T. S. I. v. State
| Decision Date | 04 October 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 52620,No. 3,52620,3 |
| Parties | T.S.I. v. STATE of Georgia |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Bishop & Sexton, Fred A. Bishop, Jr., Lawrenceville, for appellant.
Bryant Huff, Dist. Atty., Richard Winegarden, Dawson Jackson, Robert A. Barnaby, II, Asst. Dist. Attys., Lawrenceville, for appellee.
1. '. . . An order granting probation to a child found to be delinquent or unruly may be revoked on the ground that the conditions of probation have not been observed.' Code Ann. § 24A-2801(b). The threshold question in this appeal is whether 'slight' evidence of probation violation is sufficient to authorize revocation of a juvenile's probation as is the case for adult revocation. Dickerson v. State, 136 Ga.App. 885, 222 S.E.2d 649. We find neither the rationale nor the holding of the Dickerson opinion to be controlling in juvenile probation revocation proceedings; that rationale and holding being that Id. at 886, 222 S.E.2d at 649.
As noted, Code Ann. § 24A-2801(b) provides for revocation on the ground that conditions of probation have not been observed; Code Ann. § 24A- 401(e)(2) provides that an act of disobeying the terms of supervision contained in a court order directed to a child who has been adjudicated delinquent is a 'delinquent act.' Code Ann. § 24A-401(f) defines 'delinquent child' as one who has committed a delinquent act and is in need of treatment or rehabilitation. Thus it is clear that in order to revoke a juvenile's probation what is required is a de novo hearing to determine whether a 'delinquent act' has been committed and that the child is 'delinquent.' K.E.S. v. State of Ga., 134 Ga.App. 843, 846, 216 S.E.2d 670, 672. (Emphasis supplied.) Since juvenile probation revocation proceedings are in fact a delinquency trial (unlike adult revocation proceedings) it follows that a finding of delinquency through parole violation must be on 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt' (again unlike adult proceedings). Code Ann. § 24A-2201(b). In short, 'slight' evidence will not be sufficient to authorize the revocation of a juvenile's probation.
2. Having decided that there must be more than mere 'slight evidence' to support a finding of delinquency and probation violation, we turn to the petition dealing with the commission of burglary.
The evidence presented consisted of testimony that the appellant had confessed that 'he broke in a white house, white wood house and oh, went on to tell me that it was the one his brother Danny had been arrested on and he had taken some guns out of it.' 'A confession validly made by (a) child out of court is...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Belcher, Matter of
...of proof because Colorado statutes require proof beyond a reasonable doubt for revocation of adult probation. In TSI v. State, 139 Ga.App. 775, 229 S.E.2d 553 (1976), the court pointed out that, under Georgia statutes, juvenile probation cannot be revoked absent a finding at a de novo trial......
-
In re Interest of R.M.
...that the evidence did not show beyond a reasonable doubt that he violated the provisions of his probation. See T.S.I. v. State, 139 Ga.App. 775, 776 –777(1), 229 S.E.2d 553 (1976) (in juvenile probation revocation, proof of violation must be beyond reasonable doubt). Included in the terms a......
-
B.C., In re, 66561
...revocation proceedings are not analogous to adult probation revocation proceedings, due process must be afforded. T.S.I. v. State of Ga., 139 Ga.App. 775, 229 S.E.2d 553 (1976); D.P. v. State of Ga., 129 Ga.App. 680, 682, 200 S.E.2d 499 (1973). "Due process of law requires notice ... which ......
-
C.E.E. v. Juvenile Officer
...the sufficiency of the evidence based on the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof. The appellant cites T.S.I. v. Georgia, 139 Ga.App. 775, 229 S.E.2d 553 (1976), in support of his Point I and II. In T.S.I., supra, the court held that to revoke probation of a juvenile the proof must b......