Taffi, In re

• Citation: 68 F.3d 306
• Decision Date: 10 October 1995
• Docket Number: Nos. 94-55011,94-55019,s. 94-55011
• Parties: -7101, 64 USLW 2258, 28 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 19, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7978, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,687 In re Donald TAFFI; Madelaine Taffi, Debtors. Donald TAFFI; Madelaine Taffi, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Page 306

68 F.3d 306

76 A.F.T.R.2d 95-7101, 64 USLW 2258,

28 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 19,

95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7978,

95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,687

In re Donald TAFFI; Madelaine Taffi, Debtors Donald TAFFI; Madelaine Taffi, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 94-55011, 94-55019.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 7, 1995.

Decided Oct. 10, 1995.

A. Lavar Taylor, Santa Ana, California, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Paula K. Speck, United States Department of Justice, Tax Division, Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before: WALLACE, Chief Judge, KOZINSKI and RYMER, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Chief Judge Wallace; Dissent by Circuit Judge KOZINSKI.

WALLACE, Chief Judge:

The Taffis (Debtors) appeal from the district court's judgment in favor of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The district court held that for purposes of valuing a secured tax lien on the residence the Debtors will retain, the residence should be valued at its "fair market" value and that "hypothetical costs of sale" should not be deducted. The district court also refused to eliminate the unsecured portion of the IRS's lien upon confirmation of the Debtors' reorganization plan. We have jurisdiction over this timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Secs. 158(d), 1291. We affirm the district court's valuation of the lien, but reverse and remand for the limited purpose of having the district court reduce the amount of the IRS's tax lien to its allowed secured claim.

I

This case requires us to address two issues of first impression in this circuit. The first is whether the residence of a debtor should be valued, for purposes of determining the amount of a secured claim, at that residence's "fair market" value or "forced sale" value, when the debtor is to keep possession of the residence. The second issue is whether "hypothetical costs of sale" are to be subtracted from the valuation of the residence when determining the amount of the secured claim.

Debtors filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on May 22, 1991. The petition was filed because the IRS and the California Franchise Tax Board (FTB) had assessed the Debtors for taxes due in the amount, respectively, of $490,940.00 and $89,940.00. Both the IRS and the FTB filed tax lien notices for the deficiency. Debtors' personal property was worth about $10,000.00. Debtors did own a residence, but it was encumbered with four deeds of trust totaling $233,942.38, all senior to the IRS and FTB liens.

It was stipulated that the fair market value of the residence was $300,000.00. That value represented what a willing and fully-informed buyer would pay under fair market conditions. It was also stipulated that the hypothetical costs of selling the residence in the marketplace would be nine percent, or $27,000.00. Taking into account the senior liens, the IRS would thus receive $66,057.62, or, if hypothetical costs of sale are deducted, $39,057.62. It was further stipulated that the residence would sell for only $240,000.00 under forced sale conditions. Thus, under the forced sale scenario, the IRS would receive only $6,058.62, after taking into account the senior liens and nothing if hypothetical costs of sale are deducted.

The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan of reorganization on February 27, 1992. The IRS did not object to the plan or the order confirming the plan. Because the IRS's lien was senior to the FTB lien, the entire FTB lien was unsecured and thus, under the plan, void. In a published opinion, the bankruptcy court determined that the value of the IRS's secured claim should be based on the forced sale value of the Debtors' residence. Taffi v. United States, 144 B.R. 105 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1992). Having determined that the proper valuation of the IRS's secured claim was based on the forced sale value, the bankruptcy court did not address whether any hypothetical costs of sale should be subtracted. The bankruptcy court also concluded that the unsecured portion of the IRS tax lien was to be eliminated in accordance with the plan, which provided for a release of "any and all liens" upon payment of the secured claim.

