Taidoc Technology Corp. v. OK Biotech Co., Ltd.
| Decision Date | 09 October 2014 |
| Docket Number | 12 CVS 20909 |
| Citation | 2014 NCBC 48 |
| Court | Superior Court of North Carolina |
| Parties | TAIDOC TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. OK BIOTECH CO., LTD., Defendant. |
2014 NCBC 48
TAIDOC TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, Plaintiff,
v.
OK BIOTECH CO., LTD., Defendant.
No. 12 CVS 20909
Superior Court of North Carolina, Mecklenburg
October 9, 2014
{1} THIS MATTER is before the Court on the following motions: (i) Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Rehearing of Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Deposition Subpoena and Compel Appearance at Deposition; (ii) Plaintiff's Rule 52 Motion for Amended Findings of Fact and Amendment of June 10 Order on Discovery Motions; (iii) Defendant's Motion to Extend Deadline for Responses to Taidoc's RFAs or to Withdraw Default Admissions; (iv) Defendant's Motion to Unseal and Remove Confidentiality Designation From Deposition Transcripts and Exhibits; (v) Defendant's Rule 15 Motion to Amend its Twelfth Affirmative Defense; and (vi) Plaintiff's Motion to Modify CMO (collectively, "the Motions"). Each of the Motions has been fully briefed, and the Court has considered the Motions, briefs and arguments of counsel at the October 7, 2014 hearing in this matter.
I.
BACKGROUND
{2} Plaintiff Taidoc Technology Corporation and Defendant OK Biotech Co., Ltd. are competitors in the business of researching, developing and manufacturing blood glucose meters and test strips. Diagnostic Devices, Inc. ("DDI") and its affiliate, Prodigy Diabetes Care, LLC ("Prodigy"), are distributors of diabetic products, including blood glucose meters and test strips. DDI initially served as distributor for certain of Plaintiff's products and subsequently served as distributor for certain of Defendant's products. During the relevant period, DDI's principals were Ramzi Abulhaj ("Abulhaj") and Richard Admani ("Admani").
{3} In December 2008, DDI sued Plaintiff in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina (Case No. 3:08-cv-00559-RJC-DCK; later consolidated with Case No. 3:08-cv-00149-MOC) (the "Federal Action"), claiming Plaintiff had breached its distributorship agreement with DDI and asserting claims against Plaintiff for alleged breach of contract, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, unfair competition under both state law and the federal Lanham Act, and libel. In September 2011, Plaintiff asserted counterclaims in the Federal Action against DDI, Abulhaj and Admani, alleging operative facts similar to those advanced in the current action and advancing claims for breach of contract, non-infringement, unfair competition, libel, fraud, misappropriation of trade secrets under N.C. G.S. § 66-152 et seq., unfair trade practices under N.C. G.S. § 75-1.1, unjust enrichment, fraudulent conveyance and false advertising under the federal Lanham Act. The Federal Action was settled in March 2012 after a jury verdict had been returned but prior to the entry of judgment. Prodigy, Abdulhaj and Admani each testified at deposition, and Abdulhaj and Admani testified again at trial, in the Federal Action.
{4} Plaintiff filed the instant action on December 6, 2012, alleging that Defendant conspired with DDI, Prodigy, Abulhaj and Admani to misappropriate Plaintiff's trade secrets and asserting claims against Defendant for fraud (as a co-conspirator), facilitating fraud, aiding and abetting fraud, misappropriation of trade secrets under N.C. G.S. § 66-152 et seq., unfair trade practices under N.C. G.S. § 75-1.1, tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage and unjust enrichment. The designated deadline for the completion of fact discovery in this case was September 10, 2014.
II.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Rehearing of Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Deposition Subpoena and Compel Appearance at Deposition ("Motion I")
{5} Plaintiff moves this Court pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court's inherent authority to amend its own orders to reconsider and rehear Plaintiff's May 8, 2014 Motion to Enforce Deposition Subpoena and Compel Attendance at Deposition ("Motion to Compel Depositions").
