Tabor v. State, 93-608
| Decision Date | 27 July 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-608,93-608 |
| Citation | 519 N.W.2d 378 |
| Parties | Terry TABOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Mary K. Hoefer of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for appellant.
Bonnie J. Campbell, Atty. Gen., and William Hill and Layne M. Lindebak, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.
Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and CARTER, LAVORATO, NEUMAN, and ANDREASEN, JJ.
Terry Tabor, a postconviction relief applicant under Iowa Code chapter 822, appeals from an adverse judgment on his challenge to a prison disciplinary proceeding at the Iowa State Penitentiary. Two issues are presented by his appeal: first, whether he may appeal to this court as of right notwithstanding the language contained in Iowa Code section 822.9 (1993) that establishes a limited certiorari review for prison disciplinary proceedings, and second, whether the collateral consequences of a minor rule violation on a criminal sentence imposed in another state constitutes a sufficient deprivation of liberty or property to be the subject of review under the principles espoused in Davis v. State, 345 N.W.2d 97 (Iowa 1984). We answer the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative.
The applicant seeks to review the action of prison authorities imposing discipline upon him as of right under laws that antedated the enactment of 1992 Iowa Acts chapter 1212, section 38. As a result of that enactment, the statute now provides:
An appeal from a final judgment entered under this chapter may be taken, perfected, and prosecuted either by the applicant or by the state in the manner and within the time after judgment as provided in the rules of appellate procedure for appeals from final judgments in criminal cases. However, if a party is seeking an appeal under section 822.2, subsection 6, the appeal shall be by writ of certiorari.
Iowa Code § 822.9 (1993) (emphasis added). The applicant contends that the italicized language in the foregoing statute was invalidated by this court's decision in Giles v. State, 511 N.W.2d 622 (Iowa 1994), on the basis that its enactment violated the single-subject restriction contained in Article III, section 29 of the Iowa Constitution.
The State contends that, although Giles found the challenged provision to have been enacted in violation of Article III, section 29, the same opinion also concluded that the constitutional defect was subsequently eliminated by codification. Our reading of the Giles decision convinces us that the language in section 822.9 restricting review of prison disciplinary proceedings to a certiorari procedure was indeed invalidated in that case. Moreover, we do not agree it was our intention in Giles to limit the legal effect of that conclusion to a single litigant.
The State's suggestion that codification of legislation otherwise invalid under Article III, section 29 cures any continuing constitutional infirmity is not legally sound. The codification process only cuts off a right of constitutional challenge under Article III, section 29 if no one has lodged such a challenge before codification is complete. State v. Mabry, 460 N.W.2d 472, 474-75 (Iowa 1990). If some litigant does lodge a constitutional challenge prior to codification of the flawed legislation and prevails, then the resulting invalidation of the statute inures to the benefit of other persons adversely affected by the legislation. As a direct consequence of the conclusions reached in Giles, the applicant's appeal from the judgment was properly taken as of right. A petition for certiorari was not required.
Under the postconviction relief procedures established in chapter 822, review of prison disciplinary proceedings may be taken in two situations. The first of these situations exists when "[t]he person's reduction of sentence pursuant to sections 903A.1 through 903A.7 has been unlawfully forfeited...." Iowa Code § 822.2(6) (...
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...as a petition for a writ of certiorari and decided the merits. See Iowa R.App.P. 304; Bryson, 515 N.W.2d at 11. In Tabor v. State, 519 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 1994), we put the matter to rest by clarifying Giles and Mabry. In Tabor, the inmate appealed from an adverse ruling on his challenge to a ......
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