Swope Rodante, P.A. v. Harmon
| Decision Date | 28 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2D11-3228 |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
| Parties | SWOPE RODANTE, P.A., Appellant, v. THOMAS HARMON and HARMON, WOODS, PARKER, HENDRICKS & ABRUNZO, P.A., Appellees. |
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Martha J. Cook, Judge.
Stanford R. Solomon of The Solomon Law Group, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
Raymond T. Elligett, Jr., of Buell & Elligett, P.A., Tampa; and Daniel P. Mitchell of Barr, Burman & Tonelli, P.A., Tampa, for Appellees.
Swope Rodante, P.A. ("Swope"), filed a three-count complaint against Thomas Harmon and Harmon, Woods, Parker, Hendricks & Abrunzo, P.A. (collectively, "Harmon"). In that complaint, Swope claimed that (1) Harmon tortiously interfered withits contract for legal representation of a client which resulted in Swope's being fired and Harmon's being hired, (2) Harmon breached an oral contract between Swope and Harmon, and (3) Swope was entitled to a constructive trust over funds that Harmon owed it pursuant to the oral contract. The trial court dismissed the entire complaint with prejudice. We hold that Swope alleged sufficient facts to support two of these claims and reverse the trial court's dismissal in part.
"For . . . purposes of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, allegations of the complaint are assumed to be true and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom are allowed in favor of the plaintiff." Wallace v. Dean, 3 So. 3d 1035, 1042-43 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Ralph v. City of Daytona Beach, 471 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1983)). "When considering a motion to dismiss, the trial court is limited to consideration of the allegations contained within the four corners of the complaint." Al-Hakim v. Holder, 787 So. 2d 939, 941 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (citing Roberts v. Children's Med. Servs., 751 So. 2d 672, 673 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)). This court reviews an order granting a motion to dismiss de novo. Id.
Count one asserted tortious interference with Swope's contract with a client. There are four elements of tortious interference with a business relationship: "(1) the existence of a business relationship . . . (2) knowledge of the relationship on the part of the defendant; (3) an intentional and unjustified interference with the relationship by the defendant; and (4) damage to the plaintiff as a result of the breach of therelationship." Ethan Allen, Inc. v. Georgetown Manor, Inc., 647 So. 2d 812, 814 (Fla. 1994) (quoting Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Cotton, 463 So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. 1985)).
For this count, Swope's operative allegations consist of more than eighty numbered paragraphs, with specific statements regarding each of the four elements. For example, Swope alleged that Harmon intentionally contacted a person whom he knew to be Swope's client and made "numerous false representations" regarding Swope's legal performance under the contract; that those false representations were made "knowingly and . . . recklessly;" that Harmon's "intentional, unjustified, and fraudulent actions" caused Swope to suffer damages; that Harmon told the client that Swope had breached his contract with them and had not performed any work; and that Harmon's statement to Swope's clients "were patently false."
We conclude Swope has asserted sufficient factual allegations to withstand a motion for dismissal. The pleading alleges that Harmon knowingly, intentionally, and unjustifiedly provided disparaging information about Swope to Swope's client for the purpose of inducing the client to fire Swope and hire Harmon. It further alleges that Swope suffered damages because it lost out on a legal fee due to Harmon's actions. Where a claim for tortious interference sets forth an attorney-client relationship and a contingency fee agreement, and includes "elements of knowledge, intentional and unjustified interference, and damage," the party has sufficiently pled a cause of action. Ellis Rubin, P.A. v. Alarcon, 892 So. 2d 501, 503 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004).
Count two asserted breach of an oral contract arising out of the disposition of settlement funds. After hiring Harmon, the client obtained a settlement. But thesettlement check had Swope's name on it. Swope and Harmon allegedly came to an agreement that Swope would remove his name from the settlement in exchange for Harmon's retaining fifteen percent of the settlement funds in trust until the fee dispute between Harmon and Swope could be settled. Swope asserted that he held up his end of the bargain but that Harmon did not hold the funds in trust. The trial court dismissed this count, concluding that Swope's claim was premature when Swope had not yet proven entitlement to the fee.
On this motion to dismiss, the trial court was required to assume the veracity of Swope's allegations. See Wallace, 3 So. 3d at 1042-43. Swope alleged that he performed his side of an oral contract with Harmon by taking his name off the settlement. Harmon breached this contract by failing to hold the disputed funds in trust. Swope's allegations are sufficient to demonstrate a legal right to Harmon's performance of the bargain, even if Swope may not be able to establish the value of that right at this point in the pleadings. "It is well established in Florida that where the allegations of a complaint show the invasion of a legal right, the plaintiff on the basis thereof may recover at least nominal damages, and a motion to dismiss should be overruled." Hutchison v. Tompkins, 259 So. 2d 129, 132 (Fla. 1972).
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