Synagro-Wwt, Inc. v. Rush Tp., Pennsylvania

• Decision Date: 22 December 2003
• Docket Number: No. 4:CV-00-1625.,4:CV-00-1625.
• Citation: 299 F.Supp.2d 410
• Parties: SYNAGRO-WWT, INC., Plaintiff, v. RUSH TOWNSHIP, PENNSYLVANIA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

299 F.Supp.2d 410

SYNAGRO-WWT, INC., Plaintiff, v. RUSH TOWNSHIP, PENNSYLVANIA, Defendant.

No. 4:CV-00-1625.

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

December 22, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James B. Slaughter, David W. Wagner, Beveridge & Diamond, P.C., Washington, DC, Robert E. Thomas, Kaminsky, Thomas, Wharton & Lovette, Johnstown, PA, for Synagro-WWT, Inc., Plaintiff.

David J. MacMain, Montgomery McCracken Walker & Rhoads, Philadelphia, PA, George Test, Killian & Gephart, LLP, Michael J. O'Connor, Killian & Gephart, LLP, Paula J. McDermott, Duane Morris LLP, Thomas W. Scott, Killian & Gephart, Harrisburg, PA, for Rush Township, Pennsylvania, Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

MCCLURE, District Judge.

BACKGROUND:

Plaintiff, Synagro-WTT, Inc. (Synagro), initiated this civil action against defendant, Rush Township, Pennsylvania, to challenge the validity of a municipal ordinance (the Ordinance) enacted by defendant. The Ordinance imposes certain requirements on companies wishing to transport and to apply sewage sludge to lands within the township.

Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the Ordinance was preempted by various federal and state statutes, an injunction against the enforcement of the Ordinance, and damages. Plaintiff specifically alleged that: (1) the Ordinance is preempted by the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Count I); (2) the Ordinance is preempted by the Pennsylvania Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act (PaSMCRA), 52 P.S. §§ 1396.1-1396.31 (Count II); (3) the Ordinance violates the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution (Count III); (4) the Ordinance violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution (Count IV); (5) the Ordinance violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution (Count V); (6) the Ordinance violates the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution (Count VI); (7) the Ordinance is preempted by three other Pennsylvania statutes: the Nutrient Management Act (NMA), 3 P.S. § 1701 et seq., the Solid Waste Management Act (SWMA), 35 P.S. § 6018.101 et seq., and the Sewage Facilities Act (SFA), 35 P.S. § 750.1 et seq. (Count VII); (8) the Ordinance violates the Contract Clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions (Count VIII); and (9) the enactment of the Ordinance was an ultra vires action (Count IX).

Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint and alternatively moved for a more definite statement, and also requested that the court abstain from deciding the state law preemption issues. On June 7, 2002, the court denied defendant's request to abstain and request for a more definite statement. The court did, however, partially grant defendant's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and disposed of a number of plaintiff's claims. See Synagro-WWT, Inc. v. Rush Township, Pennsylvania, 204 F.Supp.2d 827, 850 (M.D.Pa.2002). Following the court's June 7th ruling, only the following counts remained: (1) whether the Ordinance violates the Commerce Clause (Count IV); (2) whether three Pennsylvania statutes, NMA, SWMA, SFA, preempt the Ordinance (Count VII); and (3) whether the enactment of the Ordinance was an ultra vires action (Count IX).

Prior to the court's ruling, plaintiff had moved for partial summary judgment on the preemption issues raised in Counts I, II, and VII. As Counts I and II have been dismissed, only Count VII remains the subject of plaintiff's motion. In its opposition to plaintiff's motion, defendant cross-moved for summary judgment as well. These cross-motions for partial summary judgment are now before the court, and are fully briefed by the parties as well as by numerous amici curiae.

We continue to have both federal question and diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.

DISCUSSION:

I. Statement of Relevant Facts

The parties are familiar with the facts of this case, so we only briefly recite the relevant, material facts, which we have previously set forth in Synagro-WWT, Inc. v. Rush Township, Pennsylvania (Synagro), 204 F.Supp.2d 827 (M.D.Pa. 2002).

