Syeed v. Bloomberg L.P.

• Decision Date: 17 August 2022
• Docket Number: 1:20-cv-7464-GHW
• Parties: NAFEESA SYEED and NAULA NDUGGA, o behalf of themselves and similarly situated women, Plaintiff, v. BLOOMBERG L.P., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

NAFEESA SYEED and NAULA NDUGGA, o behalf of themselves and similarly situated women, Plaintiff,
v.
BLOOMBERG L.P., Defendant.

No. 1:20-cv-7464-GHW

United States District Court, S.D. New York

August 17, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

GREGORY H. WOODS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Naula Ndugga, a Black woman who worked for Defendant Bloomberg L.P.'s (“Bloomberg”) media division in New York, alleges that she was denied promotions for which she was well-qualified, paid less than her male counterparts, subjected to derogatory conduct and remarks targeting her race and gender, and retaliated against for reporting that discriminatory conduct. Accordingly, she brings various claims for discrimination and retaliation against Bloomberg. In a previous opinion, the Court dismissed all claims by Ms. Ndugga's co-plaintiff, Ms. Nafeesa Syeed, and also dismissed Ms. Ndugga's claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as well as Ms. Ndugga's claims for disparate impact under the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”).

In an amended complaint, Ms. Ndugga reasserted her Title VII claims and her disparate impact claims. She also brought claims for retaliation under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL. Defendant moved to dismiss those claims. Because Ms. Ndugga did not file her amended complaint in the 90 days after she received a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), her Title VII claims are dismissed. In addition,

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Ms. Ndugga fails to sufficiently plead a claim for disparate treatment under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL. However, Ms. Ndugga's claim for retaliation may proceed.

II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY^[1]

a. Factual History

In significant part, the facts are set forth in the Court's previous opinion on Defendant's first motion to dismiss. See generally Syeed v. Bloomberg L.P., 568 F.Supp.3d 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (“Syeed I”). To the extent that Plaintiff's newly pleaded allegations are relevant the Court's analysis, those allegations are embedded into the discussion below.

b. Procedural History

The majority of this case's procedural history is discussed in Syeed I. Picking up where that opinion left off, on October 25, 2021, the Court granted in part and denied Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' second amended complaint. See id.; Dkt. No. 50. In that opinion, the Court dismissed Ms. Syeed's claims in full, and dismissed Ms. Ndugga's Title VII claims and her claims for disparate impact and failure to promote under the NYCHRL and NYSHRL. See generally Syeed I. The Court permitted Ms. Ndugga's claims for disparate pay and hostile work environment under the NYCHRL and NYSHRL to proceed. Id.

Plaintiffs amended their complaint for the third time on December 10, 2021. Dkt. No. 59 (“TAC”). On February 18, 2022, Defendant moved to dismiss the third amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 81 (“Mot.”). Plaintiff filed its opposition on March 11, 2022. Dkt. No. 90 (“Opp'n.”). Defendant filed its reply on March 25, 2022. Dkt. No. 91 (“Reply”).

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III. LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A defendant may move to dismiss a claim that does not meet this pleading standard for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). On a motion filed under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts as true the facts alleged in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 551 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). But “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are inadequate. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). And “[t]he tenet that a court must accept” as true a complaint's factual allegations does not apply “to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alterations omitted).

To survive dismissal, a complaint must allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim is plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts to support the reasonable inference that the defendant has acted unlawfully. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plaintiff's claim must be more than merely “speculative.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. And a reviewing court must “draw on its judicial experience and common sense” to determine plausibility. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citation omitted).

On a motion to dismiss, a court must generally “limit itself to the facts stated in the complaint.” Field Day, LLC v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 463 F.3d 167, 192 (2d Cir. 2006). But a court may consider “any ‘written instrument' . . . attached to [the complaint] as ‘an exhibit' or . . . incorporated in it by reference.” Lynch v. City of New York, 952 F.3d 67, 79 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c) (other citations omitted)). A court may also consider a document “solely relie[d]” on by the plaintiff if it “is integral to the complaint.” Id. (quotation and brackets omitted). A document is “integral to the complaint” if the complaint “relies heavily” on the document's “terms and effect.”

