Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Bunge N. Am., Inc.
| Decision Date | 21 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. C 11–4074–MWB.,C 11–4074–MWB. |
| Parties | SYNGENTA SEEDS, INC., Plaintiff, v. BUNGE NORTH AMERICA, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Daniel J. Brown, Mariah Reynolds, Steven J. Wells, Theresa M. Bevilacqua, Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, Minneapolis, MN, David A. Tank, Angela Ellen Dralle, Megan Flynn, Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.
Christopher M. Hohn, David B. Jinkins, John Reynolds Musgrave, Mark Sableman, Matthew A. Braunel, Thompson Coburn, LLP, St. Louis, MO, John C. Gray, Heidman Redmond Fredregill Patterson Plaza Dykstra & Prahl, Sioux City, IA, for Defendant.
This is an action by plaintiff Syngenta Seeds, Inc., the producer of seed for corn with the Viptera™ genetic trait,1 against defendant Bunge North America, the operator of grain and milling facilities and grain warehouses (or elevators) in the central United States, including two facilities in Iowa. Syngenta asserts several claims arising from Bunge's refusal to accept Viptera corn from growers at its facilities, on the ground that Viptera corn has not received approval from “major” export destinations, and from Bunge's posting of signs stating its policy of refusing Viptera corn. I previously rejected Syngenta's request for a preliminary injunction enjoining Bunge from refusing to accept transgenic corn grown from Syngenta's seed. See Memorandum Opinion And Order Regarding Plaintiff's Motion For Preliminary Injunction (docket no. 42), published at Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Bunge North Am., Inc., 820 F.Supp.2d 953 (N.D.Iowa 2011).
This case is before me on three motions. The first is Bunge's October 14, 2011, Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings (docket no. 48), in which Bunge seeks judgment on the pleadings on Syngenta's claims in Count II (violation of the United States Warehouse Act (USWA), 7 U.S.C. § 241 et seq., and 7 C.F.R. § 735.9(a)), Count III (violation of common-law requirements to accept grain as a public utility or, alternatively, violation of IOWA CODE § 203C.27), Count IV (declaratory judgment of violations of federal and state warehousing laws), and Count IX (breach of contract as a third-party beneficiary of defendant Bunge's Licensing Agreement for Grain and Rice Warehouse Operators with the USDA Farm Service Agency (FSA)). The second motion is Bunge's November 21, 2011, Motion For Summary Judgment (docket no. 56), in which Bunge seeks summary judgment on Syngenta's claim in Count I (false advertising and/or promotion in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)).2 The last motion is Syngenta's September 25, 2012, Motion For Leave To Supplement Summary Judgment Record (docket no. 98), which seeks to supplement the record after the close of targeted discovery and supplemental briefing pursuant to Local Rule 56.h. and Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. My crowded schedule has not permitted timely oral arguments on these motions, and I find that the motions are thoroughly briefed, so that they may be deemed fully submitted on the written submissions.
In its first dispositive motion, Bunge asserts that it is entitled to judgment on the pleadings on the four claims at issue as a matter of law for essentially the reasons that I concluded that Syngenta had no likelihood of success on the merits on those claims when I rejected Syngenta's request for a preliminary injunction. Indeed, most of Syngenta's Resistance (docket no. 50) is a reassertion of arguments that I rejected in my ruling denying a preliminary injunction. In its Reply (docket no. 54), Bunge points out what it believes are the failings of Syngenta's few “new” arguments.
“As a general rule, a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed under the same standard as a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Ginsburg v. InBev NV/SA, 623 F.3d 1229, 1233 n. 3 (8th Cir.2010); accord Gallagher v. City of Clayton, 699 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir.2012). Thus,
“To survive a motion to dismiss [or a motion for judgment on the pleadings], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconductalleged.” Id. While this court must “accept as true all facts pleaded by the non-moving party and grant all reasonable inferences from the pleadings in favor of the non-moving party,” United States v. Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equip., 207 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir.2000), “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955).
Gallagher, 699 F.3d at 1016. Furthermore, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)—and, hence, judgment pursuant to Rule 12(c)—is appropriate when a claim or action is fatally flawed in its legal premises. See Stringer v. St. James R–1 Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 799, 802 (8th Cir.2006) (citing Young v. City of St. Charles, 244 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir.2001)).
a. The USWA claim
As to Syngenta's USWA claim in Count II, nothing in Syngenta's reiterated arguments convinces me that I was wrong in holding that the USWA does not create a private right of action in Syngenta's favor. See...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Peters v. Woodbury Cnty.
...not consider new arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. See, e.g., Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Bunge North America, Inc., 906 F.Supp.2d 827, 832 (N.D.Iowa 2012); Truckenmiller v. Burgess Health Ctr., 814 F.Supp.2d 894, 907 n. 3 (N.D.Iowa 2011) (citing Armstrong v. American Pallet......