Tacoma Ry. & Motor Co. v. Cummings

• Decision Date: 17 November 1892
• Citation: 5 Wash. 206,31 P. 747
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: TACOMA RAILWAY & MOTOR CO. v. CUMMINGS.

31 P. 747

5 Wash. 206

TACOMA RAILWAY & MOTOR CO. v. CUMMINGS.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 17, 1892

Appeal from superior court, Pierce county; F. CAMPBELL, Judge.

Proceeding before arbitrators by the Tacoma Railway & Motor Company against J. H. Cummings. Award in favor of defendant. From a judgment of the court to which the award was delivered setting it aside, with costs, defendant appeals. Dismissed.

For dissenting opinion, see 33 P. 507.

Marshall K. Snell, (Burke, Shepard & Woods and Charles E. Shepard, of counsel,) for appellant.

Crowley & Sullivan and Campbell & Powell for respondent.

HOYT, J.

This was a proceeding under chapter 13, tit. 7, of the Code of Procedure, by which appellant and respondent agreed to an arbitration of the differences between them. The arbitrators heard the controversy, and a majority of them made out an award, which was duly filed in court, as required by section 426. Exceptions thereto were duly filed by the respondent and upon a hearing thereof the award was set aside by the court. From such order this appeal has been prosecuted. Respondent moves to dismiss, on the ground that the order appealed from is not such a final order as will sustain the appeal. Upon the argument upon such motion counsel for the respective parties are practically agreed that its determination must depend upon the question as to whether or not the power of the trial court over the proceeding was absolutely ended and determined by the making of the order setting aside the report of the arbitrators. If such proceedings were so ended by such order it must be held to be a final one, within the meaning of our statute as to appeals. If, on the other hand, the making of such order did not fully determine the cause in the lower court, it was not of that final nature which would sustain an appeal.

The briefs of the respective counsel upon this question have been prepared with elaboration, and the question discussed with great ability, both from the standpoint of reason and authority. The decision must necessarily largely depend upon the terms of our statute. The authorities cited by the respective counsel, and the care which is shown to have been exercised by them in making such citations, satisfy us that the exact question presented for our decision has not been decided by any court under a statute just like ours. Therefore we can get but little aid from the citation of authorities. An arbitration, at common law, was of such a nature that the decision of the arbitrators was not subject to control by the courts, excepting by a formal action brought for that purpose; but it is perfectly clear from our statute that the arbitration therein authorized is entirely different, so far as the question of the control of the award by the court in which it is required to be filed is concerned. Under our statute the award is not so far a finality that in itself it can be in any manner enforced against the defeated party until it has been acted upon by the court. Before it gets any force which can be made available by the successful party, a judgment must be rendered thereon by the court into which it is returned. If no exceptions are filed against such award within the time prescribed by law, such judgment follows as matter of course. If, however, exceptions are filed as authorized by statute then the court is called upon to determine whether or not such exceptions are well taken. If it decides that none of them are well taken, the report is confirmed, and the judgment rendered thereon as though no exceptions had been filed. But if the court sustains any of said exceptions, then it is its duty to set aside the award; and the important question presented to us for decision is the status of the controversy between the parties when any of the exceptions have been sustained, and the award for that reason set aside. Section 426, above referred to, directs that the court shall treat the award as the...