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Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 230 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Littlejohn v. City of N.Y., 795 F.3d 297, 305 n.3 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that a court may “consider the plaintiff's relevant filings with the EEOC” on a motion to dismiss if the filings “are integral to and solely relied upon by the complaint” (quotation and brackets omitted)). A plaintiff must “rely on the terms and effect of the document in drafting the complaint; mere notice or possession is not enough.” Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 231 (emphasis added) (quoting Glob. Network Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 458 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 2006).

IV. DISCUSSION

a. Ms. Ndugga's Title VII Claims Are Dismissed

Ms. Ndugga's Title VII claims, TAC ¶¶ 81-96, are dismissed because they were not timely filed within the 90-day period after she received a right to sue letter from the EEOC.^[2] “As a precondition to filing a Title VII claim in federal court, a plaintiff must first pursue available administrative remedies and file a timely complaint with the EEOC.” Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 2003); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)-(f). “Exhaustion of administrative remedies through the EEOC is ‘an essential element' of the Title VII . . . statutory scheme[] and, as such, a precondition to bringing such claims in federal court.” Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 274 F.3d 683, 686 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (quoting Francis v. City of New York, 235 F.3d 763, 768 (2d Cir. 2000)). “The purpose of this exhaustion requirement is to give the administrative agency

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the opportunity to investigate, mediate, and take remedial action.” Fowlkes v. Ironworkers Local 40, 790 F.3d 378, 384 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706, 712 (2d Cir. 1998)). That purpose “would be defeated if a complainant could litigate a claim not previously presented to and investigated by the EEOC.” Miller v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 755 F.2d 20, 26 (2d Cir. 1985).

Under Title VII's exhaustion requirements, a “right-to-sue letter is a necessary prerequisite to filing suit.” Newsome v. Berman, 24 Fed.Appx. 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3); 29 C.F.R. 1601.28(e)(1)). Title VII expressly provides that a plaintiff must receive a right-to-sue letter before filing a civil action asserting a Title VII claim:

If a charge filed with the Commission . . . is dismissed by the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge . . . the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section . . . or the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission . . . shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge . . . by the person claiming to be aggrieved ....

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (emphasis added). “[A] plaintiff s failure to obtain a notice-of-right-to-sue-letter is not a jurisdictional bar, but only a precondition to bringing a Title VII action that can be waived by the parties or the court[,]” and accordingly, a failure to obtain a right-to-sue letter can be excused by the Court on equitable grounds. Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm'rs of Farmingville Fire Dist., 180 F.3d 468, 474 (2d Cir. 1999).

“If the EEOC issues a notice of a plaintiff's right to sue, then that plaintiff must file their court case within 90 days after receipt of the notice to avoid being time barred.” McLeod v. 1199 SEIU United Healthcare, No. 1:17-CV-7500-GHW, 2019 WL 1428433, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)); Pohlman v. Vill. of Freeport, No. 19CV05277DLIRLM, 2020 WL 5878257, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2020) (“[A] claim under Title VII must be filed within 90 days of the claimant's receipt of a right-to-sue letter.”). “The 90-day limit is not jurisdictional but rather

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operates as a statute of limitations.” Poniatowski v. Johnson, No. 1:13-CV-1490-GHW, 2014 WL 3844790, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2014). Thus, it “is subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling.” Barbosa v. Continuum Health Partners, Inc., 716 F.Supp.2d 210, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Vollinger v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 198 F.Supp.2d 433, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he [90]-day filing requirement is akin to a statute of limitations and is subject to waiver, equitable estoppel, and equitable tolling.”).

Here, Ms. Ndugga received her right to sue letter on February 2, 2021. TAC ¶ 6. The third amended...