Sword v. State, A98A0602.
Decision Date | 07 May 1998 |
Docket Number | No. A98A0602.,A98A0602. |
Citation | 232 Ga. App. 497,502 S.E.2d 334 |
Parties | SWORD v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Alfred L. King, Jr., Jonesboro, for appellant.
Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, Brian J. Amero, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Stephanie Ann Sword was charged by accusation in Clayton County with four counts of financial transaction card fraud, OCGA § 16-9-33(a)(2)(B). She filed a plea in bar, claiming the prosecution was barred by her previous conviction in Fayette County for financial transaction card theft, OCGA § 16-9-31(a)(1). Her plea was denied, and she filed this appeal. The sole issue on appeal is the merit of her contention that financial transaction card theft constitutes a lesser included offense of financial transaction card fraud and that her prior conviction for the former offense therefore precludes her prosecution for the latter. We conclude Sword's contention is without merit in this instance, and we affirm the denial of her plea.
OCGA § 16-9-31(a) provides a number of alternative ways in which the offense of financial transaction card theft may be committed. The Fayette County indictment charged Sword with committing the offense of financial transaction card theft in that she did "knowingly and willfully take and possess a financial transaction card ... without the authorization of the cardholder." This is one of the methods of committing financial transaction card theft specified in OCGA § 16-9-31(a)(1), and it requires proof of nothing other than a knowing taking and possession of the card without the permission of the cardholder. No showing of intent to use the card is necessary, nor is a showing of actual use.1 The crime was complete when Sword took the card. Even if she had never used the card to obtain merchandise or money, she was guilty of violating OCGA § 16-9-31(a) because she obtained and retained the card, having knowledge that she was not authorized by the cardholder to do so.
The Clayton County accusation charged Sword with violating a different statute: financial transaction card fraud. The accusation alleged that on four occasions on one day, Sword presented the financial transaction card without the authorization of the cardholder to receive merchandise.
These acts constituted violations of OCGA § 16-9-33(a)(2)(B) and are completely different from the offense with which she was charged in Fayette County.2 Under these circumstances, Sword's prosecution for the Clayton County offenses is not precluded by the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, or by those of Article 1, Section 1, Paragraph 18 of the Georgia Constitution or by those of Georgia statutes.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Battista v. State, 223 Ga.App. 369, 370, 477 S.E.2d 665 (1996).
Under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), successively charged offenses are separate for purposes of double jeopardy if each offense requires the State to prove some element or fact that is not required in the other. State v. Williams, 214 Ga.App. 701, 702, 448 S.E.2d 700 (1994). Clearly, under this test the Clayton County prosecutions were separate and different from the Fayette charge, and they were not barred. They required proof of presentation of the card to receive merchandise or other things of value.
Nolen v. State, 218 Ga.App. 819, 820, 463 S.E.2d 504 (1995). Sword relies upon OCGA § 16-1-7 in contending that the Clayton prosecutions were barred because financial transaction card theft is a lesser included offense of financial transaction card fraud. OCGA § 16-1-7(a) provides that OCGA § 16-1-6 defines a crime as being included if "(1) [i]t is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts or a less culpable mental state than is required to establish the commission...
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