Tadlock v. Eccles

• Decision Date: 01 January 1858
• Citation: 20 Tex. 782
• Parties: SEVIER TADLOCK AND OTHERS v. JAMES C. ECCLES.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

20 Tex. 782

SEVIER TADLOCK AND OTHERS

v.JAMES C. ECCLES.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1858.

Where the mortgagee being sued for a foreclosure, pleaded his homestead exemption, and there was a judgment of foreclosure, ordering the property to be sold, upon which the property was sold; in a suit by the purchaser to recover the property, it was held that the defendant, the mortgagee, was concluded, by the judgment of foreclosure, from again pleading his homestead exemption. 13 Tex. 68;29 Tex. 276.

There is no better settled principle, than that the judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, directly upon the point, or necessarily involving the decison of the question, is conclusive between the parties and their privies, upon the same matters coming directly in question in a collateral action, in the same or another court of concurrent jurisdiction. There is nothing in the nature of the right of homestead, to exempt it from the operation of the general principle.

The precise question now before the court was determined by this court in the case of Lee v. Kingsberry, which, if there ever could have been a doubt as to the application of the general principle to such a case, must be held decisive of the question.

But it is insisted that there are other parties, the children of the defendant, who have intervened in this suit, and who are not concluded by the former judgment, because not parties to it. If the wife were here to assert her rights, she would not be concluded, because not a party to the proceeding (of foreclosure of a mortgage on the homestead); but the children cannot control the parents in the disposition of the homestead, or assert a right therein adversely to the act of their parents; whatever will bind the head of the family, will bind them. 13 Tex. 71;23 Tex. 585;24 Tex. 17;27 Tex. 80.

Where the title of an act of the legislature was, “To consolidate the Texas Monumental Committee and the Texas Military Institute, with Rutersville College,” it was held that it embraced but one object within the meaning of the constitution, and that it sufficiently expressed the object of the act, which was to clothe the new corporation with all the rights, privileges and powers, which formerly appertained to the two, now consolidated into one.

The terms employed in the title of the act, are sufficiently significant of the subject of its provisions; and that was what the constitution intended (by the requisition that the object of every act of the legislature, should be expressed in its title).

It could not have been intended that no act of legislation should be constitutional, which had reference to the accomplishment of more than one ultimate end.

The intention doubtless was, to prevent embracing in one act, having one ostensible object, provisions having no relevancy to that object, but really designed to effectuate other and wholly different objects, and thus to conceal and disguise the real object proposed by the provisions of an act, under a false or deceptive title.

Appeal from Fayette. Tried below before the Hon. James H. Bell.

On the 6th of April, 1852, Tadlock executed a mortgage on a tract of land including his homestead, to secure the payment of five notes of $100, each, of which notes and mortgage the Texas Monumental Committee became the owners; and on the 9th of October, 1856, “The Texas Monument and Military Institute, a corporation created and established by an act of the legislature of said state, entitled ‘An act to consolidate The Texas Monumental Committee and The Texas Military Institute, with Rutersville College,’ passed August 6th, 1856,” sued said Tadlock for judgment on said notes, praying for foreclosure of said mortgage, and for an order of sale. To said suit Tadlock pleaded that there was no such body corporate as the Texas Monument and Military Institute; that the act to consolidate the Texas Monumental Committee and the Texas Military Institute with Rutersville College, passed August 6th, 1856, was unconstitutional.

And for further plea, said defendant says that the said plaintiff ought not, etc., because he says that before the institution of said plaintiff's suit, to wit: on or about the 21st of May, 1855, the said defendant filed his application for discharge in bankruptcy before the Hon. Chief Justice of the said county of Fayette, and on the 22d day of the said month of May, in pursuance of the provisions of the act creating a system of bankruptcy in said state, passed 19th January, 1841, he proceeded to execute and tender to said chief justice a deed of conveyance and assignment to ________ as trustees for the use of said creditors in bankruptcy; that his said indebtedness to the Texas Monumental Committee was specified and embraced in his schedule or list, and on the hearing of his said application, the said Texas Monumental Committee appeared in court, interposed their objections and resisted the grant of his said application; that the said chief justice decided that said defendant was only entitled, for his homestead, to a reservation of 50 acres of land; from which decision said defendant took an appeal to the district court of said county, and the same remains still upon the docket undisposed of. Wherefore said defendant says that said plaintiff is precluded from the prosecution of his said action, and prays that the same may be dismissed and that he may have all costs, etc.

