Taggard v. State, 1446
| Decision Date | 11 August 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 1446,1446 |
| Citation | 500 P.2d 238 |
| Parties | Andrew Payne TAGGARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee. |
| Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
Lloyd I. Hoppner, of Rice, Hoppner, Blair & Associates, Fairbanks, for appellant.
Monroe N. Clayton, Dist. Atty., Fairbanks, John E. Havelock, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellee.
Before BONEY, C. J., and RABINOWITZ, CONNOR, ERWIN and BOOCHEVER, JJ.
On January 29, 1970, appellant was indicted on five felony counts. Counts I and II charged sale of tuinal capsules, amphetamine capsules, and amphetamine tablets in violation of AS 17.12.010. Counts III and IV charged sale of phenophen and morphine in violation of AS 17.10.010. Count V of the indictment was dismissed and is not subject to this appeal.
On this appeal three specifications of error are stated: first, that the appellant was denied his right to speedy trial; second, that the indictment was based solely on the hearsay statement of an anonymous informer, the statement being related to the grand jury by a police officer; third, that his sentence was excessive. We will consider these points in the order presented above.
Appellant was indicted on January 29, 1970, he was arraigned on February 2, 1970, and a trial date was set for June 158 1970. On May 27, 1970, appellant filed a motion to dismiss his attorney; this unopposed motion was granted on June 4, 1970. On June 11, 1970, four days before trial was to begin, defendnat requested a continuance in order to enable him to secure counsel. The continuance was granted and on July 31, 1971, appellant's case was reset for trial on November 2, 1970. On October 30, 1970, three days before his new trial date, appellant was again before the court and had not, by that date, secured counsel. The court then appointed the public defender to provide counsel for the appellant and the trial was continued to December 14, 1970, the date on which it commenced.
In Glasgow v. State, 1 we indicated that, in determining speedy trial claims, we would exclude those periods of time that were attributable to the defendant in our calculation for pre-trial delay. The initial delay of four and one-half months between arrest and the first trial date was not chargeable to appellant. Subsequent delays after appellant dismissed his attorney and continued the case in order to secure other counsel are attributable to the appellant.
The appellant contends that the latter delay is also chargeable to the court because the trial judge obligated himself to remain in contact with the appellant to assure that he obtained replacement counsel. However, the record shows that the appellant was not relying on any representation made by the judge in connection with securing counsel. 2 Thus, the delay not attributable to the appellant only includes the initial four and one-half months between his arrest on January 29, 1970, and the first trial date of June 15, 1970.
When presented with a case alleging unconstitutional deprivation of speedy trial, we must consider it in terms of its own particular facts and circumstances. Tarnef v. State, 492 P.2d 109 (Alaska 1971). As in other speedy trial cases we must balance the needs of the accused and the requirements of the judicial process with the purposes served by the speed trial guarantee. 3
As we have indicated in Tarnef v. State 4 and in Nickerson v. State, 5 a delay for a period substantially less than 14 months will not give rise to a presumption of prejudice. Under the circumstances of the instant case we will not presume prejudice from the length of the delay. We must require that the defendant in this case demonstrate prejudice in order to prevail.
Appellant asserts that he was hindered in the preparation of his defense by the length of time between arrest on the indictment and trial. However, there is no indication that witnesses necessary for appellant's defense were unavilable at trial or that the passage of time dimmed their memories. We find that the appellant has failed to substantiate this assertion of prejudice.
Appellant also claims prejudice due to anxiety over his pending criminal charge. We do not view the delay as such that fundamental unfairness resulted from the subjection of the accused to the prosecutorial power of the state.
'It would be an exceptional case where such anxiety, standing alone, would constitutionally necessitate dismissal of a criminal prosecution.' 6
It is clear from the record that the defendant was aware of the availability of the services of appointed counsel and of the public defender. He twice chose to have his trial continued in order to learn whether his mother would provide him with counsel from New York. We must conclude that reversal is not mandated by constitutional speedy trial considerations.
We now must turn to the assertion that the indictment resting solely on hearsay evidence of an anonymous informer must be dismissed.
Appellee urges that this court is without jurisdiction to consider this issue because appellant presented this claim in an application for a writ of habeas corpus, the denial of which was appealed to this court. 7 We dismissed the appeal by appellant because of failure of appellant to file a brief.
At common law the doctrine of res judicata was not applicable to hebeas corpus. 8 Although the question of whether the legislature intended to change the common law by enacting AS 12.75.230 9 might raise serious constitutional questions, 10 we need not reach that issue in this case.
The dismissal of a criminal appeal does not necessarily preclude a second appeal. 11 We conclude that the appeal should be allowed in the instant case, as we have never had the opportunity to consider the merits of appellant's assertion.
We said in State v. Parks 12 and Burkholder v. State 13 that an indictment is not per se invalid because it is based on hearsay testimony alone. We approve, however, of the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice which limit the use of hearsay testimony before the grand jury as follows:
14
When secondary evidence is utilized before the grand jury, therefore, it should be scrutinized with special care to ensure that it can "rationally establish facts' sufficient to support an indictment.' 15
Our examination of the record of a grand jury proceeding, in which hearsay evidence played a significant part, involves a two-step analysis. The threhold question, which must be determined in all cases involving a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a grand jury indictment, is whether the evidence presented a sufficiently detailed account of criminal activity and the defendant's participation in this activity so that 'if unexplained or uncontradicted it would warrant a conviction of the person charged with an offense by the judge or jury trying the offense.' 16 Where hearsay evidence has been introduced, we must also determine whether the credibility of the informant has been sufficiently established so that the grand jury may know how much weight to give to the hearsay testimony.
In this case we feel that the criminal activity of the defendant was described in sufficient detail. The police officer told the grand jury where each of the sales occurred, the time of the sales, the amount of money that changed hands, and the quantity and type of drug involved in each transaction. The officer also described the relationship between Taggard and the informant and related details of conversations between the defendant and the informant.
The problem in this case, however, is the complete lack of evidence by which the grand jury could evaluate the trustworthiness of the hearsay informant's testimony. The grand jury was not presented with any evidence which would demonstrate the reliability of the particular informant or independently corroborate his story. The prosecutor's unsupported assertion before the grand jury that the informant was reliable hardly qualifies as 'independent evidence' of trustworthiness. In addition, the statement, by the police officer that the informant's hearsay testimony had been used in a series of narcotics cases before this same grand jury is also inadequate to establish the informant's trustworthiness. The fact that the same informant's uncorroborated hearsay testimony has been repeated to the grand jury in a series of earlier cases does not lend credence to his testimony in a particular case. 17
We find, therefore, that the hearsay evidence presented to the grand jury in this case lacks sufficient reliability to support the indictment. The indictment is the foundation underlying a criminal prosecution. If the indictment is seriously flawed, the conviction cannot stand.
A mere formal defect does not require dismissal of an indictment after the guilt of the defendant has been established at a fair trial. 18 But courts do not hesitate to dismiss an indictment, even after a conviction. when the defect in the indictment is substantial. 19 The conviction must be overturned when an indictment is invalid and the error was properly preserved by a timely objection prior to trial. 20
In People v. Jackson, 18 N.Y.2d 516, 277 N.Y.S.2d 263, 223 N.E.2d 790 (1966), the New York court was faced with a situation similar to that in the instant case. In its reversal of the conviction, the court observed:
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