The district court reversed the bankruptcy court, holding that the IRS's secured claim should be valued based on the stipulated fair market value of the Debtors' residence. The district court also denied the Debtors' request for a reduction based on hypothetical costs of sale. The court further concluded that the unsecured portion of the IRS's lien "passed through" bankruptcy unaffected by the reorganization plan. For this conclusion, the district court relied on Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 112 S.Ct. 773, 116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992) (11 U.S.C. Sec. 506(d), which provides that a lien is void "[t]o the extent that [it] secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim," does not allow a Chapter 7 debtor to "strip down" a creditor's undersecured lien to the judicially determined value of the collateral).

II

The first issue we address is whether the fair market or forced sale value of the Debtors' residence should be used to determine the amount of the IRS's secured claim. To value a secured claim, we must look to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 506(a), which provides that "[a]n allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property.... Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property."

Several courts have pointed out a potential source of tension in section 506(a). On the one hand, the court is to obtain the value of the "creditor's interest." On the other hand, the "purpose of the valuation" and the "proposed disposition or use" of the property is also to be taken into account. See In re Trimble, 50 F.3d 530, 531 (8th Cir.1995) (Trimble ) (discussing how courts have "placed varying importance on [section 506(a)'s] two clauses, resulting in disagreement as to the proper valuation method of a creditor's secured claim").

If we focus solely on the "creditor's interest" in the property, it is tempting to say that that interest is always the amount of money that the property would bring based on a forced sale on the date of the approved plan. After all, a creditor, in order to obtain any value from a secured asset that continues to be used by a debtor, ordinarily must sell it.

However, the several circuits which have considered this issue have all concluded that the fair market value is the proper measure of value when a debtor retains possession of a residence. See In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, 50 F.3d 72, 74 (1st Cir.1995) (Winthrop ) (concluding that the fair market value is the proper standard of valuation where a debtor retains property); In re Rash, 31 F.3d 325, 329 (5th Cir.1994) (Rash ) ("If the debtor retains the property as part of a reorganization, the proper measurement of the estate's interest in the property is the 'going-concern' value of the collateral to the debtor's reorganization."); see also Trimble, 50 F.3d at 532 (concluding that the retail value of the collateral is to be used when a debtor retains possession). The reasoning of these cases is persuasive. A debtor who retains possession of a residence might eventually sell it. If so, the secured claims would have to be paid off. But there is no reason to reduce the amount of an already undersecured claim to the forced sale value of the property at the time of the plan's approval, when no forced sale is contemplated. Doing so decreases the creditor's already devalued interest in the property. It is true that the property might have to be sold for the creditor to obtain satisfaction of the secured claim, but where no sale--much less a forced sale--is contemplated, reducing the creditor's lien in the way Debtors suggest would only serve to allow a debtor to capture any future equity in the property at the creditor's expense.

In addition, the legislative history of section 506(a) indicates that: " 'Value' does not necessarily contemplate forced sale or liquidation value of the collateral; nor does it always imply a full going concern value. Courts will have to determine value on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the facts of each case and the competing interests in the case." See H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 356 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6312. Subsection 506(a) "makes it clear that valuation is to be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and the proposed disposition or use of the subject property." See S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 68, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5854.

Furthermore, with all of our sister circuits who have considered the issue arriving at the same conclusion, our going a different direction would only create an unnecessary intercircuit conflict. It is for this reason that we have adopted a cautionary rule, counseling against creating intercircuit conflicts. See United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368, 1374 (9th Cir.1987) (Chavez-Vernaza ), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1324, 127 L.Ed.2d 672 (1994).

Debtors point to In re Mitchell, 954 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 303, 121 L.Ed.2d 226 (1992), for contrary authority in this circuit. In Mitchell, the assignee of an automobile seller who had financed the debtor's automobile purchase filed a claim as a secured creditor in the debtor's Chapter 13 case. The bankruptcy court valued the secured claim based on the retail value of the automobile. We reversed, holding that the wholesale value, rather than the retail value, generally should apply. This was so even though the debtor was keeping the car. Id. at 560. Mitchell reasoned that "what...