Syme v. Riddle

• Decision Date: 28 February 1883
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: ANDREW SYME, Adm'r, v. WILLIAM D. RIDDLE.

88 N.C. 463

ANDREW SYME, Adm'r,

v.WILLIAM D. RIDDLE.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

February Term, 1883.

SPECIAL PROCEEDING heard at Spring Term, 1883, of WAKE Superior Court, before Philips, J.

This is a proceeding begun before the probate judge for the purpose of making real estate assets, and after issues joined it was certified to the superior court.

It is conceded that the plaintiff's intestate left no personal property, and that she owned no real estate except that described in the complaint. She died in 1874, and the plaintiff qualified as her administrator in 1878. Shortly before her death, she conveyed the land to the defendant in fee simple, but the plaintiff insists that this was done with the intent to defraud her creditors, and therefore the conveyance was void. The defendant denies this, and also, that the intestate was indebted to any one at the time of her death, and for a further defence relies upon the statute of limitations.

When the cause was called for trial, the plaintiff requested the court not to submit an issue to the jury as to the statute of limitations, insisting that no one but the administrator could avail himself of that defence, and especially that a fraudulent donee could not do so. His Honor, however, overruled the motion, and submitted such issue, to which the plaintiff excepted.

Upon the point as to the statute, the facts are as follows: One Mrs. Sprinkle, whose intermarriage with her present husband took place in 1866, rendered personal services to the intestate in the years 1868, 1869, 1870 and 1871, at the rate of thirty dollars per year, and this constitutes the only debt due from the estate.

Thereupon the judge below ruled that the husband of Mrs. Sprinkle was entitled jure mariti to the proceeds of her services; that it was open to the defendant to set up the defence of the statute of limitations, even admitting the conveyance to him to have been fraudulent; and that the debt for which the plaintiff sought to sell the land was barred by the statute, so far as the defendant was concerned. The plaintiff excepted.

The court refused to grant an order for the sale of the land, and the plaintiff appealed.

Messrs. Hinsdale & Devereux and Argo & Wilder, for plaintiff .

Messrs. Battle & Mordecai, for defendant .

RUFFIN, J.

Unquestionably, it was the well settled principle, both of law and equity, as understood and enforced in this state prior to the adoption of the constitution of 1868, and the “marriage act” of 1871-'72, that the husband was entitled absolutely and in his own right to the services of the wife, and likewise to the fruits of her industry, whether exerted in his own affairs or in those of a stranger. He alone could receipt for, or discharge a debt arising from her services, or, if withheld, could sue for and recover it.

These rights were given to the husband, because of the obligation which the same law imposed upon him, to provide for her support and that of her offspring; and it would seem to be but just that they should continue unimpaired, so long as that obligation rests upon him.

The question as to the effect of the changes, which have been wrought in the law by the new constitution and the “marriage act” upon this right of the husband to the services and earnings of his wife, was incidentally considered in Baker v. Jordan, 73 N. C., 145, the late Chief-Justice delivering the opinion of the court. It was there said that the husband has still, notwithstanding those changes, the same right in this regard as under the...