T.S. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1
| Decision Date | 24 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | C21-0617 TSZ |
| Parties | T.S., individually and on behalf of T.A., a minor, Plaintiff, v. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on a motion for summary judgment, docket no. 23, brought by defendant Seattle School District (the “District”). Having reviewed all papers filed in support of the motion,[1] the Court enters the following order.
T.A. is African American and autistic. Compl. at ¶ 3.2 (docket no. 1). Plaintiff T.S. is T.A.'s mother. Id. at ¶ 1.1. This case concerns events occurring on January 20, 2016, when T.A. was nine years old. On that day T.A.'s teacher, Tamara Kelley, took a book away from T.A., upsetting him, and then told him to go to the bathroom if he needed to cry. See id. at ¶¶ 4.13-4.14. According to the operative pleading, when T.A. did not comply with Kelley's direction, Kelley escorted T.A by holding his arm, would not allow T.A. to leave the bathroom, became enraged by T.A.'s crying and attempts to exit, and then pushed T.A. to the ground and kicked him in the middle of his chest. Id. at ¶¶ 4.14-4.18. As a result of the incident, the District placed Kelley on administrative leave and subsequently issued a letter of reprimand; Kelley was also prosecuted in Seattle Municipal Court for assault. Id. at ¶¶ 4.28 & 4.41-4.42. In November 2020, the local media reported about T.A.'s experiences and, shortly thereafter, Kelley was terminated. Id. at ¶¶ 4.49-4.50. Plaintiff commenced this litigation on May 9, 2021. The District is the sole defendant; plaintiff asserts no claims against Kelley.
The District seeks dismissal with prejudice of all of plaintiff's claims, which include (A) denial of equal protection, racial discrimination, and failure to train, as violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (B) racial discrimination as a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; (C) disability-based discrimination as a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (D) disability-based discrimination as a violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; (E) unlawful seizure as a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments); (F) racial and disability-based discrimination as a violation of Washington's Law Against Discrimination (the “WLAD”); (G) negligence; (H) negligent hiring training, and supervision; (I) false imprisonment; (J) assault and battery; (K) outrage; (L) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (M) loss of consortium. See Compl. at §§ V(A)-(M). Claims G through L are pleaded under Washington common law. See id. Claim M for loss of consortium, which is alleged pursuant to RCW 4.24.010, is the only cause of action brought by T.A.'s mother (T.S.) on her own behalf; all other claims are asserted on behalf of T.A. See id.
The Court shall grant summary judgment if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To survive a motion for summary judgment, the adverse party must present “affirmative evidence,” which “is to be believed” and from which all “justifiable inferences” are to be favorably drawn.[2]Id. at 255 & 257. When the record, taken as a whole, could not, however, lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party on matters as to which such party will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is warranted. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
Washington courts recognize loss of consortium as a “separate and independent claim,” which accrues when the plaintiff “knew or should have known the essential elements” of the claim. Green v. Am. Pharm. Co., 136 Wn.2d 87, 101-02, 960 P.2d 912 (1998); see Ginochio v. Hesston Corp., 46 Wn.App. 843, 846-48, 733 P.2d 551 (1987) (); see also RCW 4.24.010(1)&(2) (). The limitations period for a loss-of-consortium claim is three (3) years. See RCW 4.16.080(2). Based on the facts alleged in the Complaint, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that (i) T.S. “knew or should have known” the elements of her loss-of-consortium claim on January 20, 2016, when T.A. was allegedly maltreated by his teacher, (ii) T.S. did not commence this action within three years, and (iii) T.S.'s loss-of-consortium claim is time barred. The District's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to the sole claim that T.S. brings on her own behalf, and Claim M for loss of consortium is DISMISSED with prejudice.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). Section 1415(l) requires exhaustion when a lawsuit seeks relief for the denial of a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”), without regard to the statutes under which the claims are brought. See Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 168-69 (2017). To evaluate whether § 1415(l)'s exhaustion mandate applies, the Court must look at the “substance” of, rather than the “labels” used in, the operative pleading, and determine the “crux” or “gravamen” of the complaint, “setting aside any attempts at artful pleading.” Id. at 169. Indeed, a plaintiff need not include IDEA phrases or related acronyms (for example, FAPE or individualized education program or plan (“IEP”)) to be viewed as “in essence contesting the adequacy of a special education program.” Id. at 170 ().
According to the Fry Court, the following inquiries provide “clues” concerning whether § 1983, ADA, Rehabilitation Act, or other federal claims seek redress available under the IDEA: (i) whether the plaintiff could have brought “essentially the same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not a school-say, a public theater or library”; and (ii) whether “an adult at the school-say, an employee or visitor-[could] have pressed essentially the same grievance.” Id. at 171 (emphasis in original). If so, then the complaint is unlikely to concern a FAPE, and exhaustion is not necessary. In Fry, the Supreme Court described, as an example of a non-FAPE claim, a challenge, by either a child or an adult, to the lack of access ramps for wheelchairs, which could be asserted against any public facility, not just a school. Id. at 171-72. In contrast, § 1415(l)'s preclusive effect would be brought “into play” in a hypothetical suit involving the failure to provide tutoring in mathematics, which public theaters and libraries are not generally expected to offer, and which adult employees and visitors do not usually seek from institutions governed by the IDEA. Id. at 172-73.
The Court concludes that certain § 1983 claims, as well as the Title VI, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act claims, asserted on behalf of T.A. are substantively indistinguishable from an IDEA/FAPE claim and are therefore barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The § 1983 claims pleading denial of equal protection, racial discrimination and failure to train are premised on the theory that T.A. “has the right to equal access to an educational environment free from harassment and discrimination on the basis of race.” Compl. at ¶ 5.2. The District is accused of “deliberate indifference” with respect to the racial animosity displayed in Kelley's approach to disciplining African American students and the creation of a “hostile educational climate” that tolerates racial harassment and discrimination. Id. at ¶ 5.7. The Title VI claim alleges the District had notice that Kelley was a “ticking time bomb” and failed to take remedial measures to prevent discriminatory discipline of T.A. and other African American students. Id. at ¶¶ 5.15-5.18. In the ADA claim, the District is reproached for (a) placing T.A. in “an inappropriate classroom” given his “disability-related needs,” (b) not providing T.A. with “adequate disability-related supports in the classroom,” and (c) assigning T.A. to a teacher “known to ‘grab students.'” Id. at ¶ 5.24. Under the Rehabilitation Act, the District is faulted for failing to provide T.A. with “an educational program and related aids...
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