Tacoma Light & Water Co. v. Huson

• Decision Date: 25 November 1895
• Citation: 13 Wash. 124,42 P. 536
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: TACOMA LIGHT & WATER CO. v. HUSON ET AL.

42 P. 536

13 Wash. 124

TACOMA LIGHT & WATER CO. v. HUSON ET AL.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 25, 1895

Appeal from superior court, Pierce county; John C. Stallcup, Judge.

Action by the Tacoma Light & Water Company against Herbert S. Huson and others. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Parsons Corell & Parsons and Crowley, Sullivan & Grosscup, for appellant.

A. R Titlow, J. A. Shackleford, and J. S. Whitehouse, for respondents.

SCOTT J.

This cause was argued and submitted with No. 1,914, brought by the same plaintiff against the city of Tacoma, which we have just decided. 42 P. 533. Although the form of this action is trespass, it contains much in common with, and is largely governed by the disposition of, the other cause. In this case the defendants were sued for entering upon the plaintiff's premises, and removing therefrom certain property which they claim belonged to the city under its purchase of the light and water plant, and they claimed to be acting by authority of the city in so taking it. The action was tried to a jury, and a verdict and judgment for the defendants resulted; whereupon this appeal was taken.

We are of the opinion that, under the plaintiff's own showing in this case, the character and description of the property taken was such that the title thereto passed to the city under the terms of Ordinance No. 790, as adopted by the voters of said city; the plaintiff having ratified the offer to purchase as contained in the ordinance, by accepting the money, as we held in the other case above referred to. This being so, many questions raised by appellant are eliminated and the remaining material questions can be such only as relate to the manner of the taking. It is very evident that while the action was brought in this form, the main purpose was to determine the right of the parties to the property taken. The appellant does not contend in its brief that there was any substantial damage to the premises further than the breaking of a lock or two, which could be of no great value. Even this damage was a disputed question, and the jury found for the defendants. It is not contended that anything beyond actual damages could be recovered in this action, and consequently all questions as to the manner of the taking can bear only upon the appellant's right to recover nominal damages. A voluminous record, of nearly 1,000 pages, has been brought up, and numerous errors have been assigned, but, under the present aspect of the case, we do not feel called upon to give them more than a general consideration.

It was contended by appellant that the defendants were not authorized under their pleadings to show that they had authority from, or acted in behalf of, the city in taking the property, nor were entitled to show that they had authority from the plaintiff company to enter upon the premises whereon they were charged with trespassing. We have read enough of the great volume of testimony taken by the plaintiff in making its case to satisfy us that these questions were fairly...