Swint v. State, 5 Div. 607
| Decision Date | 26 January 1982 |
| Docket Number | 5 Div. 607 |
| Citation | 409 So.2d 992 |
| Parties | Henry Lewis SWINT v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
John Ben Jones, Lanett, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Bill North, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
A jury found appellant guilty of the murder of Dollie Maude Owens. The court fixed his punishment at imprisonment for fifty years and sentenced him accordingly.
The badly decomposed body of the alleged victim was found on September 3, 1980, in some weeds and bushes near a school playground in Lafayette, Alabama. The coroner and other authorities took charge promptly. The body was not identified until skin from her fingers had been determined to be that of the alleged victim by means of fingerprint procedures that disclosed that fingerprints therefrom matched previously taken known fingerprints of Dollie Maude Owens, an apparently well known black female who resided in Lafayette. Able expert witnesses testified to bruises and gashes on her body, and, according to their opinion, she had died from strangulation some time between six days and three days prior to September 3. Upon the establishment of her identity, it was determined that she had been last seen at various places in Lafayette on Saturday afternoon and night August 30, 1980. There was evidence that she was seen with defendant about midnight of August 30-31, and that she had never been seen alive since that time.
The defendant did not testify, but a written incriminating statement signed by him was admitted in evidence, which revealed that he was drinking and going around with the victim about midnight of August 30-31, that they had an argument about some money and that he hit her with his fist. He said, "I hit her up around the front of her neck, and she fell and hit her head on the curb." According to the written statement, defendant then picked her up, "toted her down back of Southside School and laid her down back of the playground in some bushes."
Four of appellant's contentions are without merit, in our opinion. Neither the evidence nor any of the authorities cited by appellant supports any of his four numbered contentions as follows:
1. There was no proof of jurisdiction and venue.
3. There was no proof of the corpus delicti.
4. There was no proof of the elements of the crime of murder.
5. The "Chain of Custody of Evidence," referable to the state and condition of the body of the alleged victim from the time it was discovered until it was released by the authorities for preparation for burial, was not shown.
By appellant's only other contention for a reversal (Contention No. 2), he challenges the ruling of the court admitting in evidence, over defendant's objection, his written incriminating statement, saying that "the state has not met its burden of proving that the Defendant's statement was given freely, intelligently and voluntarily and was not a product of indirect coercion."
The penned statement, with the letters of each word thereof formed separately without joinder, is tantamount to a confession that he killed Dollie Maude Owens; it is not tantamount to a confession that he murdered her, that he killed her intentionally. However, the whole of the evidence, including the statement, was sufficient to present a jury issue as to defendant's guilt of murder.
As a preliminary to the introduction of the statement in evidence during the direct examination of Lafayette Chief of Police Mike Looser as a witness for the State, the following occurred:
Thereupon, counsel for the State proved by the witness that he had advised the defendant "of his constitutional rights which we have on a card," which purportedly included the Miranda rights, the rights set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). " It was further shown by the testimony of the witness that no violence or threat of violence to defendant occurred, that defendant apparently understood his rights and that no offer of any kind was made to induce him to make a statement. The statement was then presented and read into the transcript, and counsel for the State said: "We move to admit that in evidence, Your Honor."
Immediately thereafter, cross-examination of the witness was commenced. It included the following:
There soon intervened references to the polygraph test, as to which the witness did not participate, and the cross-examination continued as follows:
The jury was then returned to the courtroom, and the direct examination of the witness was resumed, in which he repeated in substance his testimony that he had given during the hearing out of the presence of the jury as to defendant's being apprised of his constitutional rights and that nothing was done or said to "induce or coerce him to make a statement." The witness produced a copy of the written statement and was asked to read it to the jury. The transcript shows the following objection and ruling of the court:
The statement was then read in its entirety, and the following occurred:
The cross-examination was short and was devoted almost exclusively to a...
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Dunkins v. State, 6 Div. 669
...released from custody after he requested counsel and that he expressed a complete willingness to talk with Deputy House. Swint v. State, 409 So.2d 992 (Ala.Cr.App.1982); Warrick v. State, 409 So.2d 984 (Ala.Cr.App.1982). In this case we have both express and explicit oral and written waiver......
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Dunkins v. State, 6 Div. 591
...released from custody after he requested counsel and that he expressed a complete willingness to talk with Deputy House. Swint v. State, 409 So.2d 992 (Ala.Cr.App.1982); Warrick v. State, 409 So.2d 984 Dunkins v. State, supra at 1352. Even adding Jackson's testimony to the facts enunciated ......