Taber v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 24 February 1984 |
| Parties | Edwin TABER, et al. v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation. 83-160. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Thomas E. Davis of Burns, Shumaker & Davis, Gadsden, for appellants.
Michael K. Beard of Rives & Peterson, Birmingham, for appellee.
Edwin Taber, Eddie Taber, Phillip Troup, and Rhanda Troup, all plaintiffs or defendants in a negligence suit, appeal from the grant of Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company's motion for summary judgment in this separate declaratory judgment action. The trial court found that, as a matter of law, Nationwide is under no obligation to provide a defense for Edwin Taber in the negligence action. We affirm the judgment.
On July 10, 1982, an automobile driven by Eddie Taber struck and injured Phillip Troup. Troup and his wife filed suit, naming as defendants Eddie Taber and his father Edwin Taber, the owner of the automobile. The Troups seek recovery from the father on the basis of negligent entrustment of the automobile to the son, an allegedly incompetent driver. Edwin Taber made a demand upon Nationwide, which carried an automobile liability insurance policy for him, to defend him on this claim. Thereafter, Nationwide filed this action to determine whether, under the policy, it must provide coverage for the accident and defend Edwin Taber.
At the time of the accident, Edwin Taber owned four vehicles other than the one driven by his son. The car involved was given by him to his son as a gift and was insured by Allstate Insurance Company, not Nationwide. The title to the car remained in Edwin Taber's name because it was mortgaged to his credit union.
The Troups and, presumably, the Tabers, who did not file a brief, contend that Nationwide is obligated under the terms of the policy to defend Edwin Taber on the claim against him and, if unsuccessful in its defense, pay the judgment. We are asked to construe a section of the policy which they claim supports their contentions. This section states as follows:
The Troups contend that the trial court erred in granting Nationwide's motion for summary judgment and finding that the policy was unambiguous as a matter of law and, therefore, did not provide coverage under this section. They assert that there is ambiguity in this section because the term "described automobile" is not defined in the policy. It is claimed that this term can be interpreted to mean an automobile covered by this policy, or an automobile owned by the insured, regardless of coverage. The Troups argue that a jury should have been allowed to determine which was the meaning intended.
We have studied their argument and the policy and hold that the trial court's finding that this section is unambiguous is correct. The policy was properly construed according to the applicable rules of law as stated in Green v. Merrill, 293 Ala. 628, 308 So.2d 702 (1975):
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