Afterwards said Tadlock filed an amendment in said suit, as follows: And now comes the said Tadlock by leave of the court, and for amendment submits a more particular description of his homestead reservation, mentioned in his deed of assignment, which has been surveyed by the county surveyor of said county, and described as follows: (Here followed the field-notes of 200 acres.) And the said Tadlock claims and reserves the above described tract of land, with the mansion house and improvements thereon, as his homestead, being the same tract mentioned in said deed of assignment; and he now prays that said description may be incorporated in said deed of assignment.

Judgment December 4th, 1856, for plaintiff for the amount claimed, and decree as follows: It appearing to the court from the evidence submitted, that said defendant Tadlock executed and delivered to said plaintiff a mortgage to secure said sum of money, upon the following tract of land, to wit: (Here followed a description of the whole tract.) It is thereupon considered, adjudged and decreed by the court, that the said mortgage be foreclosed; that said tract of land be sold by said sheriff in like manner as sales are made under execution, in satisfaction of said judgment; that the proceeds thereof be applied to the same, and if not sufficient to pay the principal, interest and costs, then that execution issue against the defendant for the residue. On the 5th of January, 1857, order of sale issued accordingly, and on the 7th of April, 1857, at a sale regularly held, under said order of sale, James C. Eccles became the purchaser of the whole tract, and received a deed therefor; leaving a balance in the sheriff's hands, after paying the judgment, which defendant refused to receive. On the 4th of May, 1857, Eccles brought this suit to recover the land. Defendant pleaded a general demurrer, general denial; and for further plea says that plaintiff ought not to have or maintain his action against him, because he says that on the 22d May, 1855, the said defendant filed his application for discharge in bankruptcy before the chief justice of the county of Fayette, and on the 22d day of said month, in pursuance of the provisions of an act creating a system of bankruptcy in said state, passed 19th of January, 1841, he proceeded to execute and tender to said chief justice a deed of conveyance and assignment to ________ as trustees for the use of his creditors in bankruptcy, of all his property, embracing the land in controversy, with the reservation of his homestead of 200 acres out of said tract; that said chief justice refused the application of this defendant for discharge in bankruptcy, as aforesaid, from which decision an appeal was taken to the district court of Fayette county, and the judgment of the chief justice aforesaid affirmed by said district court, and the application refused; from which judgment the said defendant sued out a writ of error to the supreme court of the state, which writ of error is still pending in the said supreme court.

Three children of Tadlock, John Sevier, Jr., and Melinda, intervened by next friend, as minors, alleging that they were the children of said Tadlock by a former wife, who had died in 18--; that on the _____ day of _____, 185-, their father married again, but that some five years ago, their said stepmother, Marietta Tadlock, had abandoned their father and gone to parts unknown, and never returned; and they claimed the homestead privilege in 200 acres of said land.

Plaintiff amended by pleading the judgment in the foreclosure suit, and his purchase under said judgment.

At the trial plaintiff proved title to the land, in defendant, acquired in July, 1849, and then gave in evidence the proceedings in the suit of foreclosure, and proved the sale to him under the decree in said suit; and closed. Defendant introduced A. Irwin, who testified that he had known the defendant 8 or 10 years; that he had, during all that time, resided on the land in suit, with his family, and made it his homestead, and had no other home; that he now has two children with him, named Melinda, and Sevier, Junior; that John had left his father, and was not living with him; that he did not know whether Melinda is of age or not, but Sevier, Jr., is only about 12 or 14 years old; that these two children now compose the whole family of defendant, and that the defendant is a very old and infirm man.

S. S. Munger for defendant testified that he was acquainted with the defendant and his children; that Melinda and...