Talbot v. Chamberlain

Decision Date11 March 1889
Citation149 Mass. 57,20 N.E. 305
PartiesTALBOT v. CHAMBERLAIN.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
COUNSEL

John Hopkins, for petitioner.

F.P Goulding and J.E. Beemen, for defendant.

OPINION

W ALLEN, J.

This is an appeal from a decree of the probate court of the county of Worcester, ordering to be filed a copy of an instrument proved and allowed in the state of Iowa as the will of Gardner W Stone. Several reasons of appeal are filed, but the only question open upon them is whether the Iowa court had jurisdiction. If it had jurisdiction of the original probate of the will, questions of the capacity of the testator and of the execution of the will are concluded by its decree; if it did not have jurisdiction, the petition must be dismissed. Crippen v. Dexter, 13 Gray, 330; Shannon v Shannon, 111 Mass. 331; Loring v. Oakey, 98 Mass. 267.

Mr. Stone's domicile, at the time of his decease, was either in Massachusetts or in Iowa. Unless it was in Iowa, the courts of that state did not have, and the courts of Massachusetts did have, jurisdiction of the original probate of his will. In January, 1886, his domicile was in Massachusetts, and the question is whether the facts offered to be proved by the petitioner are sufficient to show that it was changed to Iowa. The facts, in brief, are that Mr. Stone, while residing in the family of his daughter, the respondent, in Southborough, in this state, decided to remove his domicile to Atlantic, in the state of Iowa, where his only other daughter, the petitioner, lived, and with that intention left Massachusetts and established his home in Atlantic. He twice visited Massachusetts for temporary purposes after he took up his residence at Atlantic. He died at Chicago, while on his way back to Atlantic, after his second visit to this state. The only ground upon which it can be claimed that he did not acquire a domicile in Iowa is that he was under guardianship in this commonwealth as an insane person. In December, 1885, Mr. Stone formed and expressed to the respondent the intention to change his domicile to Atlantic. On the 5th day of January, 1886, in pursuance of that intention, he left his home in Southborough and attempted to take the cars there to go to Atlantic, but was forcibly prevented by a servant of the respondent and held in duress until a complaint was made against him, on which he was committed to the lunatic hospital as an insane person. On the 20th day of January, while he was detained at the hospital, a petition was presented to the probate court for the appointment of a guardian over him as an insane person. He was held in custody at the hospital until after the hearing on the petition, which was on the 19th day of February, 1886. The case was continued, and on the 6th day of April, 1886, the decision was rendered, and a decree entered appointing a guardian. On the 20th day of February, Mr. Stone was discharged from the hospital, and from all restraint, and on the 24th day of the same month he went to the house of the respondent, and took therefrom his goods and effects and shipped them to Atlantic, and himself started for Atlantic. He reached that place on the 27th of February, and selected his home there, which he retained as his home until his death. He had in fact at that time sufficient mental capacity to change his domicile. His guardian did not assume any custody or control of the person of Mr. Stone, and did not object to his living in Iowa, and, on the occasion of one of Mr. Stone's visits to Massachusetts, his guardian, knowing that he claimed that his domicile was in Atlantic, and that he intended to return there, gave a portion of his property to him, and furnished him money for his return.

Assuming as contended by the counsel for the respondent, that Mr. Stone could not, by changing his domicile, oust the court of this state of its jurisdiction to appoint a guardian over him, that the court had acquired jurisdiction and authority to make the decree, and that the decree related back to the commencement of the proceedings, and that Mr. Stone was affected by it, as if he had continued to reside in this state, the question is whether the decree prevented him from changing his domicile to Atlantic. Perhaps another statement of the question is whether it is possible that the national domicile of a person domiciled in this state, and under guardianship here as an insane person, can be changed. There is no pretense that in this case the domicile of the ward was changed by his guardian, and we have no occasion to consider whether the probate guardian of a lunatic can, in any case, establish a domicile for his ward outside of the state to which his authority is limited. It is to be observed that a change of national domicile by a ward can be only a change sub modo. It cannot affect his status as a person under guardianship in this commonwealth. It cannot affect the legal authority of the guardian, or the disability of the ward. The decree of the court is conclusive as to everything within the scope of the guardianship. It is only as to matters outside of that that the courts will recognize the new foreign domicile, unless by comity. The only effect sought to be given to the change of residence in this case is upon the disposition of property after the death of the ward, and after the termination of the guardianship. So far as it affects the succession to property, the act of the ward, in changing his domicile, is no more inconsistent with, or prohibited by, the...

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