN
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

148 S.W. 267

104 Ark. 459

SWIFT v. ERWIN

Supreme Court of Arkansas

June 3, 1912

Appeal from Miller Chancery Court; James D. Shaver, Chancellor affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

D. L King, for appellant.

1. The court erred in sustaining the motion to make complaint more specific. The demurrer should have been overruled.

2. If the doctrine of ultra vires applies, it should be met by evidence. Demurrer is not the remedy. Verbal and mixed contracts have been upheld by this court. 90 Ark. 301; 92 Id. 213; 93 Id. 606; 94 Id. 572; 96 Id. 456; Ib. 506.

Webber & Webber, for appellees.

1. The burden was on appellant to show that Hamiter was the agent of Erwin, and within the scope of his authority. 31 Cyc. 1043; 46 Ark. 133. The motion to make the complaint more specific was properly sustained. 49 Ark. 277; 67 Id. 15, 25; 70 Id. 161; 77 Id. 1.

2. One seeking specific performance must allege and prove either that he has performed his part of the contract, or that he was ready, willing and able to perform. In this respect the complaint was defective. 36 Cyc. 778-9; 82 Ark. 573.

3. In chancery exhibits are part of the record, and control the averments of the complaint. 94 Ark. 572; 68 Id. 263; 19 Id. 482.

4. The instrument must on its face purport to be the contract of the principal; the mere addition of descriptive words, in the absence of a showing of authority, is regarded as descriptio personae only. 31 Cyc. 1414; 17 Am. Dec. 529; 9 Am. Rep. 156; 61 Ala. 518; 59 N.W. 1084; 17 Ind. 495; 13 Minn. 187.

5. Special authority in writing to sell real estate is necessary to authorize a sale by a real estate agent. 92 P. 175. An authority to sell is no authority to execute a contract of sale. 25 P. 471; 98 Id. 71; 6 Am. Rep. 617; 30 A 1063. 62 P. 499; 94 Id. 187; 84 N.E. 1041; 24 S.E 258; 92 N.W. 453; 107 Id. 84; 61 Id. 857. The only authority given was to accept bids and refer them to the owner. The meaning of letters and telegrams as to the authority of the agent is a question of law for the court. 24 P. 1040; 96 Id. 859; 95 Id. 1017; 8 cent. Dig. "Brokers," § 13; 99 P. 577; 102 P. 178; 104 P. 1118; 32 N.W. 364; 33 Id. 564; 96 Id. 964; 89 Id. 1087; 37 A. 740; 42 Id. 81; 47 N.E. 818; 49 A. 1073; 121 N.W. 862; 19 Cyc. 294-5.

3. Any deviation from the terms of the owner avoids the contract. 71 N.E. 918; 121 N.W. 202; 27 P. 891; 25 N.W. 778; 113 S.W. 191; 61 Ark. 385; 104 P. 392; 96 N.W. 964; 158 U.S. 216; 46 S.E. 701.

4. Those dealing with an agent must take notice of his powers. 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 867; 2 App. Cases, (D. C.) 279.

OPINION

FRAUENTHAL, J.

This was a suit brought by P. B. Swift, the plaintiff below, for the specific performance of an alleged contract made by the agent of the defendants to sell and convey to him certain lands situated in Miller County. In his original complaint he alleged that the defendants were nonresidents of the State and through their agent, resident of this State, had entered into a written contract by which they had sold the land to him, and this contract was made an exhibit to the complaint. Thereupon the defendants entered their appearance and moved the court to require the plaintiff to make his complaint more specific by stating what authority the alleged agent had to enter into the alleged contract of sale and in what manner such authority was obtained and the extent thereof, and, if in writing, to exhibit the same with his complaint. This motion was sustained over the plaintiff's objection. Thereupon the plaintiff, without resting upon the original complaint, filed an amended complaint. It is contended by counsel for the plaintiff that the court erred in sustaining this motion to make his original complaint more specific, but, if any error was committed by this ruling, it has been waived by the plaintiff by his failure to rest upon his original complaint and by filing an amended complaint.