Plaintiff is in the business of managing treated municipal sewage sludge (or "biosolids") for municipal treatment plants throughout the United States. Among plaintiff's services is the land application of sewage sludge to surface mine reclamation sites.

In Pennsylvania, the application of biosolids to land sites is overseen by the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). "Synagro has 5 sites in Rush Township that are permitted for mine reclamation with biosolids. Synagro received from the DEP all of the necessary permits and approvals required for it to apply biosolids to the sites. At the time Synagro filed its complaint, certain sites had yet to be reclaimed." Synagro, 204 F.Supp.2d at 833.

"After Synagro began biosolids application in one of its land sites, Rush Township enacted the Land Application of Sewage Sludge Ordinance. The Ordinance's stated purpose is `[t]o protect the health, safety and general welfare of all township citizens and other persons by seeking to prevent exposure to any toxic or other harmful material contained in sewage sludge ....'" (Ordinance, Attached to Compl., Rec. Doc. No. 1, at § 1.1(A).) The Ordinance applies to "all current existing permits issued or authorized by PA DEP for the land application of sewage sludge in Rush Township. (Id. at § 10.)" Synagro, 204 F.Supp.2d at 833.

"The Ordinance claims to be consistent with federal and state regulation of sewage sludge, but it sets forth additional preliminary procedural requirements of any entity that wishes to apply sewage sludge in Rush Township. Before sewage sludge may be applied in Rush Township, two documents must be obtained. First, the wastewater treatment facility that generates the sewage sludge must obtain a `Site Registration,' which is a document that confirms that the proposed site meets all federal, state, and local regulations pertaining to the application of sewage sludge. Second, the entity applying the sewage sludge must obtain a `Land Application Registration,' which is an authorization by Rush Township to apply sewage sludge on agricultural lands within the township." Id.

"The Ordinance mandates a considerable number of procedural requirements for obtaining a Site Registration and a Land Application Registration. An applicant must submit all DEP application material to Rush Township for review and consideration. In addition, the applicant must subject the featured land to many tests, including soil analysis and groundwater analysis. After completing the tests, the applicant must provide Rush Township with reports based on these tests. The applicant also must submit documents such as a map of the surface waters on the proposed site and a memorialization of a county-approved plan to manage surface water and control erosion on the site." Id.

"In addition to prescribing requirements for obtaining Site Registration and a Land Application Registration, the Ordinance regulates the transportation of sewage sludge. For example, the Ordinance requires that sewage sludge may be transported within Rush Township only from the hours of 6:00 AM to dusk, Monday through Friday." Id.

"The provisions of the ordinance are enforced by the Rush Township Board of Supervisors. An amendment to the ordinance, enacted on November 4, 1999, requires a tipping fee of $40.00 per ton of sewage sludge applied upon any land in Rush Township."¹ Id.

"Synagro claims that the requirements imposed by the Ordinance have, among other things, forced it to find land sites in other Townships; it alleges in excess of $2,560,000 in damages." Id.

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 130 n. 6 (3d Cir.2001).

An issue is "genuine" if a reasonable jury could find for either party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "Material" facts are those that might affect the outcome of the case. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Initially, the moving party bears the burden of stating the basis for its motions and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. "It can discharge that burden by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Once the moving party points to evidence demonstrating that no issue of material fact exists, the non-moving party has the duty to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists and that a reasonable fact-finder could rule in its favor. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E, ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir.1999) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). Although "[s]peculation and conclusory allegations do not satisfy this duty," Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 252 (citing Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 637 (3d Cir.1995)), all inferences are made in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001); Carter v. Exxon Co. USA, 177 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir.1999).

III. Standing

Preliminarily, we comment that plaintiff has correctly observed that the court implicitly found that plaintiff has standing to seek a declaratory judgment on the issue of preemption. We now make this point explicit.

"Constitutional standing requires pleadings that show (1) a...