Taber v. Talcott
Decision Date | 13 June 1917 |
Docket Number | No. 398.,398. |
Citation | 101 A. 2,40 R.I. 338 |
Parties | TABER v. TALCOTT et al. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Certified from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties.
Bill in equity by William E. Taber, sole trustee under the will of Hezekiah Allen, against Charles H. Talcott and others. Certified from superior court in accordance with Gen. Laws, c. 289, § 35, submitting questions to Supreme Court. Questions answered and decree directed.
Edward A. Stockwell, of Providence, for complainant. Gardner, Pirce & Thornley and Murdock & Tillinghast, all of Providence (William W. Moss and John A. Tillinghast, both of Providence, of counsel), for respondents Talcott and others. Swan & Keeney, of Providence (Francis B. Keeney, of Providence, of counsel), for respondents Ida J. Clark, and William D., Sarah L., C. Osgood, and C. Elnora Swan.
This is a bill in equity brought by William E. Taber, sole trustee under the will of Hezekiah Allen, praying for a construction of the will and other relief incident to a distribution of the trust estate created thereunder, and a discharge of the trustee. By a decree of the superior court the cause was certified to this court, in accordance with chapter 289, § 35, Gen. Laws R. I., and the following questions are submitted to this court:
The first question is the principal one, and the others are only subsidiary.
Hezekiah Allen, a resident of Cranston, R. I., died in 1872 leaving surviving a widow, Emeline Allen, and three children, Hezekiah Allen, Emily H. Allen, and Elvira E. Allen, five brothers and sisters, and the descendants of two deceased brothers: The widow died intestate in 1879, and each of the children died subsequently, intestate and without issue; Elvira E. Allen, the survivor of the children died May 6, 1912.
The respondents, Charles H. Talcott et al., are the persons, or in some cases the successors in interest of the persons, who, being descendants of brothers and sisters of Hezekiah Allen, answered the description of his heirs at law on May 8, 1912, and as such claim that the equitable estate in remainder to the heirs at law was contingent and did not become vested until the death of the last surviving child, and that they are entitled to a conveyance of all the trust property as it existed at that date. The opposing respondents, C. Osgood Swan et al., claim solely as successors in Interest to the three children of Hezekiah Allen, and assert that an equitable remainder in fee vested in these three children at his death. They are mainly the heirs and next of kin of Elvira E. Allen on her mother's side.
The second clause of the will is as follows:
The trustees, in their discretion, under the advice and direction of the probate court, were authorized to sell any portion of the trust estate, either real or personal, and to reinvest the proceeds in such manner as the trustees should deem most for the interest of said cestui que trust, the reinvested estate to be held by them subject to the same trust. Two of the parcels of real estate located in this state were sold by the trustees by authority of acts of the General Assembly, which provided that the proceeds of the sales should form a part of the trust estate and "be finally disposed of as directed in said will and as if no such sale * * * had been made." A part of the personal property now held in trust represents the proceeds of the sale of these two parcels of land. The third parcel which is mentioned in the will and which is located in Enfield, Conn., still forms a part of said trust estate.
Question 1 presents this issue: Are the heirs of Hezekiah Allen to be determined as of the time of his death in 1872, or as of the time of the death of the surviving life beneficiary, Elvira E. Allen, in 1912? While it is true, as stated by Tillinghast, J., in Ross v. Nettleton, 24 R I. 127, 52 Atl. 677, "that the law favors the vesting of estates immediately upon the death of the testator, and will not regard the remainder as being contingent, in the absence of a clear intent on the part of the testator to that effect," nevertheless it has been uniformly held that this preference of the law is subordinate to the fundamental principle of construction that:
"The written expression of the testator, taken in its natural sense and use, and applied to existing facts, must control." Ogden, Petition of, 25 R. I. 373, at page 374, 55 Atl. 933.
For the respondents, Swan et al., the case in Rhode Island principally...
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Starrett v. Botsford, 1459.
...as being contingent, in the absence of a clear intent on the part of the testator to that effect * * *." (italics ours) Taber v. Talcott, 40 R.I. 338, 342, 101 A. 2, 4. An intention to defer vesting the remainder is not to be inferred because of the fact that the first taker is one of the c......
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Manufacturers Nat. Bank of Troy, N. Y. v. McCoy, 1-72
...us frequently in the past. The respondent Kate L. McCoy Wilcox, the only cousin who survived the life tenant, while citing Taber v. Talcott, 40 R.I. 338, 101 A. 2, 1 and Industrial Trust Co. v. Wilson, 61 R.I. [100 R.I. 161] 169, 200 A. 467, 2 relies principally upon Luttgen v. Tiffany, 37 ......
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Plummer v. Roberts
...(b) "The intention of the testator must govern and . . . when that appears, it overrides all rules and precedents, making its own laws." Taber v. Talcot, 101 A. (R. I.) 4; 555, R. S. 1919. To that intention all technical rules of construction must give way. Grace v. Perry, 197 Mo. 559; Suyd......
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...Wolf v. Middleton, 18 R. I. 810, 26 A. 44, 31 A. 271, 31 L. R. A. 146; In re Tyler, For an Opinion, 30 R. I. 590, 76 A. 661; Taber v. Talcott, 40 R. I. 338, 101 A. 2; Dorrance v. Greene, 41 R. I. 444, 104 A. In the case before us nothing appears which indicates that the testator did not use......