In his amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants were nonresidents of the State and the owners of the land involved in this suit; that in February, 1910, they appointed one A. H. Hamiter as their agent to sell said lands; that this appointment of and authority to the agent to sell said lands was given by letters which were made exhibits to the amended complaint; that said Hamiter, as such agent, offered to sell said lands to the plaintiff at a stipulated price and terms, and, after the plaintiff had seen his authority as contained in said letters, he paid to said Hamiter as such agent the sum of $ 500 for a ninety-day option to purchase said lands. It was alleged that the option was in writing, and executed on October 17, 1910, by said agent, and a copy thereof was attached to the amended complaint as an exhibit. It was further alleged that on October 25, 1910, the defendants, for the purpose of defeating and defrauding the plaintiff out of his rights to these lands, conveyed the same to one Mary M. Erwin, who later, with the fraudulent purpose to defraud the plaintiff, conveyed same by deed to David L. Adams. He asked that said Adams be made a party to the suit, that the deeds executed to the above-named grantees be cancelled for fraud, and that the defendants be required to specifically perform the contract of sale made to him; and, in event said Adams was an innocent purchaser of said lands, that the plaintiff have judgment against the defendants for the damages sustained by him by the breach of said contract. To this amended complaint the defendants interposed a demurrer upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The court sustained this demurrer; and, the plaintiff refusing to plead further, the complaint was dismissed for the want of equity.

The letters appointing said Hamiter as defendants' agent to make sale of said lands and the authority given to him therein, as well as the contract entered into by said Hamiter as such alleged agent with the plaintiff for the alleged sale of said lands to the plaintiff, are the basis upon which this action is founded. These were made exhibits to the amended complaint, and thereby became a part thereof, and must control the allegations of the amended complaint. In a suit in chancery the exhibits, which are the foundation of the action, will control the averments of the complaint. Beavers v. Baucum, 33 Ark. 722; American Freehold Land & Mort. Co. v. McManus, 68 Ark. 263, 58 S.W. 250; Cazort & McGehee Co. v. Dunbar, 91 Ark. 400, 121 S.W. 270; Koons v. Markle, 94 Ark. 572, 127 S.W. 959. From these letters it appears that the defendants placed these lands with said Hamiter to sell at a stipulated price and upon stipulated terms. The letters were written in February and March, 1910, and in them the defendants stated that they preferred to sell during that spring, but no definite time was named in which the sale should be made. The terms of the sale were that the lands should be sold at the price of $ 25,000, of which $ 5,000 was to be paid in cash and the balance in three equal annual installments bearing 6 per cent. interest from the date of sale, with a vendor's lien retained upon the lands. The contract executed by said Hamiter to the plaintiff was signed by him, and after his signature were added words of agency for defendants. In this contract he acknowledged receipt of $ 500 as paid for an option for ninety days to purchase said lands, and therein stated that, if the plaintiff desired to purchase said lands at the expiration of ninety days, he might do so at a specified price and upon specified terms, which conformed to the price and terms named in said letters written by defendants to said Hamiter. In said contract it is further provided: "If said P. B. Swift decides that he does not want to purchase said lands upon the above-mentioned terms at the expiration of said ninety days, he forfeits the said $ 500 paid to me on this date as above mentioned, and he will not be held liable for any other sum of money in this matter. It is understood and agreed that, if the said P. B. Swift buys the said lands on the above-mentioned terms and price, that the said payment of $ 500 will be taken as a part of the first payment of $ 5,000, and Swift will pay $ 4,500, and the same will be accepted as first payment as aforesaid."

It is urged by counsel for defendants that the alleged contract was not binding upon the defendants because (1) it was not executed in the name of the defendants as principal, but by the said Hamiter personally, and that the added words of agency were only descriptive in their nature; (2) that said Hamiter was only appointed and employed to find a purchaser for said lands, and was not impowered to make a contract of sale thereof; and (3) because said Hamiter did not sell said lands to plaintiff, but only gave him an option to purchase same, which he was not authorized or impowered to do. For these reasons, they contend that the ruling of the court in sustaining the demurrer to the amended complaint should be sustained here. We are of the opinion that counsel are correct in this contention, In the view we have taken of this case, we think that it is only necessary to note and pass upon the third and last ground above mentioned, why, according to the allegations of the complaint, the defendant was not bound by the alleged contract of sale for the specific performance of which this suit is brought.

The sole authority alleged to have been given by the defendants to said Hamiter to make the sale of said lands is contained in the letters which are made a part of the complaint by being attached as exhibits thereto. The provisions of these letters control any allegation that was made or could have been made in the amended complaint relative to the authority which was given by the defendants...