Talbot v. Taylor
| Citation | 201 S.W.2d 1,184 Tenn. 428 |
| Parties | TALBOT v. TAYLOR et al. [*] |
| Decision Date | 19 March 1935 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Tennessee |
Rehearing Denied April 6, 1935.
Error to Circuit Court, Madison County; R. B. Baptist, Judge.
Action by James L. Talbot, Jr., against Andrew Taylor, Jr., and others, for personal injuries sustained while riding as a guest in named defendant's automobile. A judgment of dismissal was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial by the Court of Appeals, and defendants bring error.
Judgment of Court of Appeals reversed and that of circuit court affirmed.
One voluntarily continuing his journey as guest in another's automobile at night after discovering that one headlight had burned out, with knowledge that it was dangerous and unlawful to drive on much-traveled highway with only one light burning, was guilty of contributory negligence, as matter of law, barring his recovery of damages from automobile owner for injuries suffered in head-on collision with another automobile. Pub.Acts 1931, c. 82.
One bringing himself within operation of maxim 'volenti non fit injuria', meaning 'that to which a person assents is not esteemed in law an injury', cannot recover damages for injuries sustained by him, though assumed risk doctrine is inapplicable.
Spragins & Spragins and Pearson & Hewgley, all of Jackson, for plaintiffs in error.
Hu C Anderson and Murray & Murray, all of Jackson, for defendant in error.
Talbot was injured while a guest in Taylor's car and sued him herein for the damages which he suffered. The trial court sustained a motion for a directed verdict and dismissed the suit. The Court of Appeals reversed the case and remanded it for a new trial.
About 7 P. M. one night in December, 1931, these two young men left Jackson for Brownsville, a distance of twenty-six miles, to call on some young ladies. When three miles out of Jackson it was discovered that the bulb in the left head-light had burned out. Neither party had thirty-five cents with which to buy a new one, so they decided to make the trip with only one light burning. Near midnight on the return trip, eleven miles from Jackson, and on a curve, the Taylor car collided with one traveling in the opposite direction, resulting in serious injuries to Talbot. There is conflict in the testimony as to whether either light was burning when the accident occurred. Talbot testified that one light was burning, and that Taylor was driving carefully at about twenty miles per hour. After the impact it was observed that both cars were over the middle line of the highway. Talbot admits that he knew that it was dangerous to drive with only one light, and says he was uneasy. The night was unusually dark, foggy and misty. Chrisman and Rush, who were in the westbound car, testified that a car with both lights burning could be seen for only about thirty feet. Rush further testified that with his windows down he could see better without lights; that the conditions were so peculiar that the light reflected against the fog and made it appear as if his headlights were rebounding in his own eyes.
Chapter 82, Acts of 1931, provides that every automobile shall be equipped with two headlights, which shall be burning when operated at night.
Under the facts stated we conclude that Talbot was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, which bars a recovery. Such was the effect of the decision of this Court in Dedman v. Dedman, 155 Tenn. 241, 291 S.W. 449. In that case the plaintiff was a guest and suffered injuries when a collision occurred as a result of the car in which she was riding being operated at an unlawful rate of speed. There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether the plaintiff was conscious that the car was being so operated. The Court said that reasonable men might differ as to whether plaintiff acted with ordinary care under the circumstances disclosed hence that was a proper issue to be submitted to the jury. In that case if the plaintiff had admitted knowing that the car was being operated at an unlawful rate of speed, without any protest on her part, then she would have been guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and barred from any recovery.
The rule is further illustrated in Schwartz v. Johnson, 152 Tenn. 586, 280 S.W. 32, 47 A.L.R. 323, in which the court said that one who rides in an automobile with an intoxicated driver takes his life into his own hands. He incurs the risk which may result from a hazard of that character; he is not exercising due care for his own safety. So that, in the case under consideration where the plaintiff, with knowledge that it was dangerous to drive on this much traveled highway with only one light burning, and charged with knowledge that it was unlawful to do so, voluntarily continued the journey and was injured, he cannot escape the consequences of his failure to exercise due care for his own safety.
The rule, in a somewhat different form, is thus stated in 45 C.J 1043, 1044:
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Walters v. Kee
...41 Tenn.App. 65, 292 S.W.2d 521; Chattanooga Gas Co. v. Underwood, (1954), 38 Tenn.App. 142, 270 S.W.2d 652. In Talbot v. Taylor, 1935, reported in 184 Tenn. 428, 201 S.W.2d 1, our Tennessee Supreme Court held that the plaintiff, Talbot, was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of ......