Taylor v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 27 April 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 98-D-634-N.,Civ.A. 98-D-634-N. |
| Citation | 54 F.Supp.2d 1076 |
| Parties | J.B. TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. AETNA LIFE INS. CO., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
G. William Gill, Montgomery, AL, for plaintiff.
Davis Carr, James W. Lampkin, II, Pamela Ann Moore, Mobile, AL, for defendant.
DE MENT, District Judge.
Before the court are Defendant Aetna Life Insurance Company's Motion For Summary Judgment ("Mot."), Memorandum Of Law In Support of Its Motion For Summary Judgment ("Def.'s Br."), and Notice Of Filing Evidence, all filed on January 28, 1999. On February 16, 1999, Plaintiff J.B. Taylor filed a Response In Opposition To Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment ("Response"). On February 24, 1999, Defendant filed a Reply To Plaintiff's Response In Opposition To The Motion For Summary Judgment ("Reply"). After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court finds that Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment is due to be granted in part and denied in part.
The court properly exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, diversity jurisdiction. The Parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.
On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). As the Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard:
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no "genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).
The trial court's function at this juncture is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989).
The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of establishing, based on relevant "portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,'" that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citing Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The mechanics of satisfying the initial burden vary, however, depending upon which party, the movant or the nonmovant, bears the burden of proof at trial. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.1993) ().
Once this initial demonstration under Rule 56(c) is made, the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his or] her own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). In meeting this burden, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). That party must demonstrate that there is a "genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. An action is void of a material issue for trial "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348.
Plaintiff was injured on March 14, 1996 at the Maxwell Air Force Base ("Maxwell") commissary. (Resp. at 2.) At the time of his injury, Plaintiff had two different employers. (Id.) Plaintiff was employed by the United States Air Force ("USAF") at Maxwell, working as a Custodial Worker Supervisor at the Officers' Club. (Id.; Taylor Dep. at 27; Logan Aff. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff has been an employee of Maxwell since approximately December, 1967, when he was hired as a janitor. (Logan Aff. ¶ 2.)
Plaintiff was also employed, pursuant to a written contract, by Milbrand/Prime Team Services, Inc. ("Milbrand/Prime") as an independent contractor to stock various food product items on the shelves of the Maxwell commissary. (Resp. at 2; Taylor Dep. at 19-20; Taylor Aff. ¶ 2; Def.'s Br. Ex. 5.) Although Plaintiff was employed by the USAF at the Maxwell Officers' Club at the time of his injury, "Plaintiff was not an employee of the [Maxwell] commissary nor was he ever paid by the commissary to perform any work for the commissary." (Resp. at 3; Taylor Aff. ¶ 3.) Further, Plaintiff has never "been under the direction or control of any commissary employees or the commissary management." (Taylor Aff. ¶ 3.)
On March 14, 1996, the date of Plaintiff's injury, "Plaintiff was physically present at the commissary to perform stocking duties" (Resp. at 3) pursuant to his contract with Milbrand/Prime, as demonstrated by the following deposition testimony by Plaintiff:
However, Plaintiff states that his injury occurred before he began his shelf-stocking duties and that "he was engaged in a purely voluntary undertaking, not for pay, at the behest of commissary employees to assist them in the moving of a refrigeration unit, which unit was dropped on the Plaintiff's hand causing severe crush injuries." (Resp. at 3.) The following deposition testimony by Plaintiff details the events leading up to his injury:
After the injury, Plaintiff went to the emergency room at Montgomery Regional Medical Center ("MRMC"), where he was treated by emergency room doctors. (Id. at 37.) The following day, Dr. Jeffery Seitzinger performed surgery to repair Plaintiff's hand. (Id.) The History and Physical Report ("H & P Report") prepared by Dr. Seitzinger on March 14, 1996 states that "[t]his patient is a 47 year old black male, right hand dominant, who was at work at Maxwell Air Force Base this evening when a metal pallate [sic] crushed his right hand as he was moving this." (Def.'s Br.Ex. 6 (emphasis added).)
Plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim with Maxwell, one of Plaintiff's two employers, for medical services rendered by Dr. Seitzinger to Plaintiff. (Logan Aff. ¶ 4.) Thereafter, Kristy Wilson, Personnel Assistant for Maxwell, had a telephone conversation with Plaintiff during which Plaintiff told her that his injury occurred while he was working at a second job at the commissary. (Wilson Aff. ¶ 5.) On May 21, 1996, Norma L. Logan,...
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