Taber v. Pettus Oil & Refining Co., 2420-7909.

Decision Date03 June 1942
Docket NumberNo. 2420-7909.,2420-7909.
Citation162 S.W.2d 959
PartiesTABER v. PETTUS OIL & REFINING CO.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

Suit by the Pettus Oil & Refining Company against Eugene Taber to recover balance allegedly due under an alleged written contract executed by defendant with plaintiff's assignor. From a judgment in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. To review a judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, 153 S.W.2d 700, reversing the District Court's judgment, and rendering judgment for plaintiff, defendant brings error.

Judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, and judgment of the District Court affirmed.

Taylor, Irwin & Irwin, Ivan Irwin, and Lloyd Davidson, Jr., all of Dallas, for plaintiff in error.

Margaret A. Brand and Guthrie & Guthrie, all of Dallas, for defendant in error.

BREWSTER, Commissioner.

This is a suit by respondent, Pettus Oil & Refining Company, against petitioner, Eugene Taber, for the sum of $1,350 balance due under an alleged written contract executed by Taber with Ranco Oil Corporation, respondent's assignor. The instrument is as follows:

                              "December 11th, 1937
                "Ranco Oil Corporation
                "1201 Gulf States Building
                "Dallas, Texas
                

"Gentlemen:

"This will confirm our verbal agreement under the terms of which I agree to buy and you agree to sell me, One Hundred and Sixty (160) acres of Oil and Gas leases, covering the following described tracts, situated in Live Oak County, Texas, to-wit:

"West Quarter (W1/4) of the most southerly quarter of Section No. 3, J. Poitevent Survey, Live Oak County, Texas, being a part of the Cook Ranch, designated on the `Plat Map' as Tract #1, and containing 40 acres, more or less.

"Southwest Quarter (SW1/4) of the northeast 160 acre squared tract, Section No. 52, J. I. Clare Survey, Live Oak County, Texas, being a part of the Cook Ranch, designated on the `Plat Map' as Tract #2, and containing 40 acres more or less.

"West Quarter (W1/4) of the most westerly squared 160 acre tract, Section No. 353, C.C.S.D. & R.G.N.G. RR. Co. Survey, Live Oak County, Texas, being a part of the Cook Ranch, designated on the `Plat Map' as Tract #3, and containing 40 acres, more or less. North Quarter (N1/4) of the most westerly quarter, Section No. 1, J. Poitevent Survey, Live Oak County, Texas, being a part of the Cook Ranch, designated on the `Plat Map' as Tract #4, and containing 40 acres, more or less.

"I agree to pay, as consideration for these leases, the sum of One Thousand Six Hundred ($1,600.00) Dollars; payable on the following basis:

"Two Hundred and Fifty ($250.00) Dollars cash.

"The Balance of One Thousand Three Hundred and Fifty ($1,350.00) Dollars, to be paid you upon the completion of a test well to a depth of 5300 feet, or the Yegua Sand, unless oil and/or gas, in commercial quantities, is encountered at a lesser depth. In that event, the balance becomes due and payable.

"It is understood and agreed that upon the completion of this test well, to the depth or depths above specified, or the Yegua Sand, you will furnish me with the following:

"1. Photostat Copy of the Original Oil & Gas Lease.

"2. Exact copy of a Schlumberger log, if any, of the well.

"3. Copy of the Driller's log.

"4. Paleontological determinations, if any are available.

It is also understood and agreed that the assignments are to be the regular Texas Standard Form No. 86, properly executed.

"This clause is your authority to assign or reassign this Purchase Letter to whomsoever you may designate without further written consent from me.

                          "Very truly yours
                             "By: Eugene Taber
                                  Eugene Taber
                "Accepted:
                "Ranco Oil Corporation:
                "By H. R. Randall
                     Vice-President."
                

Trial was without a jury. The district court rendered judgment for Taber, which was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals, at Dallas, and rendered for respondent. 153 S.W.2d 700.

Taber interposed several defenses, among which was that the contract violates the Statute of Frauds, Art. 3995, subdiv. 4, R.S.1925. We think the memorandum quoted is insufficient as a basis for respondent's suit, because of the provisions of that statute, and that the trial court's judgment was correct. So that proposition is all that we need discuss.

