Tacoma Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Wolff

• Decision Date: 27 December 1893
• Citation: 7 Wash. 478,35 P. 115
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: TACOMA LUMBER & MANUF'G CO. v. WOLFF ET AL. [1]

35 P. 115

7 Wash. 478

TACOMA LUMBER & MANUF'G CO. v. WOLFF ET AL. ^[1]

Supreme Court of Washington

December 27, 1893

Appeal from superior court, Pierce county; John C. Stallcup, Judge.

Action by the Tacoma Lumber & Manufacturing Company against Samuel Wolff and others. There was judgment for plaintiff, and John Huntington, a defendant, moved to vacate the judgment. From an order denying his motion, he appeals. Affirmed.

Anders J., dissenting.

J. S Whitehouse and Baker & Campbell, for appellant.

Hudson & Holt, for respondent.

HOYT, J.

Appellant instituted a proceeding in the superior court, whereby he sought to have vacated a certain judgment theretofore rendered in said court against him, together with other parties. Affidavits in aid of such proceeding were filed by him, and counter affidavits by the plaintiff named in such judgment. Upon deciding the issue of fact, as it saw the burden of proof, the court below refused to vacate such judgment, and, from the order so refusing, this appeal is taken. A large number of questions have been discussed by the appellant, many of which have been addressed to points raised in the original cause in which the judgment was rendered prior to such judgment. In our opinion, very few of the questions thus discussed are involved in the decision on this appeal.

The most that is claimed as tending to show that the original judgment sought to be vacated was void was that it was rendered as a judgment at law, in a suit in equity. But, in our opinion, if all that is said by the appellant upon that point is conceded, it would in no manner show that such judgment was void. The most that it would establish would be that the entry thereof was erroneous, and while this would be enough to demand from this court a reversal of such judgment if an appeal had been prosecuted therefrom, it becomes of comparatively little moment in a proceeding for the vacation thereof. In such a proceeding, such fact can have no controlling influence, so long as the irregularity was not such as to deprive the court of jurisdiction. All courts hold, and we have frequently done so, that it is not enough to entitle a party to have a judgment against him vacated that he should show that it had been irregularly entered. He must, in addition thereto, establish to the satisfaction of the court the fact that such judgment is unjust and inequitable, as against him. Proceedings of this kind are of an equitable nature, and courts will not interfere with the judgment, simply because it may have been erroneously entered, unless, in addition thereto, it is made to appear that it is unjustly burdensome to the moving party. In such a proceeding, pure technicalities can have little influence upon the decision of the court, if the judgment sought to be vacated is not of such a nature that if it were set aside the moving party would be able to interpose a substantial defense upon a new trial, or in another proceeding involving the same cause of action.

Such being the status of the judgment, and such being the office of proceedings of this kind, but a single reason was presented, by the showing of the moving party, why such judgment should, in such a proceeding, be vacated and set aside; and that was that, if so set aside, he would be able to show, in his defense, that, by an arrangement between him and the plaintiff, it was agreed that he should not be held...