A.T. Stearns Lumber Co. v. Howlett

• Decision Date: 23 May 1927
• Citation: 260 Mass. 45
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: A.T. STEARNS LUMBER COMPANY v. AUGUSTINE J. HOWLETT & others.

260 Mass. 45

A.T. STEARNS LUMBER COMPANY v. AUGUSTINE J. HOWLETT & others.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 23, 1927

December 10, 1926.

Present: RUGG, C.

J., BRALEY, CROSBY PIERCE, & SANDERSON, JJ.

Unlawful Interference. Conspiracy. Monopoly. Labor Union. Strike. Unfair List. Equity Pleading and Practice, Master: report of evidence excluded subject to exception, exceptions to report. Evidence, Relevancy and materiality. Damages, In suit in equity, Nominal.

In a suit in equity by manufacturers of trim or finish used in the construction of buildings, each having a usual place of business in

Boston and vicinity, against named officers and agents of labor unions voluntary unincorporated associations, and their members "who are numerous and most of whom are" to the plaintiffs unknown, to enjoin the defendants from interfering with the "use and sale of the plaintiffs' material by and to such persons as may desire to purchase and use the same," by the institution or threatening of strikes or boycotts and sympathetic strikes "for the purpose of compelling the plaintiffs to refuse to employ operatives who are not members of said defendant unions or to compel them to use the union label, or to do any other act or thing whereby a monopoly in the sale of such merchandise may be created," facts were found and reported by a master, and it was held, that

(1) An act lawful in an individual may be the subject of an unlawful civil conspiracy when done in concert, provided it is done with a direct intention to injure another, or when, although done to benefit the conspirators, its natural and necessary consequence is the prejudice of the public or the oppression of individuals;

(2) It was unnecessary for the maintenance of such suits that any overt acts constituting unlawful means be shown; it was enough that the individuals who had combined intended to use unlawful means to accomplish a lawful end;

(3) Whether there was an unlawful purpose creating or tending to create a monopoly was a question of fact;

(4) If the necessary and direct consequence of the acts done or contemplated by the combination would unduly interfere with the free exercise of the rights of those engaged in the manufacture of trim, or of the nonunion workers, it was immaterial that it was not the specific intent of the combination to restrain trade, but that its object was to benefit themselves;

(5) From facts found by the master showing that the union held a controlling position in the labor market and had for one of its objects the employment of union men and the use of union made materials only, and that, considered in connection with the requirements of its constitution and votes of its members which set forth its plans to compel the employers to sign certain agreements containing provisions for the use of the union label and requiring the employers to employ only members of the union and "at any time, to discuss and adjust such grievances or misunderstandings as may occur from time to time that are not provided for in" the agreements, it was probable that the course of action of the union if carried out would create a monopoly within G.L.c.

93, Section 2; (6) It was not necessary to decide what the legal status of such agreements would be if it appeared that as a result of the combination of union men a monopoly existed; the case rested upon a conspiracy to create a monopoly, not upon the existence of a monopoly;

(7) The findings of fact and the inferences that fairly might be drawn therefrom did not support a contention that any of the acts of the defendants had a direct and immediate effect upon interstate commerce, and therefore the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief under the

Federal anti-trust law; (8) While a strike for higher wages, shorter hours or better working conditions is recognized as legal, a strike merely to secure recognition of a union, to force discharge of nonunion men, or to effect a "closed shop" may be found to be illegal;

(9) Voluntary agreements between a union organization and employers whereby the employer promises to give preference in hiring to union men or to hire only union men or to give all his work to members of a union, have been upheld;

(10) In the absence of an agreement entered into voluntarily by the employer with the union organization, whereby the employer agreed to buy only union made materials, a strike because of his refusal so to do was illegal;

(11) An inference was warranted from findings by the master that the members of the defendant union, having declined to set any nonunion made trim, had agreed to strike on any job, irrespective of whether the contractor had entered into such an agreement as above described, and were ready to carry out their intention;

(12) Agreements between the contractors and the labor union to the effect that the contractors would furnish their employees with unionmade material only, even if they were entered into by the contractors voluntarily, could not affect the right of the plaintiffs to the benefit of contracts previously made by them for the furnishing of nonunion made material; and strikes or threats of strikes to enforce such agreements would be unlawful as to the plaintiffs and might be enjoined by their suits in equity;

(13) The placing of the plaintiffs' names on an unfair list and circulating it in the manner described in the record was unlawful;

(14) While it was held that the use of a union label in the way planned by the defendants and under their constitution and rules would have been unlawful, no injunctive relief was necessary because it appeared that its use had been abandoned, and in the absence of a finding of actual damage the plaintiffs were entitled to nominal damages only on that branch of the suit;

(15) Evidence, offered by the plaintiffs and excluded by the master, to show that there was an existing understanding between the defendants and other building trades in Boston as to calling sympathetic strikes, should have been admitted, since the understanding between the defendants as to sympathetic strikes could be found to have been a part of the unlawful scheme, in which it was alleged the defendants were engaged;

(16) A sympathetic strike generally is held to be illegal; (17) A strike merely to compel the employment of union foremen is illegal;

(18) A labor union cannot lawfully compel its members to join an unlawful strike by the imposition of fines;

(19) The mere fact, that in the settlement of a strike with the defendants an officer of the union insisted that one of its members who did not strike should be fined and that one of the plaintiffs should pay the fine, even if such conduct was wrongful, was not ground for relief under the frame of the bill;

(20) The plaintiffs severally were entitled to a decree dealing with the following issues: (1) The refusal of the members of the union to install nonunion made material; (2) strikes to compel any employers to refrain from purchasing nonunion made material; (3) the issuing of an unfair list; (4) strikes to compel the hiring of union foremen only; (5) the imposition of fines upon union men who were unwilling to join unlawful strikes; and (6) the combination to induce employers to sign the agreement above described or to agree to purchase union made material only;

(21) The plaintiffs were entitled to nominal damages only by reason of findings by the master that, "if upon the facts as found, the court is of opinion that, as matter of law, a conspiracy did exist, I find, that damage in some amount, which I am unable to determine, was done to the plaintiffs. I find as a fact, however, that whatever damage the plaintiffs may have sustained . . . was that suffered by others in the same line of business as the plaintiffs, and that they suffered no special damage whatsoever."

Testimony as to a telephone conversation, offered at the hearing by the master of the suit above described, to bind the defendants as representatives of the union, properly was excluded because the identity of the person with whom the witness talked was not proved and it did not appear that the witness had called the union headquarters on the telephone.

An exception to a failure by a master, to whom was referred a suit in equity " to hear the parties and their evidence and report his findings to the court together with such facts and questions of law as either party may request," to include in his report findings in support of a certain paragraph in the bill, will not be sustained where it appears that no request for such finding was made before the parties were informed of the contents of the draft report.

TWO BILLS IN EQUITY, filed in the Superior Court on June 20 and June 23 1916, respectively, and afterwards amended, seeking to enjoin the defendants, certain named officers of voluntary, unincorporated labor unions and all members of such unions "who are numerous and most of whom are" to the plaintiffs unknown "(a) from combining and conspiring in any way to prevent the use and sale of the plaintiffs' material by and to such persons as may desire to purchase and use the same; (b) from threatening in any way any person or persons who desire to use these plaintiffs' products that the use of such products will cause them labor troubles or loss of any kind; (c) from inducing, or attempting to induce, in any manner any person or persons, whether the defendants herein or not, to decline employment or not to seek employment with any one because such person may have purchased, or proposes to purchase, materials from these plaintiffs, or because materials furnished by these plaintiffs are being used on or in connection with some building where said persons are doing work, or from any way...