Taft v. Washington Mut. Sav. Bank

• Decision Date: 15 December 1923
• Docket Number: 18027.
• Citation: 127 Wash. 503,221 P. 604
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: TAFT et al. v. WASHINGTON MUT. SAV. BANK et al.

221 P. 604

127 Wash. 503

TAFT et al. v. WASHINGTON MUT. SAV. BANK et al.

No. 18027.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

December 15, 1923

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Brinker, Judge.

Suit by William G. Taft and others against the Washington Mutual Savings Bank and another to enjoin from enforcement of an ordinance of defendant City of Seattle. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal. Reversed and remanded, with instructions to dismiss.

Tolman Parker, Fullerton, and Mitchell, JJ., dissenting.

Peters & Powell, of Seattle, for appellants.

Kerr McCord & Ivey and Beebe & Whitcomb, all of Seattle, amici curiae.

Byers &amp Byers, of Seattle, for respondents.

HOLCOMB J.

Appellant Washington Mutual Savings Bank, a corporation, is the owner in fee of lot 7, block 13, C. D. Boren's addition to Seattle, upon which is located its bank building, and is also the holder of a contract to purchase lot 8 in the same block. These two lots abut on Spring street, and extend from Second avenue on the east to First avenue on the west, being separated at the rear of each by an alley extending through the block from Spring street to Seneca street. The remaining lots in the block, 1 to 6 inclusive, lie northerly of these two, and the rear of each lot in the block abuts upon the same alley. Respondents are the owners of lot 6, which adjoins lot 7 on its northerly side.

The owners of lots 7 and 8, in January last, petitioned the City Council of the city of Seattle to vacate 'that portion of said alley lying immediately between lots 7 and 8, in block 13, extending indefinitely upward from an imaginary horizontal plane the full width of said alley, and 16 feet perpendicularly above the center line of said alley as now graded,' the purpose being to erect a building on lot 8 similar to the one now on lot 7 extending over and across, and connecting the two buildings above the 16-foot alley space, which would remain as an alley, if the prayer of the petition should be granted.

Such proceedings were had, the regularity of which is not questioned, as resulted in the passage of an ordinance by the city council, which reads:

'An ordinance vacating a portion of the alley in block 13 of C. D. Boren's addition on petition of the Washington Mutual Savings Bank and the People's Savings Bank--where-as there has been filed with the city council of the city of Seattle a petition of the Washington Mutual Savings Bank and of the People's Savings Bank (file No. 87874) asking for the vacation of a portion of the alley in block 13, C. D. Boren's addition to the city of Seattle, and whereas, at the time and place of hearing on said petition, the city council granted said petition in part, now therefore, be it ordained by the city of Seattle as follows:

'Section 1. That that portion of the alley in block 13 of an addition to the town, now city of Seattle, laid out on the claims of C. D. Boren and A. A. Denny and H. L. Yesler, immediately adjoining and between lots 7 and 8 of said block 13, except the northerly 10 feet thereof, and except the southerly 10 feet thereof, and extending indefinitely upward from an imaginary horizontal plane 16 feet above the elevation of the center line of said alley as now graded, be and the same is hereby vacated.'

After the passage of the ordinance, and before it took effect, respondents, as plaintiffs, brought this action to enjoin the appellant Washington Mutual Savings Bank from asserting title under the ordinance, or otherwise, to any part of the alley described in the ordinance, and to enjoin the city from enforcing the ordinance, or permitting any action thereunder by its codefendant, and alleging, among other things:

'Plaintiffs are informed and believe that defendant Washington Mutual Savings Bank has a binding contract to purchase said lot 8 from the People's Savings Bank, and will acquire the same and thereby become the owner of all of the vacated part of said alley, and that it will thereupon remove the building now standing on said lot 8, and will erect thereon a substantial concrete or brick building, six stories or more in height, covering all of lot 7, and extending over and across said alley, and connecting with the building on lot 7 so as to occupy the vacated portion of said alley from a horizontal plane 16 feet above the center line of the alley upwards to a height of three stories or more, thus forming a bridge or viaduct over said alley, which will materially shut off the light and air from the westerly part of the building on plaintiffs' property, to their great and irreparable damage. * * *'

'The purpose of said People's Savings Bank and defendant Washington Mutual Savings Bank, in obtaining the vacation of a part of said alley, was to acquire title to the part so vacated or to an easement for the purpose of constructing and maintaining over the alley, the bridge, or structure above referred to, and such will be the effect of said ordinance No. 44833, if allowed to become effective; and defendant city will permit said ordinance to become effective, and will permit defendant Washington Mutual Savings Bank to so acquire the vacated portion of said alley, and to construct and maintain its proposed building thereon, unless the operation of said ordinance and the proposed acts of defendants thereunder be enjoined by this court.'

To this complaint defendants demurred. Their demurrers were overruled, and they electing to stand thereon, judgment was rendered against them perpetually enjoining them according to the prayer of the complaint, from which judgment both defendants have appealed.

Two questions are herein presented, and by stipulation of the parties we are asked to decide both. These questions are thus stated:

'(1) The right of a municipality of the first class to vacate a portion of an alley measured from a horizontal plane, 16 feet above the surface of the alley, indefinitely upwards without vacating the surface of the alley.

'(2) The right of the owner of a neighboring lot, not immediately abutting or touching the space vacated, to enjoin the city from putting the vacating ordinance into operation, or the abutting owner from building across the vacated portion, as affecting the right to light and air.'

1. The power of a city to vacate streets and alleys is conferred by statute. Section 9297, Remington's Compiled Statutes, specifies the procedure. Section 9298 empowers the city to entertain and hear petitions therefor, and 'such city or town shall be authorized and have authority by ordinance to vacate such street or alley or any part thereof.' Section 9299 provides that the property within the affected limits shall belong to the abutting property owners, one-half to each, unless other proceedings are had to determine the title; and section 9300 reads: 'No vested rights shall be affected by the provisions of this act.'

In Ponischil v. Hoquiam Sash & Door Co., 41 Wash. 303, 83 P. 316, it was held that the Legislature has power to vacate streets and may, and has, by the statute referred to, delegated such power to the municipalities of the state; that the exercise of that power rests within the discretion of the municipal authorities, and, being a political function, will be reviewed by the courts only upon a clear showing of collusion or fraud; and that one who has suffered only damages similar to those sustaind by the general public may not be heard to complain. See, also, Freeman v. Centralia, 67 Wash. 142, 120 P. 886, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 786, in which case several of these principles are reaffirmed. These decisions clear the ground somewhat, and indicate why our present inquiry is limited to the exact points stated.

The statute, as we have seen, authorizes the vacation of a street or alley or any part thereof without any limitation or specification as to the particular part, longitudinally laterally, or in altitude or celsitude. The vacation of a half of a street in width was held unwarranted in Brazell v. Seattle, 55 Wash. 180, 104 P. 155, only because the petition did not ask for that result, and the power of the city council to so vacate in a proper proceeding was not there questioned. To the same effect is Smith v. Centralia, 55 Wash. 573, 104 P. 797. The right to vacate longitudinally is so obvious and is so commonly exercised without question that no discussion or citation of authority is necessary. If the municipal authorities, under the statute cited, may vacate a part in width, or a part in length, why may they not also vacate a part in altitude? According to the theory of the common law, the ownership of the surface of land embraces at least the control of and the right to use and enjoy the space above it to an indefinite distance. Pearson v. Matheson, 102 S.C. 377, 86 S.E. 1063. In the case just cited the right of the grantor to reserve the use of all space above a 14-foot line parallel to and above the soil, notwithstanding his...