{6} Plaintiff filed the Motion to Compel Depositions seeking to compel the depositions of non-parties Prodigy, Admani and Abulhaj (collectively, the "Non-Parties"). The Non-Parties objected to Plaintiff's Motion on the grounds that because the Non-Parties had testified at deposition and at trial in the earlier Federal Action regarding many of the same facts and circumstances alleged in this action, further depositions of the Non-Parties would be unduly burdensome, cumulative and unnecessary.
{7} This Court (Murphy, J.) granted Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Depositions on June 10, 2014 (the "June 10 Order"), ordering that the Non-Parties could be deposed "but only as to matters not addressed by prior depositions of [the Non-Parties]" and that should Plaintiff choose to take depositions of any of the Non-Parties, Plaintiff would be required to "bear the fees and costs associated with any deposition, including attorney's fees of the deposed [Non-Parties]." (June 10 Order, ¶¶ 2, 3.)
{8} A dispute has arisen between Plaintiff and the Non-Parties concerning the scope of the examination permitted under the Court's June 10 Order and the timing and circumstances concerning the payment of the Non-Parties' fees and costs.
{9} Plaintiff contends that the restrictions and conditions imposed on the depositions of the Non-Parties in the June 10 Order are contrary to law and should be stricken. Plaintiff further contends that the June 10 Order is ambiguous and should be broadly construed and that the Court should clarify the June 10 Order for the mutual benefit of the parties and the Non-Parties.
{10} The Non-Parties and Defendant contend that the Plaintiff has not shown the requisite circumstances permitting this Court to reconsider the June 10 Order under applicable law and that, in any event, the June 10 Order is clear and unambiguous and should be narrowly construed without further clarification.
{11} As an initial matter, our appellate courts have held that "[o]ne superior court judge may only modify, overrule, or change the order of another superior court judge where the original order was (1) interlocutory, (2) discretionary, and (3) there has been a substantial change of circumstances since the entry of the prior order." Crook v. KRC Mgmt. Corp., 206 N.C.App. 179, 189, 697 S.E.2d 449, 456 (2010). "A substantial change in circumstances exists if since the entry of the prior order, there has been an intervention of new facts which bear upon the propriety of the previous order. The burden of showing the change in circumstances is on the party seeking a modification or reversal of an order previously entered by another judge." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, "where the trial court fails to find that there has been a material change in circumstances, it has no authority to modify the order of another judge." Id., 206 N.C.App. at 190, 697 S.E.2d at 457; see generally Calloway v. Ford Motor Co., 281 N.C. 496, 501, 189 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1972); First Fin. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Coverage, Inc., 154 N.C.App. 504, 507, 572 S.E.2d 259, 262 (2002).
{12} The June 10 Order was a discretionary, interlocutory order by Judge Murphy; thus, this Court may modify, overrule or change the June 10 Order only if there has been a substantial change of circumstances since its entry. Based on the facts and circumstances presented, however, the Court concludes that nothing in this litigation has occurred since June 10 to permit the Court to find that there has been a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to permit the Court to modify, overrule or change Judge Murphy's June 10 Order.
{13} Although not permitted to modify, overrule or change the June 10 Order, the Court nonetheless concludes that it does have the authority to interpret, construe and enforce the June 10 Order according to its terms. See, e.g., Morley v. Morley, 102 N.C.App. 713, 716, 403 S.E.2d 574, 575 (1991) (concluding that one Superior Court Judge may construe an order entered by another Superior Court Judge).
{14} The Court finds that the June 10 Order is potentially capable of differing interpretations in certain respects and that it will assist the fair and efficient administration of justice in this matter for the Court to construe the June 10 Order to resolve the dispute reflected in Motion I.
{15} In construing the June 10 Order, the Court will, where appropriate, use normal rules of contract construction. Thus, unambiguous terms will be given their plain and ordinary meaning, see, e.g., Johnston County v. R.N. Rouse & Co., Inc., 331 N.C. 88, 95, 414 S.E.2d 30, 34 (1992) (noting that "the most fundamental principle of contract construction is that the courts must give effect to the plain and...
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