Synoracki v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 May 2022
• Docket Number: C18-1784RSL
• Parties: LEO SYNORACKI, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ALASKA AIRLINES, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington

LEO SYNORACKI, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ALASKA AIRLINES, INC., et al., Defendants.

No. C18-1784RSL

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle

May 31, 2022

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on “Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.” Dkt. # 49. Plaintiff asserts that defendants violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”), 38 U.S.C. § 4301, et. seq., when they (1) denied the accrual of sick time during periods of military leave and (2) denied the accrual of vacation time during the first 90 days of military leave. The Court certified a sub-class for both the sick time and vacation time claims. Defendants argue that the claims fail as a matter of law.

Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact that would preclude the entry of judgment as a matter of law. The party seeking summary dismissal of the case “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion” (Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S 317, 323 (1986)) and “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” that show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Once the moving ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT party has satisfied its burden, it is entitled to summary judgment if the non-moving party fails to designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. The Court will “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.” Colony Cove Props., LLC v. City of Carson, 888 F.3d 445, 450 (9th Cir. 2018). Although the Court must reserve for the trier of fact genuine issues regarding credibility, the weight of the evidence, and legitimate inferences, the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position will be insufficient” to avoid judgment. City of Pomona v SQMN. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 2014); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Factual disputes whose resolution would not affect the outcome of the suit are irrelevant to the consideration of a motion for summary judgment. S. Cal. Darts Ass 'n v. Zaffina, 762 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 2014). In other words, summary judgment should be granted where the nonmoving party fails to offer evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could return a verdict in its favor. Singh v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 925 F.3d 1053, 1071 (9th Cir. 2019).

Having reviewed the memoranda, declarations, and exhibits submitted by the parties, having heard the arguments of counsel, and taking the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff the Court finds as follows:

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff and the class he represents are current or former employees of defendant Alaska Airlines, Inc., ^[1] who are or were military service members. During the class period, plaintiff was a member of the Reserve Component of the United States Air Force. In that role, he took approximately 71 military leaves of absences, some of which lasted months at a time and which together totaled over 2, 500 days.^[2] Plaintiff retired from the Reserves as a Lieutenant Colonel on April 1, 2017.

Since the beginning of the class period on October 10, 2004, employment as a pilot for Alaska Airlines has been governed by a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). The CBA governs the accrual of sick and vacation hours, but the provisions have changed over time as discussed below.

A. Sick Leave (Section 14 of the CBA)

Prior to May 2009, Alaska Airlines pilots accrued sick time for each month of their employment, regardless whether they were on a leave of absence (military or otherwise). Since May 2009, however, a pilot accrues sick time “for each Month he receives compensation from Alaska Airlines for six (6) or more hours of work performed.” Dkt. # 50-1 at 42. Pilots on military leave accrue sick leave for each month in which they “perform work for Alaska Airlines without regards to the six (6) hour threshold.” Id.

B. Vacation (Section 7 of the CBA)

Throughout the class period, Alaska Airlines pilots have accrued vacation time in any month in which they satisfy a specified work requirement. Prior to May 2005, pilots had to work 15 days in a month to accrue vacation time. Between May 2005 and July 2013, pilots accrued vacation time in any month in which they either worked 15 days or received 37.5 hours of compensation. After July 2013, pilots accrue vacation only in the months in which they have received 37.5 hours of compensation.

C. USERRA

USERRA provides in relevant part that “[a] person who ... has an obligation to perform service in a uniformed service shall not be denied ... any benefit of employment by an employer on the basis of that ... performance of service ... or obligation.” 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a). For purposes of the Act, benefits of employment are either seniority-based or non-seniority based. With regards to seniority-based benefits, an employee returning from military service “is entitled to the seniority and other rights and benefits determined by seniority that the person had on the date of the commencement of service in the uniformed services plus the additional seniority and rights and benefits that such person would have attained if the person had remained continuously employed.” 38 U.S.C. § 4316(a). Thus, if a benefit is based or determined on seniority, the benefit accrues as though the employee were continuously employed, regardless of the length of the military service. 20 C.F.R. § 1002.210. See Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 284-85 (1946) (holding that the returning service member “does not step back on the seniority escalator at the point he stepped off. He steps back on at the precise point he would have occupied had he kept his position continuously during the war.”). With regards to benefits that are not determined with reference to seniority, the returning employee is “entitled to such other rights and benefits . . . as are generally provided by the employer of the person to employees having similar seniority, status, and pay who are on furlough or leave of absence[.]” 38 U.S.C. § 4316(b)(1)(B).

1. Characterization of Sick Time Benefit

A benefit is considered a “seniority-based benefit” when “the nature of the benefit [is] a reward for length of service, rather than a form of short-term compensation for services rendered.” Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., 447 U.S. 191, 197-98 (1980). See 20 C.F.R. § 1002.212(a). Of course, any money or benefit paid based on a unit of time worked (be it an hour or a year) can be characterized as either compensation or a reward for longevity. See Moss v. United Airlines, Inc., 420 F.Supp.3d 768, 771 (N.D. Ill. 2019). “This does not mean, however, that employers and unions are empowered by the use of transparent labels and definitions to deprive a veteran of substantial rights guaranteed by the Act.” Accardi v. PennsylvaniaR. Co., 383 U.S. 225, 229 (1966). In order to safeguard Congress' intent to “preserve for the returning veterans the rights and benefits which would have automatically accrued to them had they remained in private employment rather than responding to the call of their country, ” the term “seniority-based benefit” is not limited by a narrow, technical definition. Id.

Case law in this area suggests that the key factor in determining whether a benefit is seniority-based is whether the benefit is forward-looking (i.e., offering an incentive for longevity with the company) as opposed to backward-looking (i.e., providing compensation for work already performed). Moss, 420 F.Supp.3d at 771. Benefits such as pensions (Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581, 593-94 (1977)), annual bonuses (DeLee v. City of Plymouth, Ind., 773 F.3d 172 (7th Cir. 2014)), severance pay (Accardi, 383 U.S. at 230), and supplemental unemployment pay (Coffy, 447 U.S. at 205) have been found to be seniority-based benefits: they often vest only after a certain amount of time on the job, accumulate without regard to the number of hours worked, and/or provide a level of economic security that is tied to the length of service. In contrast, vacation benefits that are earned based on the amount of work performed in a certain period are not based on seniority: to hold otherwise would grant to service members returning from years of service the accumulated vacation benefits, which would be “sharply inconsistent with the common conception of a vacation as a reward for and respite from a lengthy period of labor.” Foster v. Dravo Corp., 420 U.S. 92, 101 (1975). See also 20 C.F.R. § 1002.150(c) (“As a general matter, accrual of vacation leave is considered to be a non-seniority benefit that must be provided by an employer to an employee on a military leave of absence only if the employer provides that benefit to similarly situated employees on comparable leaves of absence.).

Plaintiff concedes that vacation time under the CBA is not seniority-based. Dkt. # 57 at 6.

He argues, however, that sick time is different for two reasons. First, an Alaska Airlines pilot need only work for six hours in a month, which plaintiff asserts is a paltry amount that divorces the benefit from the work requirement and instead rewards mere time on the payroll. Plaintiff argues that, by requiring so little in exchange for an award of sick time, Alaska Airlines effectively made the award automatic and treats pilots as...