Taggart v. Mills
| Decision Date | 21 January 1942 |
| Docket Number | 14. |
| Citation | 23 A.2d 832,180 Md. 302 |
| Parties | TAGGART, Insurance Commissioner of Pennsylvania, v. MILLS. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore City; George A. Solter Judge.
Action on assessment on an automobile insurance policy issued by reciprocal or inter-insurance exchange, by Matthew H Taggart, Insurance Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, against Silas B. Mills. From a judgment for the defendant, the plaintiff appeals.
Reversed and new trial awarded.
John A. Cochran, of Baltimore, and Ralph P. Dunn, of Washington, D. C. (Allers & Cochran, of Baltimore, on the briefs), for appellant.
Alfred J. O'Ferrall, Jr., of Baltimore, for appellee Silas B. Mills.
Eldridge Hood Young, of Baltimore (Niles, Barton, Morrow & Yost, William A. Graham, Victor I. Cook, and C. Morris Harrison, all of Baltimore, on the brief), amicus curiae for Keystone Policyholders' Protective Committee.
Palmer R. Nickerson, Gordon G. Power, and Due, Nickerson & Whiteford, all of Baltimore, amici curiae.
Before BOND, C.J., and SLOAN, DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, FORSYTHE, and MARBURY, JJ.
After the decision of the case of Taggart v. Wachter, Hoskins & Russell, Inc., Md., 21 A.2d 141,
settling several questions of law arising out of the assessment of the policyholders in the Keystone Indemnity Exchange, the liquidator of that Exchange filed within three years subsequent to the assessment a large number of suits against other policyholders, and this second case is brought up on appeal to settle for all of these the additional question of the application to the causes of action, previously existing as they were, of the limitation enacted by the Act of 1941, chapter 640, § 2, Code, Art. 48A, sec. 171A. To a declaration in a suit against a subscriber and policyholder the defendant pleaded the statute, the plaintiff demurred to the plea, the demurrer was overruled, judgment for the defendant was entered, and the plaintiff appeals.
The period of limitations applicable except for the new statute would be three years from the date of the assessment, September 12, 1938, a period expiring after the suits were brought. Taggart v. Wachter, Hoskins & Russell, supra. But the statute, section 171A, approved on May 2, 1941, provides that no action shall be brought against a subscriber or policyholder in a reciprocal or interinsurer on an assessment later than one year after the termination of his policy or contract, unless he shall have been notified of the assessment within one year after the termination of his policy or contract. This present suit is against a holder of an automobile insurance policy in the Exchange, which was effective one year from February 8, 1930, and the statute, though finally enacted on May 2, 1941, became by its terms and by force of the constitutional provision, effective June 1, 1941, Constitution of Maryland, Art. XVI, sec. 2. Policies of other holders or subscribers were in full force as late as March of 1933, when the Exchange became insolvent and was placed in the hands of the liquidator. A notification of the assessment, as required by the new statute, was never given, and, of course, could not be given now before a past time. The new statute, if effective against the suit, would impose by its terms an impossible condition, and bar the suit altogether.
The hardship of recovery now, after such a long lapse of time, from a policyholder or subscriber who had forgotten his contingent liability for assessments, if he had ever regarded it as having any substance, is obvious, and has been referred to in argument. It is agreed, however, that it can have no influence on the decision, that there can be no departure from the established rules of law. The subscribers entered into an undertaking to maintain a fund to insure each other and to add to that fund if necessary, upon proper assessment; it became necessary; and by reason of the slow progress of liquidation of the Exchange up of that point their contract became a hard one. The period of limitation, if unaffected by the recent statute, dated from the time of the assessment. Glenn v. Williams, 60 Md. 93, 123; Mister v. Thomas, 122 Md. 445, 459, 89 A. 844; Taggart v. Wachter et al., supra.
The objections now made to application of the new statute are that it has no retrospective effect to bar causes of action accrued before its passage, and that if it could be given that effect it would be to that extent an unconstitutional enactment because of its barring the pre-existing causes without allowing a reasonable further time for their enforcement. The two objections are to be considered as quite distinct.
Williams v Johnson, 30 Md. 500, 508, 96 Am.Dec. 613; Diamond Match Co. v. State Tax Commission, 175 Md. 234, 239, 200 A. 365. And this is a rule which, in Maryland, applies to statutes of limitation as well. 'But while statutes of limitation are incidental to procedure, unless a contrary intent is clearly manifested, the general rule is that such statutes will not be construed as operating retroactively so as to bar the enforcement of rights existing at the time they were passed, but prospectively so that the period prescribed will as to such rights begin to run at the time when the statute takes effect.' Ireland v. Shipley, 165 Md. 90, 99, 166 A. 593, 596. The decision in Ireland v. Shipley is shown to have been possible on another ground, but the ground actually adopted was that the statute of limitation was to be construed to apply to existing rights only after the lapse of time stated, unless an intention to make it apply retroactively appeared in the act, or by clear implication; that the question of its application was one of intention. This is in accord with the Maryland decisions cited. Manning v. Carruthers, 83 Md. 1, 8, 34 A. 254; Garrison v. Hill, 81 Md. 551, 557, 32 A. 191; Baumeister v. Silver, 98 Md. 418, 427, 56 A. 825; Frey v. Kirk, 4 Gill & J. 509, 23 Am.Dec. 581. And it is in accord with many, but not all, decisions in other jurisdictions. 1 Wood, Limitations, 4th Ed. sec. 12b; United States v. St. L., S. F. & T. Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 1, 3, 46 S.Ct. 182, 70 L.Ed. 435. 'While the rule is abundantly settled that statutes will not be construed as operating retrospectively unless the legislative intent is unmistakable * * * it is after all a question of legislative intent'. Silurian...
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...123; Mister v. Thomas, 122 Md. 445, 459, 89 A. 844; Taggart v. Wachter, Hoskins & Russell, 179 Md. 608, 21 A.2d 141, 141 A.L.R. 751; Taggart v. Mills, supra. It been frequently held by this court that, in the absence of a clear manifestation of a contrary intent or unless such construction ......
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