Switzer v. Pratt
| Decision Date | 29 July 1946 |
| Docket Number | 46893. |
| Citation | 23 N.W.2d 837,237 Iowa 788 |
| Parties | SWITZER v. PRATT et ux. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
D D. Staples, of Des Moines, for appellants.
Bump & Bump, of Des Moines, for appellee.
The facts in this case are stipulated as follows: That Delmar Eugene Switzer and Ruth Ione Switzer were husband and wife prior to the 9th day of September, 1939, and continued to be husband and wife until the death of Delmar Eugene Switzer, which occurred in France on the 24th of March, 1945, while in the military service of the United States. That he was the owner of lot sixty-seven (67), except the south 20 feet and lot sixty-six (66), except the north 10 feet thereof, all in Taylor Park addition in the city of Des Moines, Iowa. That on the 9th day of September, 1939, he and his wife executed a deed to Delmar Eugene Switzer, himself, and Ruth Ione Switzer, his wife, as joint tenants. That the said property was occupied as a homestead of Delmar Eugene Switzer and Ruth Ione Switzer, his wife, from about the first of September 1939, to the date that he entered the military service in 1942. That Ruth Ione Switzer, surviving wife of Delmar Eugene Switzer, entered into a contract to sell the said property to the defendants, LeRoy B. Pratt and Ruth Louise Pratt, husband and wife, for the consideration of $8,600 $600 paid down, and the balance to be paid by assuming a mortgage and the difference in cash. That pursuant to the said contract, Ruth Ione Switzer tendered a deed to the defendants. That the said purchasers declined and now decline to accept the said deed and pay the purchase price, claiming that the deed from Delmar Eugene Switzer to Delmar Eugene Switzer and Ruth Ione Switzer did not create a joint tenancy and that Ruth Ione Switzer does not have full and complete title to the property under the said deed. That on the 9th of September, 1939, Delmar Eugene executed a will, duly and properly witnessed, giving all of his property, real and personal, to his wife, Ruth Ione Switzer, which will has been duly admitted to probate in the district court of Polk county, Iowa, on the 2d day of July, A.D., 1945. That after making the said will, a child was born to Delmar Eugene Switzer and Ruth Ione Switzer, on September 1, 1944, named Nancy Ione Switzer. That after the child was born the will was not re-executed nor is any provision made in it for the child.
The deed referred to, so far as material to this inquiry, is as follows:
'Know All Men By These Presents: That Delmar Eugene Switzer and Ruth Ione Switzer, his wife of Polk County and State of Iowa in consideration of the sum of One ($1.00) Dollars in hand paid by Delmar Eugene Switzer and Ruth Ione Switzer, his wife, as joint tenants and not as tenants in common, with the right of survivorship, of Polk County and State of Iowa do hereby sell and convey unto the said Delmar Eugene Switzer and Ruth Ione Switzer, his wife, as joint tenants and not as tenants in common, with the right of survivorship (describing the property conveyed).' Duly signed and acknowledged.
The action by the survivor, Ruth Ione Switzer, was submitted on the foregoing stipulation and the district court entered a decree in favor of plaintiff, holding that the deed in question created an estate in joint tenancy with right of survivorship and that the grantor, as survivor, was the owner, entering judgment for plaintiff and providing that plaintiff shall execute and deliver deed, and making the judgment a lien on the premises. From this decree defendants appeal.
In this action no issue is raised as to the will. The only question to be determined is the validity of the deed from Ruth Ione Switzer to the Pratts. That is, may a husband, who has title to real estate, properly create a joint tenancy by deed to himself and wife which recites 'as joint tenants and not as tenants in common, with the right of survivorship'.
The appellant argues that the creation of a joint tenancy in real estate, as derived from the common law, requires unity of possession, interest, time, and title in all holding an interest in such estate, and that the deed in question does not do so. He urges that the common law rule must be preserved and bases his argument upon the case of Stuehm v. Mikulski, 139 Neb. 374, 297 N.W. 595, 137 A.L.R. 327, which he cites to the court without further argument.
