Symonds v. St. Louis & S.E. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 November 1911
• Citation: 192 F. 353
• Parties: SYMONDS v. ST. LOUIS & S.E. RY. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas

192 F. 353

SYMONDS v. ST. LOUIS & S.E. RY. CO.

United States Circuit Court, W.D. Arkansas, Texarkana Division.

November 20, 1911

Richard M. Mann, for plaintiff.

Gaughan & Sifford, for defendant.

YOUMANS District Judge.

This is a motion to remand a case brought in a state court under what is known as the 'Employer's Liability Act.' The case is here on removal from the Lafayette county circuit court on the ground of diverse citizenship. The right of removal depends on the construction given to section 6 of said act, as amended by an act approved April 5 1910 (36 Stat. 291, c. 43). That part of the section applicable to this question is as follows:

'Under this act an action may be brought in a Circuit Court of the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this act shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several states, and no case arising under this act and brought in any state court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United States.'

It is contended by the defendant that the language, 'and no case arising under this act and brought in any state court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United States,' was intended to apply only to the ground of removal based on the existence of a federal question, and was not intended to apply to diverse citizenship. It must be conceded that the words of the sentence above quoted are comprehensive. They include every case arising under the act and brought in a state court. There is no qualification or exception. Giving to the language its common meaning, it excludes removal on any ground. What reason can be assigned for qualifying that meaning by construction? The only reason given is an assumption that Congress did not intend to give as wide application as the language indicates. This assumption can find no justification in the language itself. Section 2 of article 3 of the Constitution provides that:

'The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States and treaties made or which shall be made, under their authority, to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more states, between a state and citizens of another state, between citizens of different states,' etc.

The jurisdiction so given did not depend on the amount involved. Notwithstanding that fact, the first judiciary act, passed in 1789 (Act Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, 1 Stat. 73), excluded from the jurisdiction of the United States Circuit Courts all cases of a civil nature involving sums or values that did not exceed $500. In 1887 (Act March 3, 1887, c. 373, 24 Stat. 552) and 1888 (Act Aug. 13, 1888, c. 866, 25 Stat. 433 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 508)), Congress provided that the United States Circuit Courts should have jurisdiction in civil causes only where the amount involved exceeded the sum or value of $2,000. Under the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1087), which goes into effect January 1, 1912, the matter in controversy must exceed the sum or value of $3,000. These restrictions on the jurisdiction of the federal courts have been sustained, and their legality is not open to question. Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441, 12 L.Ed. 1147. A case may be removable prior to January 1, 1912. The same case, brought after that date, may not be removable. A statute must unite with the Constitution to give the right of removal, or to make the exercise of that right possible. It cannot be said that Congress is without power to deny removal. Therefore, if the plain meaning of the language of the statute is to deny such right, the discussion is closed.

This is the conclusion reached on this question by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in the case of Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Cook, 140 S.W. 579, in an opinion rendered on October 23, 1911. In that case the court said:

'It is next insisted that this statute does not repeal or affect former statutes giving the right of removal on account of diversity of citizenship, and does not deprive the defendant of the right of removal where that ground exists. It is argued that the purpose of the statute in question was to give the federal and state courts concurrent jurisdiction, and merely to prohibit removal on the ground that a federal question is involved, and that it was not intended to change the law with reference to removal on the ground of diversity of citizenship. It appears to us very clear that this contention is unsound, and in disposing of it we need only to refer to the plain language of the statute, which declares that 'no case arising under this act and brought in any state court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United States.' The language of the statute is emphatic, and admits of no exceptions whatever. It evinces a clear intention on the part of the lawmakers to give the state courts concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts in the enforcement of this statute, and to prohibit the removal of any action

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