Sykes v. State

• Decision Date: 14 January 1904
• Parties: SYKES v. STATE.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

82 S.W. 185

112 Tenn. 572

SYKES v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

January 14, 1904

Appeal from Circuit Court, Smith County; Cordell Hull, Judge.

W. J Sykes was convicted of violating the age of consent law, and appeals. Affirmed.

Hale & Lee, for appellant.

Chas T. Cates, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Fisher & Fisher, for the State

NEIL J. (after stating the facts).

There was no error in the action of the circuit judge.

The general rule is that evidence of offenses other than that for which the defendant is on trial cannot be introduced. Kinchelow v. State, 5 Humph. 10. But there are well-established exceptions. Peek v. State, 2 Humph. 78; Williams v. State, 8 Humph. 585; Britt v State, 9 Humph. 31; Defrese v. State, 3 Heisk. 53, 8 Am. Rep. 1; Cole v. State, 6 Baxt. 239; Dobson v. State, 5 Lea, 273; Mynatt v. State, 8 Lea, 47; Murphy v. State, 9 Lea, 377; Links v. State, 13 Lea, 710, 711; Foute v. State, 15 Lea, 719; Rafferty v. State, 91 Tenn. 655, 664, 665 16 S.W. 728. The principle is that no evidence is competent which is not of a character to throw light on the issue, and it is usually true that proof of other crimes committed will not reflect any light upon the special crime with which the defendant stands charged. But in a case like the one before us other acts of intercourse do illustrate and tend to prove the commission of the particular act of intercourse which the state has elected to try the prisoner on, because they show the relations--the state of intimacy-- existing between the prisoner and the girl, and tend to make very probable the commission of the crime charged.

In the class of cases we are dealing with, and in cognate cases, there is a conflict of authority as to whether evidence may be introduced tending to show subsequent acts, but the great weight of authority is in favor of the admissibility of prior acts. Bass v. State, 103 Ga. 227, 29 S.E. 966; Taylor v. State, 110 Ga. 150, 35 S.E. 161; Com. v.

Lahey, 14 Gray, 91; State v. Snover, 64 N. J. Law, 65, 44 A. 850; State v. Jackson, 65 N. J. Law, 62, 46 A. 767; State v. Kemp, 87 N.C. 538; State v. Pippin, 88 N.C. 646; State v. Guest, 100 N.C. 410, 6 S.E. 253; State v. Dukes, 119 N.C. 782, 25 S.E. 786; Com. v. Bell, 166 Pa. 405, 31 A. 123; State v. Potter, 52 Vt. 33; Crane v. People, 65 Ill.App. 492; State v. Briggs, 68 Iowa, 416, 27 N.W. 358; State v. Henderson, 84 Iowa, 161, 50 N.W. 758; State v. Clawson, 32 Mo.App. 93; Lawson v. State, 20 Ala. 65, 56 Am. Dec. 182; McLeod v. State, 35 Ala. 395; Cross v. State, 78 Ala. 430; Brevaldo v. State, 21 Fla. 789; United States v. Griego (N. M.) 72 P. 20; People v. Patterson, 102 Cal. 239, 36 P. 436; People v. Jenness, 5 Mich. 305; People v. Skutt, 96 Mich. 449, 56 N.W. 11; People v. Schilling, 110 Mich. 412, 68 N.W. 233; State v. Markins, 95 Ind. 464, 48 Am. Rep. 733; Lefforge v. State, 129 Ind. 551, 29 N.E. 834; State v. De Hart, 109 La. 570, 33 So. 605--cases covering prosecutions for various forms of illicit commerce between the sexes--fornication, adultery, and incest.

Upon the trial of an indictment for rape in the second degree--a crime in substance the same as the violation of the age of consent law in this state--it was held in New York that evidence of prior acts of intercourse between the defendant and the female in question was admissible, as tending to establish the commission of the special act under examination, and to corroborate the evidence of witnesses testifying thereto. People v. Grauer, 12 A.D. 464, 42 N.Y.S. 721. To same effect, see State v. Peres, 27 Mont. 358, 71 P. 162; Reg. v. Chambers, 3 Cox, C. C. 92.

In a prosecution for an assault with intent to commit rape, it has been held in this state that evidence of prior assaults for the same purpose was admissible, as tending to show the intent with which the assault in question was made. Williams v. State, supra. See, also, People v. O'Sullivan, 104 N.Y. 481, 10 N.E. 880, 58 Am. Rep. 530; State v. Scott, 172 Mo. 536, 72 S.W. 897; People v. Abbott, 97 Mich. 484, 56 N.W. 862, 37 Am. St. Rep. 360; State v. Walters, 45 Iowa, 389.

In prosecutions for lewdness, it has been held in this state that it is competent to prove both prior and subsequent acts. Mynatt v. State, supra, Cole v. State, supra. In the following cases, arising in other jurisdictions, it has likewise been held that, in prosecutions for sexual crimes, it is competent to introduce evidence of subsequent acts in corroboration or explanation of the act in question, or for the purpose of showing the relation and mutual disposition of the parties, viz.: Lawson v. State, supra; Alsabrooks v. State, 52 Ala. 24; Crane v. People, 65 Ill.App. 492, affirmed in 168 Ill. 395, 48 N.E. 54; State v. Withom, 72 Me. 531; State v. Williams, 76 Me. 480; State v. Way, 5 Neb. 283; State v. Robertson, 121 N.C. 551, 28 S.E. 59.

The following observations upon the general subject occurring in Thayer v. Thayer, 101 Mass. 111, 100 Am. Dec. 110 are deemed useful in the present inquiry, although that was an action for divorce. In disapproving of Com. v. Horton, 2 Gray, 354, and particularly of Com. v. Thrasher, 11 Gray, 450 (both prosecutions for adultery), in which latter case it had been held that prior acts of improper familiarity, which themselves amounted to adultery between the same persons, were inadmissible either in corroboration of witnesses for the commonwealth, or to show the disposition of the parties to commit the crime, the court said: "But by the application of the rule laid down in these cases, evidence tending to establish an independent crime is to be rejected, although all acts which are only acts of improper familiarity are to be admitted in proof. There is no sound distinction to be thus drawn. There is no difference between acts of familiarity and actual adultery committed, when offered for the purpose indicated, except in the additional weight and significance of the latter fact. The adulterous disposition of the defendant and the particeps criminis cannot be shown by stronger evidence than the criminal act itself. There is no one act by which the moral status of the parties is more clearly defined, and, for the purposes and with the limitations here stated, evidence of it is always admissible." And the court also said: "The fact that the conduct relied on has occurred since the filing of the libel does not exclude it, and proof of the continuance of the same questionable relations during the intervening time, as in the case at bar, will add to its weight." This case was followed and approved in Com. v. Nichols, 114 Mass. 285, 19 Am. Rep. 346, wherein it was held that, on the trial of an indictment for adultery, evidence of...