In that case the deed in question, which was worded substantially as the deed in the present action, was held to be invalid, as procured by undue influence, and also as not capable of creating a joint tenancy. That court gave three principal reasons for rejecting the deed on the latter ground. First, it lacked the four unities argued by appellant. That is, one and the same interest arising by the same conveyance, commencing at the same time and held by the one and the same undivided possession. This of course was the common law requisite to the creation of a joint tenancy. Second, the court argued that one holding an estate in fee title may not, without the intervention of a trustee, convey directly to himself and another, and create in himself and such another an estate in joint tenancy. Third, that the rule as to intent, by statute in Nebraska, did not enlarge, limit, or modify the substantive law, but was merely a rule of construction. In a dissent by Simmons, Chief Justice, all the propositions advanced in the majority opinion are assailed and the authorities, upon which the said majority opinion is based, reviewed. We can do no more than refer to the majority and minority opinions, but we are more in accord with the latter which holds that the rule as to the intention of the parties should prevail over the technical common law rules as to the creation of joint tenancies, and such we believe has been the trend of our decisions in this state, as well as in other jurisdictions. It is of interest, though not controlling, to note that the Legislature of Nebraska, within a few weeks after the rendition of this opinion, abolished the rule laid down in the majority opinion. Laws of 1941, Chapter 153, Revised Statutes of Nebraska 1943, Vol. 4, sec. 76-118.
I. We think that a deed, such as the one here considered, is a valid conveyance in joint tenancy. The case of Fay v. Smiley, 201 Iowa 1290, 1297, 207 N.W. 369, 372, recognizes the form of conveyance by one to himself and another. The court says: Citing cases. For the reason that the deed failed to describe the estate conveyed in detail, the court held that it conveyed an estate in common, the part referring to the tenancy being merely descriptive and not controlling the subsequent clauses in the deed, and the granting clause conveying a fee simple estate. But the form of deed by one to himself and another was upheld, although the property conveyed was an estate in common.
In the case of Conlee v. Conlee, 222 Iowa 561, 269 N.W. 259, two brothers, owners in common, by contract changed the ownership of their property to that of joint tenancy. This court held that there being nothing in law to prohibit them in so doing, upon the death of one of the partners the survivor became the absolute owner of the partnership property as in joint tenancy. Citing cases.
In Stonewall v. Danielson, 204 Iowa 1367, 217 N.W. 456, the parties orally agreed that their accumulations of real and personal property were to be held jointly. After the death of one the court held the property to be that of the survivor. Citing Wood v. Logue, 167 Iowa 436, 149 N.W. 613, Ann.Cas.1917B, 116; Stewart v. Todd, 190 Iowa 283, 173 N.W. 619, 180 N.W. 146, 20 A.L.R. 1272. The holding of the Nebraska court in the Stuehm case was based, in part, on the common law rule that one might not convey real estate to himself. That to create an estate in joint tenancy, grantor either had to convey to himself, and in so doing change the nature of his estate, or such estate must have come into being without the required unity of time or title. But, under our decisions, such a conveyance to oneself and another is not invalid. And we are also satisfied that, under the majority of decisions of other states, such a conveyance is valid. It is not disputed that a conveyance through a trustee would convey a title in the grantee. We see no reason why the desired result may not be directly accomplished instead of indirectly by the intervention of a trustee, when the result sought is the same in either case.
Among the cases holding that a deed to oneself and another is valid, are Dutton v. Buckley, 116 Or. 661, 242 P. 626, 628; Edmonds v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 9 Cir., 90 F.2d 14, 16, holding that the weight of authority is that such conveyance is valid. Citing cases. Irvine v. Helvering, 8 Cir., 99 F.2d 265; Ames v. Chandler, 265 Mass. 428, 164 N.E. 616; In re Horler's Estate, 180 A.D. 608, 168 N.Y.S. 221, 223; Cadgene v. Cadgene, 8 A.2d 858, 17 N.J. Misc. 332; Colson v. Baker, 42 Misc. 407, 87 N.Y.S. 238.
II. Holding as we do, that the deed was not invalid as to the parties thereto, we should consider what was conveyed thereby. Appellee cites and appellant refers to the case of Wood v Logue, supra [167 Iowa 436, 149 N.W. 614]. In that case Daniel Logue, unmarried, made a deed for forty acres granting to his two sisters, also unmarried, the right to occupy the premises, and upon the death of the last one of the three the survivor should own the entire fee simple title. The recitation of the deed was as follows: ...
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Realism and Formalism in the Severance of Joint Tenancies
...be conveyed twice when a single conveyance is just as effective and has the virtues of economy and efficiency"); Switzer v. Pratt, 23 N.W.2d 837, 839 (Iowa 1946)(agreeing with the rule that "the intention of the parties should prevail over the technical common law rules"); Lipps v. Crowe, 1......