Cantrell v. Garrard, Tex.Com.App., 240 S.W. 533, is decisive of this case. Garrard agreed to sell to Cantrell "an oil and gas lease" on 20 acres of land in Wichita County for fifty thousand dollars payable upon examination and approval of the title. Ten thousand dollars was deposited in a bank to be paid to Garrard as liquidated damages in the event of default by Cantrell. The land covered by the lease was adequately described, but the only description of the terms of the lease was a recitation that "a lease or an assignment of a lease is hereby proposed to be sold, what is known as a commercial lease, providing for one-eighth royalty to the landowner." At the time the contract was executed, one Young owned an oil and gas lease on the 20 acres referred to. Within the time specified, Garrard tendered Cantrell an abstract showing good title to the twenty-acre lease in Young and a proper assignment of the lease from Young to Garrard and from the latter to Cantrell. Cantrell declined to accept them. Garrard sued for the ten thousand dollars earnest money. Cantrell answered that the contract was void for uncertainty because the lease which Garrard agreed to sell him was not sufficiently described in the contract to identify it. Cantrell's contention was sustained, the court pointing out that since the term for which the lease was to run, the time for beginning drilling operations, the time and amount of payments in lieu of drilling operations, and the amount to be paid for gas produced, all essential elements of description, were not set out in the contract, the description of the lease was insufficient to identify the same and was, therefore, insufficient to meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, hence Garrard was not entitled to recover. This decision has been cited with approval in numerous cases, notably in Fagg v. Texas Co., Tex.Com.App., 57 S.W.2d 87; Laird v. Laird, Tex.Civ.App., 52 S.W.2d 1113, error refused; Sneed v. Lester et al., Civ.App., 76 S.W.2d 802, error refused; and Taubert v. Earle, Tex.Civ.App., 133 S.W.2d 145, error refused.

In Fagg v. Texas Co., supra, , the writing bound one party to furnish an oil and gas lease on described lands, the same to be "an 88 form lease." The court said that neither the particular character of the rights which were to be acquired by the lessee nor their extent and duration was disclosed or made ascertainable; that the provision for an 88 form lease could shed no light on the question because "the character of printed matter contained in any designated class of oil and gas lease forms depends on what matter various designers of such forms may deem appropriate — and may vary accordingly"; that the reference to the 88 form is as incapable of definite application as the term "oil and gas lease form" used in Cantrell v. Garrard, supra.

The memorandum in this case calling for "one hundred and sixty acres of oil and gas leases" and assignments thereof to Taber "to be the regular Texas Standard Form No. 86, properly executed" certainly makes the essential elements of description referred to in...

To continue reading

Request your trial
33 cases
  • Lohse v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 11099
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 9 Junio 1986
    ...271 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Civ.App.1954); Knox v. Rutherford, 168 S.W.2d 313 (Tex.Civ.App.1943); and Taber v. Pettus Oil & Refining Co., 139 Tex. 395, 162 S.W.2d 959 (Tex.Com.App.1942). It is also clear that an agreement to enter into a "standardized" oil and gas lease form adds nothing to the def......
  • Cowden v. Bell
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 25 Julio 1956
    ...thing that he could have done, viz., closed his trade in writing, as required by law. As expressed in Taber v. Pettus Oil & Refining Co., 139 Tex. 395, 162 S.W.2d 959, 962, 141 A.L.R. 808, the 'Respondent drilled the well charged with knowledge that the law would not enforce its alleged con......
  • Crowder v. Tri-C Resources, Inc.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 12 Diciembre 1991
    ...the second document must refer to the first one. See Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex.1972); Taber v. Pettus Oil & Refining Co., 139 Tex. 395, 162 S.W.2d 959, 961 (1942); see also Owen v. Hendricks, 433 S.W.2d 164, 166-67 The plat, which may be a sufficient description of the la......
  • Southern Coast Corp. v. Sinclair Refining Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
    • 18 Agosto 1948
    ...of Frauds, the Court cites the following authorities: Hooks v. Bridgewater, 111 Tex. 122, 229 S.W. 1114; Taber v. Pettus Oil & Refining Co., 139 Tex. 395, 162 S.W.2d 959, 141 A.L.R. 808; Kistler v. Latham et al., Tex.Com.App., 255 S.W. 983; James v. National Cotton Oil Co., 31 Tex.Civ.App. ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT