Sabatino v. Saint Aloysius Parish

• Decision Date: 20 June 1994
• Citation: 654 A.2d 1033,280 N.J.Super. 185
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court
• Parties: , 97 Ed. Law Rep. 1096 Karen SABATINO, Plaintiff, v. SAINT ALOYSIUS PARISH, Saint Aloysius School, and Archdiocese of Newark, Defendants.

Page 185

280 N.J.Super. 185

654 A.2d 1033, 97 Ed. Law Rep. 1096

Karen SABATINO, Plaintiff, v. SAINT ALOYSIUS PARISH, Saint Aloysius School, and Archdiocese of Newark, Defendants.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division Essex County.

Decided June 20, 1994.

William I. Strasser, Nutley, for plaintiff (Costenbader, Strasser & Donohue, attorneys).

Eileen P. Mulroy, Newark, for defendants (Law Office of William A. Cambria, attorneys).

JULIO M. FUENTES, J.S.C.

Karen Sabatino, who was employed under yearly contracts as principal of a Catholic school, was not rehired as principal when several parishes formed a co-sponsored school. She filed a suit against defendants, St. Aloysius Parish, St. Aloysius School and the Archdiocese of Newark, contending that their failure to offer her the position of school principal in the new school constituted a breach of her employment contract.

The primary question presented by defendants' motion for summary judgment is whether, under First Amendment church-state principles, this court should decide if plaintiff, a lay person, is contractually entitled to the position of principal at a sectarian school.

The relevant facts are summarized as follows. In the fall of 1990, for economic reasons, the Newark Archdiocese approved a plan to create a co-sponsored school district. Pursuant to the plan, parishes in North Caldwell and Roseland, as well as St. Aloysius in Caldwell, formed a co-sponsored Catholic elementary school. The school was to be known as Trinity Academy, and was to be located at the site occupied by St. Aloysius. From 1986 to 1991, Karen Sabatino was employed as principal of St. Aloysius under a series of one-year contracts. Her last contract expired in June 1991.

Acting under guidelines issued by the Archdiocese, all positions in the Academy were opened, and all interested administrators, faculty and staff from the original schools were invited to apply. Specifically, the Archdiocesan guidelines provided that:

If there is no corporate commitment from any religious community in a particular configuration, any one of the incumbent principals may apply for the position of principal in the co-sponsored school. If all of the incumbents choose to apply, they will be interviewed by a Search Committee.... If the Board chooses not to accept any of the candidates, the search will be expanded to include other candidates.... (Emphasis added.)

In January and February 1991, a search committee was formed to find a principal for the Academy. The search committee was composed of nine members: three pastors, one lay representative from each parish, two representatives of the Superintendent of Schools of the Archdiocese, and the committee chairperson. The recommendation of the search committee was advisory; the three pastors were to make the final decision to appoint the new principal.

Before interviewing any candidates, the search committee decided that they would proceed with interviews of Karen Sabatino and one other incumbent principal. The committee then expanded the search to other candidates. After all of the candidates were interviewed, the committee made a recommendation to the pastors that Sister Joan Sullivan be appointed principal.

Defendants contend that Sister Joan was an especially desirable candidate because of her general qualifications, as well as her ability to carry out the religious mission of the school. Defendants thus maintain that their selection of a school principal was guided by religious principle, and made pursuant to their exercise of religious freedom. Accordingly, defendants claim that the court should abstain from reviewing the selection process. Defendants also assert that since plaintiff was employed under a one-year contract which had expired, she had no contractual entitlement to the new position.

The religion clauses embodied in the First Amendment to the Constitution provide that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. Const. amend. I, § 1. Although the religion clauses were originally intended to limit only actions by the federal government, the First Amendment has been extended to limit the action of state governments through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15, 67 S.Ct. 504, 511, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947); see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). Thus, both state and federal action may be restricted if they impinge upon First Amendment rights. Infringement of First Amendment rights may occur where civil courts interfere with a sectarian school's choice of principal.

A longstanding principle of First Amendment jurisprudence forbids civil courts from adjudicating issues involving religious doctrine or ecclesiastical polity. Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445, 451-52, 89 S.Ct. 601, 604, 607-08, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F.Supp. 321, 332 (S.D.N.Y.1991); Lewis v. Lake Region Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists, 779 F.Supp. 72, 75 (E.D.Mich.1991); Welter v. Seton Hall Univ., 128 N.J. 279, 608 A.2d 206 (1992); Chavis v. Rowe, 93 N.J. 103, 105, 459 A.2d 674 (1983); St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church of North America v. Kedroff, 302 N.Y. 1, 13, 96 N.E.2d 56 (1950), rev'd on other grounds, 344 U.S. 94, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952). More recently, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed Watson and held that no essentially ecclesiastical decision made by a religious body, however arbitrary, may be reversed by a secular court. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 720, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 2385-86, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873, 97 S.Ct. 191, 50 L.Ed.2d 155 (1976). Restrictions on the free exercise of religion are permitted only when necessary to "prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1186, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943). "[T]he power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). The same principle was recently observed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Elmora Hebrew Center, Inc. v. Fishman, 125 N.J. 404, 415, 593 A.2d 725 (1991):

Civil adjudications by deference to authoritative decisions by church officials, or by application of neutral principles, must always be circumscribed carefully to avoid courts' incursions into religious questions that would be impermissible under the First Amendment.

Court involvement in religious determinations is "simply inappropriate because judicial scrutiny cannot help but violate the first amendment." Id. at 416, 593 A.2d 725.

This does not lessen the entitlement of religious parties or institutions to civil adjudication of secular legal questions. Id at 413, 593 A.2d 725. Temporal matters affecting civil, contract, or property rights of a religious body and its members or clergy, may be resolved in a civil court, if the dispute involves purely secular issues and can be resolved without entanglement with the church's faith, discipline or doctrine. Chavis v. Rowe, supra, 93 N.J. at 109-10, 459 A.2d 674; McElroy v. Guilfoyle, 247 N.J.Super. 582, 585-86, 589 A.2d 1082 (App.Div.1990). In addition, our Supreme Court has recently held that enforcement of employment contracts does not violate the First Amendment where the plaintiff neither performed ministerial functions for the religious organization nor could reasonably have contemplated that compliance with religious doctrine constituted a condition of the employment contract. Welter v. Seton Hall University, supra, 128 N.J. 279, 608 A.2d 206; Alicea v. New Brunswick Theological Seminary, 128 N.J. 303, 608 A.2d 218 (1992).

However, religious organizations have an interest in autonomy over their internal affairs including freedom to run their own institutions. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987). Churches have the power to decide matters of faith, doctrine, and even internal governance free from state interference. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952); Hutchinson v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392, 394 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885, 107 S.Ct. 277, 93 L.Ed.2d 253 (1986); Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490, 492 (5th Cir.1974).

For example, in Assemany v. Archdiocese of Detroit, 173 Mich.App. 752, 434 N.W.2d 233 (1988), a church organist filed a discrimination claim under Title VII against the church. The court found that a church organist is intimately involved in the propagation of religious doctrine and the observance and conduct of religious liturgy. On that basis, the function of his position was "clergy," and his discrimination claim was barred by the free exercise clause. In reaching this decision, the court relied upon Rayburn v. General Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 (4th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 3333, 92 L.Ed.2d 739 (1986). The Rayburn court held:

As a general rule, if the employee's primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship, he or she should be considered "clergy" ... this approach necessarily requires a court to determine whether a position is important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church.

[Id. at 1169 (citing EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905, 102 S.Ct. 1749, 72 L.Ed.2d 161 (1982))].

See also Chavis v. Rowe, supra, 93 N.J. 103, 459 A.2d 674 (judicial inquiry into...