Sylvester v. Pipino
| Decision Date | 19 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 1:12-cv-00057 (jgm) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Vermont |
| Parties | WAYNE SYLVESTER, Plaintiff, v. NICHOLAS PIPINO Defendant. |
(Docs. 8, 20)
The Plaintiff in this action seeks damages for injuries purportedly caused by an automobile collision in Massachusetts. (Doc. 1.) The Defendant moves to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue. (Doc. 8.) The Plaintiff opposes this motion (Doc. 19), and alternatively moves to transfer this action to the District of Connecticut. (Doc. 20.) His transfer motion is unopposed. For the reasons set forth below, the Court reserves ruling on the pending motions, and ORDERS the parties to show cause within fourteen days why it should not transfer this action to the District of Massachusetts, and invites responsive memoranda within seven days after this deadline.
On March 21, 2009, the Defendant lost control of his vehicle as he merged onto I-91 in Northhampton, Massachusetts. (Doc. 19-3 at 3.) His vehicle spun into oncoming traffic, colliding with a vehicle in which the Plaintiff was a passenger. Id. The collision injured the Plaintiff, whoresides in Irasburg, Vermont. Id. The Defendant has lived in West Hartford, Connecticut since 1998. (Doc. 19-4 at 7.) The collision occurred on his drive home from visiting a friend in Massachusetts. Id. at 20-21.
The Defendant attends college and works at a supermarket in Connecticut. Id. at 9-11. He orders groceries for the supermarket through an electronic system. Id. at 17. The Defendant acknowledges that he "order[s] a lot of stuff" and has ordered groceries from "mom-and-pop" distributors in Vermont. Id. at 16. The supermarket has three large distributors that the Defendant deals with regularly. Id. None of these distributors are located in Vermont. Id. He only orders from small distributors "here and there." Id. Because he places the orders electronically, the Defendant notes he "never really establishe[s] a rapport with" the distributors. Id. at 17.
The Defendant has worked at the supermarket since 2007. Id. at 15. From 1998 to 2007, he placed orders for several other stores in Connecticut. Id. at 10-14. There is no evidence he ordered from distributors in Vermont while at these stores. See id.
The Defendant has visited Vermont three times. Id. at 18-20, 23-24. In addition to driving through Vermont in 2004, he attended a concert in Vermont in 2010 or 2011. Id. at 18-20. He also traveled to Vermont in 2012 to reunite with his half-sister. Id. at 18, 23-24.
When a defendant moves to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 196-97 (2d Cir. 1990). A plaintiff satisfies this burden before discovery "with legally sufficient allegations that present prima facie evidence of proper jurisdiction." Anichini, Inc. v. Campbell, No. 1:05-cv-55, 2005 WL 2464191, at *1 (D. Vt. Oct. 4, 2005) (internalquotations omitted). At this preliminary stage, a court "evaluates the plaintiff's pleadings and affidavits, construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolves any doubts in the plaintiff's favor." Id. (citing cases).
A two-part inquiry governs personal jurisdiction determinations. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 567 (2d Cir. 1996). The courts first review the applicable long-arm statute and next consider whether jurisdiction violates due process. Id. at 567-68. Because Vermont's long-arm statute allows jurisdiction over a defendant to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause, the inquiry in Vermont is reduced only to the due process analysis. KBA N. Am. Inc. v. Amerigraph, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-118, 2007 WL 4119119, at *2 (D. Vt. Nov. 16, 2007). The due process analysis requires courts to consider: (1) whether the defendant has sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum state, and (2) if such contacts exist, whether jurisdiction based on such contacts is reasonable under the circumstances of the particular case. Id.
To satisfy the first prong of this analysis, a nonresident defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state that the defendant "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc. v. Coronet Priscilla Ice Cream Corp., 921 F. Supp. 1206, 1209 (D. Vt. 1996) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). A defendant should "reasonably anticipate" out-of-state litigation when it "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum [s]tate, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its law." Id. at 1209-10 (Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
A showing of either "specific" or "general" jurisdiction may satisfy the minimum contacts requirement. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 84 F.3d at 567. Specific jurisdiction exists where a claim "aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant's contacts with the forum." Id. at 567-68 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)). The automobile collision giving riseto this lawsuit occurred in Massachusetts as the Defendant drove to Connecticut. The Plaintiff has not alleged any relationship between the collision, the Defendant, and Vermont, making an exercise of specific jurisdiction inappropriate here. See Doc. 19 at 2. The Plaintiff must therefore satisfy the "more stringent minimum contacts test" for general jurisdiction cases by demonstrating the Defendant has "continuous and systematic general business contacts" with Vermont. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 84 F.3d at 568.
The Plaintiff's prima facie jurisdictional showing falls short of establishing continuous and systematic contacts with Vermont. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to him, the Plaintiff has shown that the Defendant: (1) traveled through Vermont in 2004; (2) attended a concert in Vermont in 2010 or 2011; (3) visited his half-sister in Vermont in 2012; and (4) has ordered groceries for his current employer from Vermont. Doc. 19 at 2. The Defendant's three visits to Vermont over an eight-year period by no means constitute continuous and systematic contacts. See Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93 (1978) (). These brief visits are neither frequent nor significant enough for the Defendant to reasonably anticipate that a Vermont court might subject him to jurisdiction. See Xiu Feng Li v. Hock, 371 Fed. App'x. 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 576 (2010) ().
Even adding the grocery orders to this calculus, this Court still lacks jurisdiction. See Metro. Life Ins. Co., 84 F.3d at 570 (). The Plaintiff has alleged the Defendant orders groceries from distributors in Vermont on behalf of his employer. There is no allegation the Defendant established the relationship his employer has with the distributors. Nor does the Plaintiff allege the Defendant personally contracts to purchase thegroceries. The Defendant just places the orders for his employer through an electronic system. The Supreme Court has made clear that "mere purchases [of products] . . . are not enough to warrant a [s]tate's assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in a cause of action not related to those purchase transactions." Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 466 U.S. at 418. See also Artec Distrib., Inc. v. Video Playback, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1558, 1561 (D. Vt. 1992) (). Taken together, the Defendant's placement of grocery orders and three visits do not constitute continuous and systematic contacts for personal jurisdiction purposes. Because the Defendant lacks sufficient minimum contacts with Vermont, this Court will not consider the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over him. See KBA N. Am. Inc., 2007 WL 4119119, at *2-3. The Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing that a Vermont court may exercise jurisdiction over the Defendant.
In addition, venue is improper in Vermont because: (1) the Defendant does not reside in Vermont; (2) the collision did not occur in Vermont; and (3) the Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in Connecticut, where he resides, and Massachusetts, where the collision occurred. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Accordingly, if it could exercise personal jurisdiction over the Defendant, this Court would nevertheless dismiss this action for improper venue under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3).
In lieu of dismissing an action for lack of personal jurisdiction or improper venue, a court may instead transfer it to an appropriate federal court. The Plaintiff moves to transfer this action to the District of Connecticut under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (Doc. 20 at 3.) However, because the Courtlacks jurisdiction and venue is improper, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)2 is the applicable transfer provision here. Matera v. Native Eyewear, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 2d 680, 687 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). Section 1406(a) provides that "[t]he district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong . . . district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district . . . in which it could have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). A court may transfer an action under section 1406(a) even if it lacks personal jurisdiction and proper venue over the action. SongByrd,...
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