Sydnor v. State

• Decision Date: 15 June 2021
• Docket Number: No. 196,196
• Parties: FRANK SYDNOR v. STATE OF MARYLAND
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

FRANK SYDNOR v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 196

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2020

June 15, 2021

Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Case No. 819319009

UNREPORTED

Fader, C.J., Berger, Arthur, JJ.

Opinion by Fader, C.J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

A jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City found Frank Sydnor, the appellant, guilty of second-degree assault of Keona Tate. Mr. Sydnor contends that the circuit court erred in: (1) permitting Ms. Tate to testify concerning the reason she was afraid of him and his family; and (2) not sua sponte precluding the prosecutor from making certain statements during rebuttal closing argument. We conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary ruling during Ms. Tate's testimony, and we decline to engage in plain error review of Mr. Sydnor's unpreserved objections to the prosecutor's rebuttal argument. Accordingly, we will affirm.

BACKGROUND

On August 22, 2019, at around 3:30 a.m., Ms. Tate left her brother's house in Baltimore. On her way home, she encountered Ziona Farmer, a former friend with whom she was not on good terms, and Terrence Roberts, Ms. Farmer's nephew. Ms. Tate attempted to avoid the pair but was intercepted by Ms. Farmer's mother and Mr. Sydnor. Ms. Tate claimed that an altercation ensued, during which Ms. Farmer, Mr. Roberts, and Mr. Sydnor punched, kicked, and stomped on her.

Mr. Sydnor was subsequently arrested and indicted for second-degree assault and conspiracy to commit second-degree assault in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. He elected a jury trial, which took place in January 2020. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury acquitted Mr. Sydnor of conspiracy to commit second-degree assault but convicted him of second-degree assault. This timely appeal followed. We will discuss the background relevant to each of Mr. Sydnor's specific contentions below.

DISCUSSION

We typically review a trial court's ruling to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Wheeler v. State, 459 Md. 555, 560-61 (2018). When reviewing objections based on relevance and prejudice under Rules 5-401 and 5-403, the Court of Appeals has explained that the applicable standard of review is a two-step process.

First, we consider whether the evidence is legally relevant which is a conclusion of law that we review de novo. Portillo Funes v. State, 469 Md. 438, 478 (2020) (citing Ford v. State, 462 Md. 3, 46 (2018)) ("An appellate court reviews de novo a trial court's determination as to whether evidence is relevant."). After determining whether the evidence in question is relevant, we consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting relevant evidence which should have been excluded as unfairly prejudicial. Thus, the trial judge's ruling on the admissibility of evidence under Rule 5-403 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. The standard of review for "[a]n abuse of discretion occurs where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the circuit court." Williams v. State, 457 Md. 551, 563 (2018) (citing Fuentes v. State, 454 Md. 296, 325 (2017)). Appellate "courts 'are generally loath to reverse a trial court unless the evidence is plainly inadmissible under a specific rule or principle of law or there is a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.'" Portillo Funes, 469 Md. at 479 (quoting Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 404-05 (1997)).

Montague v. State, 471 Md. 657, 673-74 (2020) (alteration in original).

A trial court's ruling regarding the propriety of statements in a closing argument also will not be overturned "absent a clear abuse of discretion[.]" Mitchell v. State, 408 Md. 368, 380-81 (2009). Attorneys have a great deal of leeway in presenting closing arguments to the jury. See Spain v. State, 386 Md. 145, 152-53 (2005).

While arguments of counsel are required to be confined to the issues in the cases on trial, the evidence and fair and reasonable deductions therefrom, and to arguments of opposing counsel, generally speaking, liberal freedom of speech should be allowed. There are no hard-and-fast limitations within which the argument of earnest counsel must beconfined—no well-defined bounds beyond which the eloquence of an advocate shall not soar. [Counsel] may discuss the facts proved or admitted in the pleadings, assess the conduct of the parties, and attack the credibility of witnesses. [Counsel] may indulge in oratorical conceit or flourish and in illustrations and metaphorical allusions.

Id. at 153 (quoting Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 430 (1999)).

Furthermore, it is the trial court, not the reviewing court, which stands in the best position to assess the propriety of both evidentiary rulings and closing arguments. That is because a trial court is "physically on the scene, able to observe matters not usually reflected in a cold record," and "has [its] finger on the pulse of the trial." Frazier v. State, 197 Md. App. 264, 282 (2011) (quoting State v. Cook, 338 Md. 598, 615 (1995)).

I. THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT ERR OR ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN OVERRULING MR. SYDNOR'S OBJECTION TO MS. TATE'S TESTIMONY EXPLAINING WHY SHE WAS AFRAID.

There are three types of second-degree assault in Maryland: intent-to-frighten, attempted battery, and battery. State v. Frazier, 469 Md. 627, 644 (2020). At trial, the State contended that Mr. Sydnor was guilty of both the battery and intent-to-frighten types of second-degree assault. As the court instructed the jury at the close of all the evidence, using MSBA Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction (2d ed. 2018), 4:01A, to convict Mr. Sydnor of intent-to-frighten assault, the State was required to prove:

One, that the Defendant committed an act with the intent to place the complaining witness in fear of immediate offensive physical contact or physical harm;

Second, that the Defendant had the apparent ability at that time to bring about offensive physical contact or physical harm; and

Thirdly, that the complaining witness reasonably feared immediate offensive physical contact or physical harm; andFourthly, that the Defendant's actions were not legally justified.

See State v. Stewart, 464 Md. 296, 299 n.2 (2019) (stating that the Court of Appeals "has recognized this formulation as a correct statement of Maryland law on second-degree assault of the intent-to-frighten type").

During the State's case-in-chief, presumably with the aim of establishing the third of those requirements, the prosecutor asked Ms. Tate whether she was afraid during the encounter. Ms. Tate answered that she was. The following exchange then took place:

[Prosecutor]: Why were you afraid?

[Ms. Tate]: Because I know what they're capable of, the type of things that they do. So -

[Defense counsel]: Objection, Your Honor.

The Court: Overruled.

[Prosecutor]: You may continue.

[Ms. Tate]: I know how they are. I know the types of things that they do. I've been around them.

After clarifying that the "they" to whom Ms. Tate was referring included Mr. Sydnor, Ms. Farmer, and Mr. Roberts, she continued:

[Ms. Tate]: I know that they hurt people. They like to hurt people.

Mr. Sydnor contends that the court erred in permitting the State to elicit that testimony from Ms. Tate because it constituted impermissible "other crimes" evidence that did not meet the standard for admission under Rule 5-404(b), was not relevant evidence under Rule 5-402, and was more prejudicial than probative under Rule 5-403. We disagree.

As an initial matter, Mr. Sydnor's claims on appeal are only partially preserved. He identifies three of Ms. Tate's answers that he contends the court erroneously admitted: (1) her statement that she knew what Mr. Sydnor and his family were "capable of, the type of things that they do"; (2) her testimony that she knew "how they are" and "the types of things that they do"; and (3) her statement that "they hurt people" and like doing so. As reflected above, Mr. Sydnor objected to only the first of these statements. In his brief, Mr. Sydnor argued preemptively that his counsel was not required to make another objection "when the court, not seconds before, had overruled the first objection to remarks of substantially similar character . . . and the subsequent comments were a continuation of the original answer."

Rule 4-323(a) requires objections to evidence be made contemporaneous to the entry of that evidence to preserve those objections for our review. To preserve an objection for appellate review, "a party should object to each question or assert a continuing objection to an entire line of questioning." State v. Robertson, 463 Md. 342, 366 (2019). If a party fails to object contemporaneously or assert a continuing objection, "the objection is waived and the issue is not preserved for review." Fone v. State, 233 Md. App. 88, 113 (2017). The contemporaneous objection requirement permits a trial court to "pass upon, and possibly correct any errors in the proceedings," and "prevent[s] the trial of cases in a piecemeal fashion, thus accelerating the termination of litigation." Paige v. State, 226 Md. App. 93, 121-22 (2015) (quoting Fitzgerald v. State, 384 Md. 484, 505 (2004)). If a litigant fails to object, the trial court is deprived of the opportunity to correct any errors in the proceedings. Jordan v. State, 246 Md. App. 561, 587, cert. denied, 471 Md. 120 (2020).

Here, Mr. Sydnor relies on an exception to the contemporaneous objection requirement pursuant to which counsel is "not required to make a second objection when the court, not seconds before, ha[s] overruled [counsel's] first objection to remarks of substantially similar character."¹ Donaldson v. State, 416 Md. 467, 494 n.6 (2010). However, Mr. Sydnor assumes, without any analysis, that all of the remarks to which he refers were of ...