Swindle v. Neshoba Cnty. Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 08 May 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2012–CA–00758–COA.,2012–CA–00758–COA.
• Citation: 137 So.3d 869
• Parties: Jimmy SWINDLE, Individually, and as Natural Father and Guardian of Jason Swindle, A Minor Appellant v. NESHOBA COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

137 So.3d 869

Jimmy SWINDLE, Individually, and as Natural Father and Guardian of Jason Swindle, A Minor Appellant

v.NESHOBA COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.

No. 2012–CA–00758–COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

Sept. 10, 2013.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 7, 2014.

Certiorari Denied May 8, 2014.

Wayne E. Ferrell Jr., attorney for appellant.

Roy A. Smith Jr., Steven James Griffin, Flowood, attorneys for appellee.

Before GRIFFIS, P.J., ROBERTS and CARLTON, JJ.

CARLTON, J., for the Court:

¶ 1. Jimmy Swindle (Swindle), individually and as natural father and guardian of Jason Swindle (Jason), a minor, filed the present action against the Neshoba County School District (School District) pursuant to the Mississippi Torts Claims Act (MTCA), Mississippi Code Annotated section 11–46–1 (Rev.2012), et seq., after his son was injured during a school-sponsored activity. The Neshoba County Circuit Court granted the School District's motion for summary judgment after finding the School District was entitled to discretionary-function immunity under the MTCA. Swindle now appeals. We find that the trial court erred in determining that discretionaryimmunity of the MTCA barred the action. We, therefore, reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. We find a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the School District violated its affirmative duty to maintain discipline and to supervise the students, as required by the School District's handbook.

FACTS

¶ 2. On May 4, 2007, two members of the Neshoba Central High School football team, Eathan Scarbrough and Jason, got into a physical altercation on the football field during football practice after school. Jason testified that he was walking back to the lines during practice when all of a sudden he felt Eathan on top of him, hitting him. The coaches on the field intervened and inquired as to why the two were fighting. Jason responded, “I don't know,” and Eathan gave no response. During his deposition, Jason admitted that these types of minor skirmishes are common during football practice, due to its physical nature, and the skirmishes are usually over soon after they happen.

¶ 3. According to Swindle, the next day, on May 5, 2007, when left unsupervised in front of the football locker room after football practice, Eathan again attacked Jason and accused him of talking negatively about Eathan. This time, Eathan beat Jason so severely that he suffered brain damage and bodily injury. Swindle states that Jason suffered a seizure after being knocked to the ground by Eathan. The players notified the coaches of the altercation. Upon arriving at the field house, Coach John Mullins observed Jason lying on the ground, and he testified that Jason was not exhibiting any seizure-like symptoms at that time. When Coach Mullins knelt down to check on Jason, he testified that Jason lunged out and punched Coach Mullins in the nose while yelling at Eathan. Coach Mullins also stated that several coaches and players had to restrain Jason.

¶ 4. Coach Chuck Friend then instructed Jason to follow him to his office. Jason informed Coach Friend that he could not remember what happened, so Coach Friend returned to the field house to gather details from the players who had witnessed the incident. Swindle claims that the coaches did not call for immediate emergency medical assistance upon learning of the altercation. He also states that Jason suffered a second seizure, this time while unattended in Coach Friend's office, when Coach Friend was questioning other football players about the incident. Coach Mullins arrived to the office and observed Jason experiencing the second seizure and called an ambulance.

¶ 5. On February 13, 2009, Swindle filed his third amended complaint against the School District, Eathan, and Eathan's parents, Wendell and Martha Scarbrough, in Neshoba County Circuit Court. Swindle alleged that the School District breached the following duties: the duty to discipline and supervise its students as set forth in the Neshoba County School District handbook; the duty to provide a quick response to a medical emergency; and to adequately hire, train, and monitor its employees. The School District filed its answer and affirmative defenses on March 15, 2009.

¶ 6. On February 23, 2011, the School District filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming discretionary-function immunity pursuant to the MTCA. Swindle responded with a counter-motion for summary judgment on October 12, 2011. On February 28, 2012, the trial court granted the School District's motion for summary judgment, entered a Rule 54 judgment of dismissal, and denied Swindle's counter-motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.

¶ 7. We find that the School District possessed a ministerial duty to maintain discipline and to supervise the students on school property during a school-sponsored activity, as required by the School District's handbook; thus, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the School District breached its duty to exercise ordinary care in supervising students. The discretionary-function immunity of the MTCA fails to apply herein as to this issue; accordingly, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand on this basis.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8. This Court applies a de novo standard when reviewing a trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment. Waggoner v. Williamson, 8 So.3d 147, 152 (¶ 11) (Miss.2009). Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” The supreme court has established that “[t]he moving party has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact(s) exists, and the non-moving party must be given the benefit of the doubt concerning the existence of a material fact.” Waggoner, 8 So.3d at 152–53 (¶ 11) (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

¶ 9. Swindle argues that the trial court erred in granting the School District's motion for summary judgment. Swindle specifically argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the actions and conduct of the coaches, teachers, administration in the School District, and the School District itself, constituted a discretionary duty relating to the supervision of the football players at the school. The School District constitutes a governmental entity, and the issue before us addresses whether immunity under the MTCA exists to bar the instant action against the School District in this case, or, if no governmental immunity exists, whether a disputed issue of material fact exists. We agree that the trial court erred in its determination. The School District herein possessed a ministerial duty to supervise and maintain discipline of students at school, as required by the affirmative duties set forth in the School District's own handbook, and we, therefore, find that a question of material fact exists as to whether the School District breached its duty of ordinary care in performing this duty.¹

¶ 10. The School District argues that its alleged acts or omissions were not ministerial, but rather discretionary, in nature, thereby providing the School District with immunity pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 11–46–9(1)(d) (Rev.2012). Additionally, the School District argues that its football coaches possessed no notice that Eathan and Jason would engage in a physical altercation on May 5, 2007, and that such action was not foreseeable. The School District further submits that Eathan failed to exhibit any disciplinary problems prior to that point during spring football. In support of this argument, the coaches and Jason testified that skirmishes between the players are not uncommon during football practice. The coaches and Jason also testified that on May 4, 2007, the day before the May 5th assault at issue herein, the coaches intervened immediately after becoming aware of an altercation that occurred during practice. However, the record shows that at the time of this prior altercation on May 4th, when the coaches intervened, they failed to determine the cause of this prior altercation or achieve resolution of any remaining animosity, leaving foreseeability of a future altercation to be a disputed factual issue. The School District's argument regarding foreseeability fails to address the failure of the coaches to comply with the supervision requirements set forth in the School District's own handbook.

¶ 11. On May 5, 2007, the day of the assault, the students were unsupervised as they returned to the locker room after football practice ended, in violation of the School District's handbook defining its supervision policy. With respect to the existence of discretionary immunity or a ministerial affirmative duty, the issue before us pertains to whether the coaches possessed an affirmative ministerial duty to supervise the students players at this time or whether the coaches possessed the discretion to exercise their own judgment regarding how and when to supervise students. Relevant to this inquiry, the students were still on school property within the designated time for practice during a school-sanctioned extracurricular activity, and the coaches were performing their official coaching duties. With respect to duty and discretion, the School District handbook defined the required supervision of students under such circumstances, and the handbook provided no exemption for coaches from this duty. Stated otherwise, the coaches possessed no discretion to refuse or fail to comply with the supervision requirements of the School District's handbook.

¶ 12. Swindle also argues that the School District possessed a ministerial duty under Mississippi Code Annotated...