Switzer v. Mercantile Bank of St. Louis, N.A.
| Decision Date | 29 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 69785,69785 |
| Citation | 932 S.W.2d 893 |
| Parties | Peter K. SWITZER, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. MERCANTILE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, N.A., a/k/a Mercantile Trust Company, National Association, Defendant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Blumenfeld, Kaplan & Sandweiss, P.C., Alan G. Gerson, James M. Niemann, St. Louis, for plaintiff/appellant.
Thompson Coburn, Gary Mayes, Daniel C. Cox, St. Louis, for defendant.
Peter K. Switzer, (Switzer), appeals from the trial court's judgment granting Mercantile Bank of St. Louis, N.A.'s, (Bank), motion to dismiss. We affirm.
The uncontested facts are as follows. On November 29, 1963, Luke Hart, Sr. (Hart) established a Trust as part of his last Will and Testament (will). At the time of the execution, Hart had three children: Luke Hart, Jr. (Luke), Catherine J. Switzer (Catherine), and John T. Hart (John). At the time of the will's execution, Catherine had three children: Susan Fons, Paul Switzer and Peter Switzer, the last of whom is the appellant in this case. Both Paul and Peter Switzer were adopted by Catherine when they were children.
Within his will, Hart left various instructions and divisions of his estate. He appointed Jerome Switzer and John as co-trustees, with an allowance that there may be a substitute trustee later on. Under his will, Hart provided the following pertinent instructions:
Provision Thirteenth: All the rest, residue and remainder of the property which I may own at the time of my death ... I give and bequeath to Jerome A. Switzer and John T. Hart, as Trustees....
(c) Twelve months after my death the Trustees shall divide the Trust estate into three shares, herein referred to as Shares B, C and D, respectively....
1. If my said son, Luke E. Hart, Jr., is then living said Share B shall be retained and held by the Trustees and the entire net income therefrom shall be paid over and distributed to him in equal quarter-annual or other more frequent and convenient installments so long as he shall live ... and the Trustees shall pay over and distribute the remainder of said Share B and the accumulated net income derived therefrom to (a) the children of his body, if any, in equal shares, free of trust, upon their attaining the age of twenty-one years, respectively....
2. If my said daughter Catherine J. Switzer is then living, said Share C shall be retained and held by the Trustees ... and at her death the Trustees shall pay over and distribute the remainder thereof and the accumulated net income derived therefrom to my said granddaughter Susan Switzer Fons or if she shall not then be living to the children of her body, free of trust, upon their attaining the age of twenty-one years.
On February 19, 1964, Hart died testate. In 1982, after the death of Catherine, Switzer was adopted by his Uncle Luke. At the time of his second adoption, Switzer was 39 years-old.
In 1983, the bank became the sole trustee of Hart's trust. By 1993, the trust terminated, as the principal and income had been expended. Luke died on December 24, 1994.
On September 20, 1995, Switzer sued the bank, claiming breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. In his petition, Switzer claimed he was the sole beneficiary/remainderman under Hart's trust. The bank moved to dismiss Switzer's petition for lack of standing. During the course of oral arguments on the motion to dismiss, Hart's will was accepted into evidence without controversy. The bank argued the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because Switzer did not have standing to sue. In response, Switzer argued the will was ambiguous, and that as a matter of law his petition should not be dismissed.
On December 20, 1995, the trial court determined, as a matter of law, the will was unambiguous and by its terms Switzer was not a beneficiary of the trust. In so holding, the trial court found Switzer had no standing to bring a claim and dismissed his petition. Switzer then filed this appeal.
Before addressing the merits of Switzer's appeal, we first reiterate the guidelines which govern this court in reviewing the trial court's dismissal based on Switzer's lack of standing. Smith v. Rost, 906 S.W.2d 906, 907 (Mo.App. S.D.1995). Because the trial court determined as a matter of law Switzer was not a beneficiary and, therefore, did not have standing, we note ITT Commercial Finance v. Mid-Am. Marine, 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993); Lehr v. Collier, 909 S.W.2d 717, 723 (Mo.App. S.D.1995); In Re Estate of Beare, 880 S.W.2d 562, 565 (Mo.App.1993).
Switzer cannot bring a cause of action against the bank unless he has standing. To have standing, Switzer must have an actual interest in Hart's will. "To warrant standing as a party, the prospective plaintiff must have some actual and justiciable interest susceptible of protection through litigation." Smith, 906 S.W.2d at 907, quoting Crigler v. Frame, 632 S.W.2d 94, 95 (Mo.App.1982). Switzer alleges in his petition that he is a beneficiary under Hart's will, and as such he has standing.
We recognize Switzer's petition may be dismissed only if it appears he could not prove any set of facts which would make him a beneficiary under Hart's will. Frison v. City of Pagedale, 897 S.W.2d 129, 132 (Mo.App.E.D.1995). In determining whether Switzer could be a beneficiary, we must consider Hinton v. City of St. Joseph, 889 S.W.2d 854, 857 (Mo.App. W.D.1994). If Switzer could not prove any facts which show he is a beneficiary, he then has no right to relief, and the trial court necessarily lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Bremen Bank & Trust v. Muskopf, 817 S.W.2d 602, 608 (Mo.App.1991); Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Kansas City Bank & Trust Co., 743 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Mo.App.1988).
In order to determine if Switzer could be a beneficiary under the will, we must look at the will and determine whether Hart intended Switzer to be a beneficiary, for the testator's intent controls. Hollis v. Estate of Hollis, 845 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Mo.App. E.D.1993). In construing Hart's will, it is not the question of Switzer's right to take, but rather a question of Hart's intent. Boatmen's Trust Co. v. Conklin, 888 S.W.2d 347, 351 (Mo.App. E.D.1994). If the meaning or intention is plain and unambiguous, then such intent must govern. First Nat'l Bank v. Waldron, 406 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Mo.1966). However, it is important to note "[t]he mere fact the parties disagree upon the interpretation of a document does not render it ambiguous." Boatmen's Trust Co. v. Sugden, 827 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Mo.App. E.D.1992).
We first note that Hart did not intend for Switzer to be a beneficiary under his will. Hart specifically left Switzer only his love and affection:
Provision Tenth: I remember my...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re in the Estate of Spencer
...must have some actual and justiciable interest susceptible of protection through litigation.” Switzer v. Mercantile Bank of St. Louis, N.A., 932 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Mo.App.E.D.1996) (internal citations omitted). To have standing to contest the Third Amendment and the Settlement Agreement, Appe......
-
Switzer v. Hart
...standing to pursue his claims under Share C de novo and does not defer to the trial court's order. Switzer v. Mercantile Bank of St. Louis, N.A., 932 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Mo.App. E.D.1996). Therefore, the standard the trial court used in reaching its decision is not determinative of whether thi......